

UA: UKRAINE ANALYTICA

Issue 3 (35), 2024

INDIA POLICY
ASPIRATIONS
EUROPE
INFORMATION
RUSSIA
DECEPTION
CHALLENGES
NATO
GEOPOLITICAL
FUTURE
ADVANCEMENT
TECHNOLOGIES
ARTIFICIAL
UKRAINE
NARRATIVE
HISTORY
PARTNERS
DEEPFAKES
WAR
CHINA
ALLIANCES

- NEW WARFARE
- NATO ASPIRATIONS
- FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY

FUTURE

Editors

Dr. Hanna Shelest
Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko

Publisher:

Published by NGO «Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation» (Ukraine),
Centre of International Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support of the
Representation of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Ukraine

UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian analytical journal in English
on International Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal is aimed
at experts, diplomats, academics, students interested in the international
relations and Ukraine in particular.

Contacts:

website: <http://ukraine-analytica.org/>
e-mail: Ukraine_analytica@ukr.net
Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/ukraineanalytica>
Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica

The views and opinions expressed in the articles are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine Analytica,
its editors, Board of Advisors or donors.

ISSN 2518-7481

500 copies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE NEW FACE OF DECEPTION: AI'S ROLE IN THE KREMLIN'S INFORMATION WARFARE 3
Volodymyr Solovian and Matt Wickham

PERFECT STORM FOR UKRAINIAN FOREIGN STRATEGY 13
Maryna Karlevits

NODAL DEFENCE AND UKRAINE'S NATO ASPIRATIONS. 20
Alexander Lanoszka

RISE OF THE NEW 'AXIS OF EVIL' AND NATO'S CHALLENGING PATH AHEAD. 28
Yasin Yildirim

THE 2024 UNITED STATES ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 37
Brendan H. Gallagher

CIVILIZATIONAL NARRATIVE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA AND CHINA: THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR 48
Sofia Lysko

PERFECT STORM FOR UKRAINIAN FOREIGN STRATEGY

Maryna Karlevits

Foreign policy advisor to a Member
of the Parliament of Ukraine

Even though the full-scale invasion of Russia in 2022 has changed the global and European geopolitical landscape, there have already been signs of so-called 'war fatigue' or getting back to business as usual. However, Ukraine's perception of the world and its role within it has irrevocably changed. This article explores the transformation of Ukraine's role in the world, examining its past and present while outlining the foreign policy priorities it should adopt for the future. Should Ukrainian foreign policy be focused solely on the EU and NATO? What should be the Ukrainian strategy towards Asia, Africa, and Latin America? How should Ukraine promote itself and what role should it seek in the new geopolitical reality?

Ukraine has followed a long path since restoring its independence in 1991, and this path was marked with revolutionary upheavals, Russia's invasion in 2014, and the full-scale invasion in 2022. Living through such turbulent times has led to drastic changes in the society and a re-evaluation of Ukrainian identity. «Who are we?», «What do we stand for?» and «What can Ukraine offer to the world?» – these are the questions being asked, to shape Ukraine's current and future roles in the world.

While the most recent and the one and only edition of Ukraine's foreign policy strategy was published in 2021, the geopolitical landscape has changed drastically since then. Therefore, it is time to begin discussion of the ideas and thoughts that should become the foundation of Ukraine's foreign policy for decades ahead, and the ones that should be adhered to by the government, regardless of the parties and politicians who are or will be in power. Such a strategy should be based on three main questions: Who are we? Who are our partners? Who are our enemies?

Who are we?

For decades, Russia has been portraying Ukraine as a failed state, or as «Russians who simply forgot their identity under pressure from the West», denying the Ukrainian nationality, language, and culture. If there is something Russia is good at it is at producing propaganda which in the form of a virus was targeted at both Ukraine and the other countries in the world.

Whether as The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, the country has been using the same strategy and tools throughout the years, and is now successfully combining them with modern technologies and approaches. By using the narrative of 'brotherly nations', it usually erases cultural boundaries and makes their nation believe that we and they are all the same people since we 'share' the same language, history, and traditions. This is usually done through education, the media, by banning the neighbour's language and erasing the differences between the

ethnicities. In the recent decade, Ukraine has become, by default, one of the major experts on Russian propaganda, and it has developed its own anti-propaganda vaccine.



