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Resilience

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THE EFFECTS OF MYTHMAKING ON RESILIENCE AND FOREIGN, SECURITY POLICY IN POLAND

Alicja Prochniak

Does identity politics together with the associated system of symbols in the form of political myths allow true resilience, threat assessment and adequate response to the events occurring in international affairs? This narrative analysis would aim at investigating how discourses and narratives loaded with emotional messages set paradigms and frameworks, which can hinder the perception and resilience in international affairs. The appeal to emotions and identity politics with the frequent use of political myths in the public political debate can simplify political reality. They popularise a narrow view that does not allow for the appearance and formulation of alternative definitions.

Introduction

In recent years the use of the term 'resilience' has increased in the context of foreign and security policy. The term gained great popularity as many policymakers prefer its neutral character over the traditional term 'stability' that does not fully portray the ever-changing nature of political and economic relations in the post-Cold War world.[1] Rather, in the current circumstances, states and governments have to be prepared to constantly adapt and reform to the changing conditions. The term 'resilience' originates from the fields of ecology and biology and describes the ability of systems to return to equilibrium, a dynamic capability to adapt and adjust to the occurring changes.[2]

Resilience in international relations and especially security policymaking will thus mean the form of governance which is characterised by flexibility, a bottom-up approach and the rapid ability to reform and adjust policies. To achieve resilience, governments need to incorporate a multi-stakeholder vision and perspectives so a wide variety of actors influence the policymaking process. In this sense, resilience in foreign and security policy implies the internal ability of the state to cope with the appearance of multiple and a variety of types of crises.[3] This level of elasticity and the ability to reform could only be achieved in a particular institutional set-up where political parties, parliament, civil services, the media, and society are actively engaging in the policymaking process. Thus, the power structure and the relationships between the actors should be characterised by truly democratic inclusivity, transparency and accountability. Furthermore, the separation

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1   The European Partnership for Democracy, *Resilience: What is Resilience*, 2019, [https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Factsheet-Resilience-Final.pdf]

2   EPD 2019

3   EPD 2019

of powers between the government, a free media, an independent judiciary and the non-politicisation of military forces are equally important in establishing truly resilient forms of governance,[4] contributing to a more deliberative model of public sphere, where ideas can be freely shared and discussed, where minority voices have an opportunity to share opinions with their perspectives and voices.[5]

> **To achieve resilience, governments need to incorporate a multi-stakeholder vision and perspectives so a wide variety of actors influence the policymaking process**

In Poland, in 2001-2005, together with the governance of a new political party, a shift in the direction of foreign policy and a new vision of national identity were introduced. In 2005, both the presidential and the parliamentary elections were won by the representativess of the same political party, the Law and Justice.

Previously, the ruling parties mainly had an internationalist orientation, a direction of thought in a foreign policy called 'Piast'. This vision was constructed primarily on a liberal or centre-left vision of politics with a paradigm promoting openness, dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries.[6] This school of thought may be linked with an onward leaning vision of foreign policy which fosters overseas investments, international exposure and strong international links.[7]

The new party had a mainly nationalist orientation and a vision of foreign policy inspired by the politics conducted by the Jagiellonian dynasty of kings who established the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th century. The essence of Jagiellonian politics is a conviction that Poland should cooperate closely with other Eastern European countries and become the regional leader, to counterbalance the strong position of Russia and Germany.[8] 'Jagiellonian' vision in international politics mostly concentrates on a bid for regional hegemony to counter influences of other strong powers in the region. The significant influences of Józef Piłsudski, and the Giedroyc Doctrine[9] can also be noted.

The Law and Justice foreign policy vision at that time was mostly orientated towards the maximisation of national gains. It supported non-internationally competitive sectors and domestically oriented actors, groups that possess few foreign assets or ties, and companies which compete with imports. Its strongest supporters include inefficient industries (the coal industry in Poland for

4   EPD 2019

5   Habermas J.; Lennox S.; & Lennox F., *The Public Sphere*, New German Critique, no. 3, p.49-55, 1964.

6   Maciążek P., *Rządowa Wizja Polskiej Polityki Wschodniej*, Geopolityka.org, 2011

7   Lobell S. E., *Threat Assessment, The State, And Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model*, CUP, 2014, p.59.

8   Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, *Warto Być Polakiem*, 2010.