Today's word associations of Ukraine in the world usually come with terms such as 'bravery', 'unity' and 'resilience'

This largely affects Ukrainians' self-identification, and encourages people to learn more about their origin and roots, which is similar to a situation of waking up after being under the influence of propaganda for many years. For instance, in 2006, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine adopted a law officially recognising the Holodomor of 1932-1933 [the great famine] as a genocide against the Ukrainian people.²¹ These days, on National Remembrance Day, millions of Ukrainians share the stories of their families and how their lives have been affected, even decades later.²² Moreover, many Ukrainians are switching from using the Russian language to Ukrainian in all spheres of their lives, and as of the beginning of 2024, almost 60% of Ukrainians use only

Ukrainian with the about 30% who still use both languages.²³ More than 50% of the population now celebrate Christmas according to the newly-established tradition (which in fact dates back to the pre-Soviet times, when Ukrainians had celebrated Christmas on December 25).²⁴ These are all parts of the national identity, which also helps the country to become more resilient to propaganda. Such changes are also happening in foreign policy, where support for NATO and EU membership has increased significantly since the beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine.^{25,26}

Despite all Russia's efforts to conquer it, Ukrainian society has enormously transformed since 1991, as well as changes to Ukraine's image in the world. Today's word associations of Ukraine in the world usually come with terms such as 'bravery', 'unity' and 'resilience', according to *Ukraine's Global Perception Report 2022*.²⁷ Ukraine is known around the world for its resilience, and its ability to adapt to the horrible realities of the war. However, it was not that long ago when the main words associated with Ukraine were 'corruption', 'oligarchy', and 'post-soviet space.' In 2020, the Ukrainian Institute (UI), in cooperation with the Foreign Policy Council 'Ukrainian Prism' conducted research into how Ukraine

21 The Law of Ukraine on Holodomor 1932-1933 in Ukraine. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 28.11.2006. [<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/376-16#Text>]

22 *Holodomor survivors' stories*. Ukrainian Canadian Congress. (n.d.). [<https://www.ucc.ca/issues/holodomor/survivors-stories>]

23 *IRI Survey: The majority of Ukrainians believe in victory over Russia and support reintegration*. International Republican Institute. October 2024. <https://iri.org.ua/survey/opytuvannya-iri-bilshist-ukrayintsiv-viryt-u-peremohu-nad-rosiyeyu-ta-pidtrymuye-povernennya>

24 *Survey: The vast majority of Ukrainians believe in victory over Russia and support reintegration*. International Republican Institute. February 2024. <https://iri.org.ua/survey/opytuvannya-absolyutna-bilshist-ukrayintsiv-viryt-u-peremohu-nad-rosiyeyu-pidtrymuyut>

25 *Ukraine and NATO: Evidence from public opinion surveys*. Stockholm School of Economics. 30.10.2023, [<https://www.hhs.se/en/about-us/news/site-publications/2023/ukraine-and-nato--evidence-from-public-opinion-surveys>]

26 *Ukrainians' survey: NATO & EU*. Statista. 2023. [<https://www.statista.com/chart/26933/ukrainians-survey-nato-eu/>]

27 *Ukraine's global perception report 2022*. Brand Ukraine. 2023. https://brandukraine.org.ua/documents/32/Ukraines_Global_Perception_Report_2022.pdf

is perceived in the world. Alongside the support for Ukraine's European choices and hopes for the future, there are also mentions among US academia and the professional community of 'endemic corruption' and «an inability to set up a well-coordinated normal system of governance».²⁸ For Türkiye, Ukraine had surprisingly been 'a blind spot' even though it is located just on the other side of the Black Sea. Some respondents even mentioned the fact that Russia was the first association they made with Ukraine.²⁹ Even in countries with a large Ukrainian diaspora, such as Canada, there was no clear understanding of what Ukraine was and stood for until the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. For instance, while Japan has been extremely supportive of Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, a disturbing reality was that there had been very little known about Ukraine according to the UI research on perception of Ukraine in that country in 2020.³⁰



Freedom and democratic values should be backed up by force, and this is the key message Ukraine is sending to its partners

In essence, Ukraine today is a country that has gone from a post-Soviet corrupt oligarch state to one that is largely famous for its resilience and striving for freedom.

All the challenges have led to Ukrainians re-discovering their identity, going back to their roots, and paving the way to the new characteristics of modern Ukraine. Among those, there is a high demand for justice and self-reliance when it comes to protecting the country. According to a survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre in September 2024, more than 90% of Ukrainians trust the Armed Forces of Ukraine above all others.³¹ Even though this is not something that describes the national identity, this is an important feature of Ukrainian society. Freedom and democratic values should be backed up by force, and this is the key message Ukraine is sending to its partners.

Who are our partners?

War does not fundamentally change people or countries, it only exposes what's inside them – and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated what various countries around the world stand for. In today's reality, it is not accurate to say that Ukraine is supported solely by the West, or the Western alliance. This means that the concept of the 'West' transcends geography and it now means not the geographical location of the country so much as a shared commitment to values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, and alliances. Ukraine is largely supported not only by Western countries through geographical proximity, but also by countries like Japan,³² Australia,³³ and others that align with these principles.

28 H. Shelest, N. Bureiko, *Perceptions of Ukraine Abroad. The United States*. Ukrainian Institute. 2020. [https://ui.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ssha_povnyj-zvit_fin_eng-0503.pdf]

29 Y. Gaber, M. Vorotnyuk. *Perceptions of Ukraine Abroad. Turkey*. Ukrainian Institute. 2020. [https://ui.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/turechchyna_povnyj-zvit_eng-0503.pdf]


30 S. Gerasymchuk, A. Polishchuk, *Perceptions of Ukraine Abroad. Japan*. Ukrainian Institute. 2020. [https://ui.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/yaponiya_povnyj-zvit_eng-0503.pdf]

31 *Assessment of the situation in the country and government performance, trust in social institutions, politicians, officials, and public figures, and belief in victory*. Razumkov Centre. September 2024. [<https://bit.ly/4gtuzJo>]

32 Y. Nakano. *Japan's leadership role on Ukraine*. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). 22.02.2024. [<https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-leadership-role-ukraine>]

33 *Ukraine country brief*. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). 2024. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/ukraine/ukraine-country-brief>

There are countries that are well-aware of what Russia is and what consequences might be, in the event that the aggressor is appeased, not punished. Therefore, such countries as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, and other countries of Eastern Europe, as well as Scandinavian states, are among the biggest supporters of Ukraine per capita.³⁴ It is also necessary to mention Moldova, which might not be able to provide substantial financial or military support, but it has been consistent in its strong support of Ukraine. The same applies to Georgia: even though its government has been acting openly in the Russian interest, the Georgian people have been extremely vocal in their support for Ukraine and a pro-European future for their own country. These countries do not need explanations on why appeasing Russia is dangerous for Europe and the global order, and they are trying to warn the world that cooperation with Russia brings more damage than benefit in a long-term perspective.



It is our strategic goal to demonstrate that it is in the US interest that Russia loses and Ukraine wins

Ukraine's biggest partner is definitely the United States; therefore, Ukraine is hugely dependent on everything that happens in that country – any change in the geopolitical course, presidential elections or mood

swings in the society will be reflected in the situation on the frontline. And this is something that Ukraine should work at. November 5, 2024 saw a triumph for the Republican Party and for President-elect Donald J. Trump. During his campaign, he promised to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours if he was elected.³⁵ The Vice-President-elect JD Vance has said that it should not be the US's main priority to assist Ukraine, since the United States have more serious problems to take care of.³⁶ Still, since the elections, the rhetoric has slightly changed, with the understanding that the Russian-Ukrainian war is too complicated to finish in 24 hours.