9   In the Cold War era, the "Giedroyc Doctrine" largely influenced by Piłsudski's Prometheism created the foundation of Poland's eastern policy which became crucial for the country independence after 1991. The doctrine was originally formulated and published in the writings of Juliusz Mieroszewski and Jerzy Giedroyc in the Polish émigré magazine *Kultura*. The most important element of this policy was to recognise the post-Yalta eastern borders and the right to independence of the newly emerged nations. Another important objective was to progress with cooperation towards independent Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. Such an alliance would have the capability to weaken Russian imperial ambitions. *Kultura* has seen Ukraine as a pivotal component of Eastern European security.

example), agriculture, import-substituting manufacturing firms, and labour-intensive industry.[10]

In order to mobilise society and extract resources for the ambitious goals of their foreign policy such as the establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) and the development of the LNG gas infrastructure, the government introduced the elements of identity politics and rhetoric based on political myths and historical narratives. This type of strategic political communication, while highly effective domestically, can nonetheless affect the level of resilient governance. Through the use of myths, political communication is designed to activate society through an appeal to emotions, values and historical narratives which cannot be questioned. This type of communication, while effective in some aspects, limits deliberation and does not allow inclusivity in the formation of opinion and policymaking process. The use of political myths limits the policy debate to perspectives and interpretations which are already broadly accepted, have the status of common knowledge and that operate within the framework of the dominant narrative.[11]

Threat inflation and securitisation occurs when political actors are able to dominate news coverage with exaggerated descriptions of the threat.[12] The scholars of critical security studies are already well aware of the effects of farming on foreign and security policies. Securitisation effects as described by Ole Wæver in 1993 (Copenhagen School) are considered as one of those phenomena where the specific use of language directly affects the formation of security and foreign policy strategies. The Copenhagen School was one of the first to introduce the critical approach to security studies. Securitisation describes the event where narratives, frames and discourses which function in security, can make some actions appear more legitimate, credible and realistic than others.[13]

Threat inflation is another technique, which uses strategically formed narratives to influence policy outcomes.[14] Thrall describes threat inflation as a form of framing – "the effort to frame the world and thus persuade a mass audience to adopt a cause".[15] The public accepts the inflated perception of a threat when there is a lack of deliberative debate to help selectively choose truth from falsehood. Payne highlights that because of a democratic system of checks and balances, some scholars are sceptical about the possibility of threat inflation in political debate. The three liberal institutions, domestic political opponents, the military, and the free press provide democratic checks and can introduce alternative expertise to balance the debate. All of these elements constitute a marketplace of ideas in well-functioning democracies.[16]

10 Lobell 2014, p.59-60.

11 Krebs R., *How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus*, International Organizations, p.809-845, 2015. Payne R., *Thinking the Unthinkable About National Security Narratives*, Thinking About Security, 2014; Thrall, A. T., *A bear in the woods? Threat framing and the marketplace of values*, Security Studies 16(3): 452-488, 2007; Snyder J., *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, CUP, Ithaca and London, 1991.

12 Thrall 2007, p.468.

13 Hagström L. & Gustafsson K., *Narrative Power: How Storytelling shapes East Asian International Politics*, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, No 32, vol.4, p.387-406, 2019.

14 Thrall 2007 p.452.

15 Thrall 2007 p.466.

16 Snyder, Jack and Karen Ballentine, *Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas*, International Security 21(2): 5-40, 1996.

When the public debate presents a variety of voices and alternatives, the debate will move towards consensus, and people will develop a more accurate perception of the threat.

Jack Snyder and Karen Ballantine note that in states which are in the early stages of democratisation, the marketplace of ideas may not function properly. The more established the market, the greater the deliberation and the better the quality of information.[17] While a poorly developed marketplace of ideas may result in biased information, it is commonly believed that well-constituted Western democracies in principle enjoy wide deliberation in foreign and security policy creation.[18] Many scholars and journalists, however, have used the example of the Bush administration's rhetoric regarding the Iraq War to demonstrate the failure of the marketplace of ideas even in developed Western democracies. It is therefore important to emphasise that the marketplace of ideas can malfunction in both well-established and in developing democracies.[19] Thrall concludes that the marketplace of ideas will not perform the usual check and balance process and detect threat inflation, securitisation or other forms of deception if elites do not compete with one another. In a situation when one frame or narrative is dominating the ability to provide a meaningful counter-narrative,

this may be significantly disabled due to the structure of the dominant narrative and the type of framing used.[20] This can occur especially when the narrative is dominated by nationalist rhetoric and built on appeals to values, emotions, and political myths.[21]

Thrall finds that the marketplace of ideas may often function rather as a "marketplace of values". This applies equally to established democracies and where the democratic institutions are still evolving. The political elites seek support not through appeal to argument but by implementing strategical political communication, which appeals to identity and values instead. The debate does not lead to the emergence of the most accurate and rational statements. The centrality of values means that any political or security issues are discussed through the lens of personal values.[22]

According to Thrall's theory, the threat perceptions will then mostly mirror the distribution of values in society.[23] The perception of threat requires first a system of understanding and evaluating the world. Interpretations matter when validating threats results from the competing values and perspectives held by the public and its leaders.[24] The very definition of national security, and thus of a security threat, can widely depend on the worldview, identity and interests of the political group presenting and assessing the issue.[25]

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17 Thrall 2007 p. 455.