It is often predicted that Europe will suffer politically, strategically, and economically from Trump's presidency, and NATO's support of Europe is likely to be significantly decreased.³⁷ However discouraging certain politicians may see Trump's victory to be, the most discouraging thing is how dependent Europe has become on the United States and therefore, how much is at stake every four years on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. At the Munich Security Conference at the beginning of 2024, JD Vance expressed his concerns over Europe being not capable enough to protect itself from security threats. Referring to a «wake up call for Europe»,³⁸ his main point was that Europe should start being more self-reliant and more independent from the United States. Marco Rubio, most-likely Secretary of State in Trump's administration, has also stressed the importance of Europe becoming

34 Institute for the World Economy (Kiel). (n.d.). *Ukraine Support Tracker*. 2024.

[<https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/>]

35 Wall Street Journal. (n.d.). *Watch: Trump says as president he'd settle Ukraine war within 24 hours*. The Wall Street Journal. 11.05.2023, [<https://bit.ly/41Mfy11>]

36 K. Liptak, *Vance, Trump ally, says Russia's invasion of Ukraine is not an 'existential threat' to the US* The New York Times. 13.09.2024. [<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/vance-trump-ukraine-russia-war.html>]

37 P. Taylor, *Why Donald Trump's return is a disaster for Europe*. The Guardian. 7.11.2024. [<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/nov/07/why-donald-trumps-return-is-a-disaster-for-europe>]

38 Vance, J. D. *Senator Vance delivers a wake-up call to Munich Security Conference*. 14.11.2024, [<https://www.vance.senate.gov/press-releases/senator-vance-delivers-a-wake-up-call-to-munich-security-conference/>]

more self-reliant in terms of its security strategy.³⁹ And this self-reliance is clearly the best response the European Union can make to ensure its future, and it definitely will be beneficial for all – the United States, its European allies, and Ukraine.

For Ukraine, it is important to carefully and thoroughly study the new US administration's approach, their strategies, ideas, and vision, so that we can develop a clear strategy on how to engage effectively, and build a partnership that will be mutually beneficial. It is our strategic goal to demonstrate that it is in the US interest that Russia loses and Ukraine wins.



For a long period of time, Ukraine has underestimated or did not have enough capacity to pay attention to many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America

To sum up, the Ukrainian partners are countries which not only share the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights, they are countries where our cooperation will be mutually beneficial. Even though common values are an important part of cooperation, the world is transitioning from a solely value-driven to a deal-driven one. Power, deals, and benefits – these are all associated strongly with the upcoming world order. Concerns and condemnations do not work any more, power and flexibility do. The world is coming back to a 'peace through strength' approach, and it can be achieved through close cooperation of those like-minded actors whose values and ideas are backed up with tanks, missiles, and military industrial complexes.

Who are our adversaries?

The world is moving towards a new Cold War or World War III – it does not matter what you call it, what is more important is that the world is becoming more and more divided based on values and ideas. In this new reality, authoritarian regimes all around the world tend to form coalitions and cooperate with each other. Since February 2022, Russia has been backed by Iran and North Korea in its war against Ukraine. It has been already more than a year since another part of the conflict in the Middle East unfolded, and there are more and more conflicts happening around the world. In this regard, it can be concluded that the main aim of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes around the world is to disrupt and destabilise the current world order. In this reality, it is clear that such countries as Russia, Iran, and North Korea are definitely the enemies of Ukraine, and it is in Ukraine's best interests to be a country that is able to resist them.

At the same time, a large part of the world is *terra incognita* in terms of support for Ukraine. For a long period of time, Ukraine has underestimated or did not have enough capacity to pay attention to many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which led to a lack of understanding and awareness in Ukraine. It is only in the recent years when Ukraine started working on its African and Latin American strategy, and it will take an extremely long time for this. There is a lack of experts in those regions and a lack of Ukrainian vision about those countries.

Given an even more limited capacity when the country is at war, we should focus on the countries that are supportive of Ukraine in the above-mentioned regions, and spend

³⁹ Марко Рубіо про Дональда Трампа як державного секретаря США (Marco Rubio about Donald Trump as a US State Secretary). Radio Svoboda. 7.11.2024, [<https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/mark-rubio-derzhsekretar-donald-tramp-ssha/33200613.html>]

some time on understanding them before identifying the nature of relations with them. This has to become a long-term and strategic job for the Ukrainian foreign service.

Conclusions

Foreign policy strategy always goes hand-in-hand with the general vision of a country and its place in the world. In the current geopolitical situation, Ukraine is now shaping its new role and re-discovering its position on the map of the world. Since regaining its independence in 1991, the country has already undergone a long journey from post-Soviet state to the country it is today. Russia's attempts to bring the country back under its influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union were not successful, and Russia's aggression in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have only proven Ukraine's independence and striving for its Euro-Atlantic future.



Ukraine is the only country that has real-combat experience against the second largest army in the world, with the biggest nuclear arsenal

Striving towards membership of the European Union and NATO is one of the central ideas of Ukraine's foreign policy, but it should not be the fundamental one. Given the fact that accession to both alliances is a matter of the political will of all the member states, Ukraine should at first focus on its capacity to become more self-reliant. It is something that looks almost impossible in the current climate; yet it seems to be one of the most efficient ways to ensure stability and security for the country. For Ukraine, these two words will define its foreign policy for decades ahead. What

Ukraine can do already today is to ensure that all decisions are based on the national interest and its role in the region and in the world.

Ukraine should definitely continue its path towards membership of the European Union and NATO. Given the fact that the current geopolitical order is shattering and falling apart, it has to be closer to the alliances that it is well-familiar with. At the same time, Ukraine should dedicate more time and effort in studying such regions as Asia, Africa, and South America, which were usually overlooked by Ukraine due to the lack of its capacity. It might be easier to begin by focusing on the larger players in each region which are already supportive of Ukraine, in order to understand the region better, and to start developing a vision and strategy towards them. It also should pay attention to forming its strategy within the Black Sea region, given the fact that Russia is not going to disappear from the map of the world and Ukraine has to have a strategy in this region anyway.

Ukraine is the only country that has real-combat experience against the second largest army in the world, with the biggest nuclear arsenal. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have trodden the path from being one of the weakest armies in Europe to one of the strongest and respected in the world. And this is going to be Ukraine's biggest asset. The first thing that Ukraine can offer is its experience and expertise in modern warfare, which is a dangerous combination of the classic warfare of tanks and artillery alongside advanced technologies, such as drones and AI. It is hard to predict how these technologies will advance in the near future, but it is important that Ukraine starts working in this direction today. This is something that Ukraine brings to the table when it comes to mutually beneficial cooperation with its partners.

It is also necessary to remember that modern politics requires a modern approach and such tools as PR and the media can be simultaneously beneficial and harmful. Winning the hearts and minds of people around the world is an important task for Ukraine, and it should use all available instruments – its foreign service, Ukrainians abroad, the diasporas, and modern media tools and social media.

It has been almost three years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and there are already many signs of so-called 'war fatigue' in the world. Even though this was predictable,⁴⁰ it is still challenging for Ukraine, as it depends on the public opinion

in the West. For decades, Ukraine has been seen by the world through the lenses of Russian propaganda, and it is time now for Ukraine to form the narrative instead of only reacting to it.

Maryna Karlevits is a foreign policy advisor to a Member of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Oleksii Goncharenko. She holds an MA in International Relations and is a foreign policy expert. Ms Karlevits is one of the chief organisers of the Black Sea Security Forum. She previously worked as Head of the International Cooperation Division and Head of Analytics at the Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

40 Brand Ukraine. *Ukraine's global perception report 2023*. 2023.
[https://brandukraine.org.ua/documents/147/EN_Ukraines_Global_Perception_Report_2023.pdf]

BOARD OF ADVISORS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the European Policy Institute)

Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, State Counsellor of the Romanian Prime Minister for Foreign Relations, Security and Strategic Affairs)

Amb., Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky (Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Japan)

Prof., Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Odesa City Council)

Felix Hett (Germany, Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Ukraine)

James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs)

Amb., Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Amb., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to France)

Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, Director, Defence Transformation at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies)

Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Head of the Parliamentary Committee on European Integration)

Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Professor of International Politics, Panteion University, Athens)

Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Vice Chair of the Nobel Committee, Research Director at the Norwegian Nobel Institute)

UA: UKRAINE
ANALYTICA

Issue 3 (35), 2024

ISSN 2518-7481