18 Thrall 2007 p. 456.

19 Thrall 2007 p.452.

20 Payne 2014, p.8.

21 Payne 2014 p.11.

22 Thrall 2007, p.469.

23 Thrall 2007, p.469.

24 Thrall, 2007, p.466

25 Thrall, 2007, p.464-5

Theoretical Framework

Political myths have been recognized as elements that enhance the power of messages and narratives, making them more effective.[26] Myths create the common, "mythical' ground that does not need to be backed by political debate or arguments".[27] Political myth is "an ideologically marked narrative, which purports to give a true account of a set of pasts, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social group".[28]

> ❝ *Identity politics and an appeal to historical and mythical symbols, as a result, can however obscure security assessment and formation of foreign policy*

National political myths appear in historically simplified or selective stories about the founding of the state.[29] They are the legends, told around specific historical figures and events that were crucial in the nation-building processes, and they are part of the state ceremonies, celebrations, and rituals.[30] Through the use of political myths, governing elites can more effectively extract resources and mobilise domestic support, to undertake ambitious foreign policy goals.[31] Political myths embedded in historical narratives can be seen as a tool, communicated tactically to dominate the agenda.[32] Once implemented into the debate, they serve as cultural lenses through which a nation's views about the outside world are shaped.

This type of messages sets the primary definition of international affairs and marginalises competing points of view.[33] Identity politics and an appeal to historical and mythical symbols, as a result, can however obscure security assessment and formation of foreign policy. The term "identity politics" refers to movements that mobilise around ethnic, racial or religious identity to claim state power.[34] The theorists whose work concentrates on investigating political myths and narratives, argue that through the use of specific signs and linguistic structures political actors and institutions form strong, influential discourses, which function in the public sphere.[35] This language contains specific construction mechanisms based on political myths that ensure the sustainability of institutional practices and can provide legitimacy.[36]

26 De Guevara B., *Myth in International Politics: Ideological Delusion and Necessary Fiction*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.

27 Munch S., *Beyond National Policymaking: Conceptions of Myth in Interpretive Policy Analysis and Their Value for IR*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.

28 Flood C., *Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction*. Routledge, New York, 2002.

29 Munch, 2016

30 De Guevara, 2016, p.4

31 Schweller R., *Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in The Age of Mass Politics*, CUP. 2014

32 Yanow D., in "Myths and Narrative in International Politics", Palgrave Macmillan., 2016

33 Hall S., *Policing the Crisis, Mugging, The State and Law and Order*, The MacMillan Press, Ltd, 1982.

34 Kaldor M, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, SUP, Stanford, 2007.

35 De Guevara B. B., *Myth and Narrative in International Politics: Interpretative Approaches to the Study of IR*, ResearchGate, 2016. De Guevara B. B., *Myth in International Politics: Ideological Delusions and Necessary Fiction*, Chapter 2 in "Myth and Narrative in International Politics", Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Flood C., *Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction*, Routledge, New York, 2002.

36 Harcourt B. E., An *Answer to the question: What is Poststructuralism*, Public Law and Legal Theory working paper delivered at the Seminar on Law and Political Theory, Tel Aviv University, 2006.

According to Barthes, myths have a political function because they facilitate the spread or approval of particular worldviews. Barthes' work can be considered as pioneering on political myths because he was the first to emphasise the active manipulation of semiosis. Narratives, when structured in a specific way, have a strong ability to shape and form perception and point of view.[37] Different elements have been used to enhance the strength of the narrative and to construct meaning. Hence, an analysis of narratives has to be performed to examine how the political myths, appeal to values and emotions have been used in the debate to reinforce the specific interpretation of the political affairs.

> *At least three different events, which took place in Poland in the last few years, could signal that the policymaking process does not fulfil or meet the conditions needed for a truly resilient policymaking environment*

The analysis will demonstrate which interpretations and opinions have been marginalised, and how the structure of narrative and the elements used can obscure the assessment. Political myths narrow down the debate within a framework of broadly accepted facts and mythical interpretations. This type of strategic political communication marginalises alternative and innovative points of view, instead focusing on familiar and generally recognised explanations.

Analysis
The Current Institutional Set-Up

At least three different events, which took place in Poland in the last few years, could signal that the policymaking process does not fulfil or meet the conditions needed for a truly resilient policymaking environment.

- Media

Reporters without Borders rated Poland two places lower and the country dropped to 64th position in the World Press Freedom Index in 2021, due to reports concerning increasing government control over the state broadcast media. The main objections relate to state-owned broadcasters' participation in a government hate campaign during the Presidential election and involvement in the government 'repolonisation' campaign.[38]

- Military Forces

In 2016, the key Polish generals submitted their resignation from the military service. Gen. Miroslaw Rozanski along with two other major commanders Gen. Mieczysław Gocuł and Gen. Adam Duda left the military. All three resigned as they could not affirm with their authority the peculiar and controversial decisions of the Ministry of Defence. According to commentators, unacceptable decisions of the ministry's leadership put the military staff under pressure. Having their good name and authority in mind, the generals did not want to affirm the government's decisions in their own names.[39] The book published after these events presents more details about the processes of politicisation that took place in

37 Onega S. & Landa J., *Narratology*, Routledge, London and New York, 1996.

38 RWB 202, [https://rsf.org/en/poland]

39 Żemła E., *Tsunami w Polskiej Armii. Z Wojska Odchodzą Kluczowi Generałowie*. Onet News, 16 December 2016. [https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/tsunami-w-polskiej-armii-z-wojska-odchodza-kluczowi-generalowie/dx7zqg5].

the army at that time and what led to more dismissals or resignations among army personnel.[40]

• Judicial System

The ongoing dispute between Poland and the European Union over judiciary reform and fears about the state of the rule of law in Poland posed an additional obstacle. The top EU court had already ruled that Poland's disciplinary procedure for judges violates European law. A Polish court however questioned the supremacy of EU law. The dispute may not only lead to Warsaw's 'legal Polexit' but more concerning is the fact that the Court of Justice expressed the opinion that the Polish chamber lacks guarantees of independence and impartiality. This means that court decisions in Poland may be politicised and harm true deliberation in public sphere debate.[41]

> **The analysis of narratives in 2008 – 2021 found that Polish foreign policy and the publications issued by the institutions and political actors have been structured in terms of binary oppositions**

The institutional setup in Poland is thus presently characterised by political pressures over the judiciary and military and attempts to control or censor the media's voice. In these circumstances, the creation of resilient policies may be constrained. More importantly, however, this type of environment allows the spread and primacy of government interpretations and policy aligned with government interest and values.

Mythmaking and Its Effects on Policy-Making Process

The conducted narrative analysis has identified the presence of several myths and biased discourses in the political debate. The myths, which had influenced the formation of the strategic aims of foreign policy are also clearly referenced in the texts produced by the leading politicians, ministries and think tanks. In this section, I will present how the existence and reference to myths has steered the formation of policy but excluded other alternative points of view and arguments.

• *The Discourse of the 'West and the Rest'*

The term "West", when used in political texts and messages, relates to an idea, concept, or type of society. Stuart Hall notes that the construction of western discourse is often based on binary oppositions, which emphasise European uniqueness and non-western inferiority.[42] In political discourses and narratives, the term provides a model of comparison to the non-western actors by putting them in opposition.[43] Through the use of binary oppositions, representatives construct the meaning which can determine policy outcomes in advance. Meaning is defined in terms of binary oppositions to simplify reality or to validate the government line of policy to their audience, but at the same time may lead to strong emotional reactions, prejudice or discrimination.[44]

40 Ćwieluch J., *Generałowie*, Wielka Litera, 2017.

41 Bayer L & Burchard H., *Polish Legal Showdown Escalates as Top EU Court Issues New Reprimand*, Politico, 15 July 2021. [https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-legal-eu-court-reprimand-disciplinary-procedure-for-judges].

42 Hall, 1992

43 Hall, 1992

44 Shah N. *The Concept of Binary Oppositions*, 2015.

This gives the narrator control over the formation of opinion.[45]

The analysis of narratives in 2008 – 2021 found that Polish foreign policy and the publications issued by the institutions and political actors have been structured in terms of binary oppositions. The analysis revealed that the dominant narration of that time perceives the country as belonging to Western civilisation; while other countries such as for example Russia do not share the same, western values, traditions, or heritage. The leaders of Eastern European countries place themselves as belonging to different civilisational blocks. The US and NATO here are presented as the main allies and friendly, secure powers, guarantors of security, stability, and peace in the world. Poland is a faithful ally and provides its support and loyalty to America and NATO. America is a trusted partner, which has always supported Poland, its closest, most solid and stable supporter which wants to protect Polish independence.

On the other hand, the Russian Federation is portrayed as a suspicious, dangerous, and unpredictable neighbour, a country that is no longer interested in cooperation and building mutual trust with the West.[46] The political elites, authoritarian governments and clerks in Russia are corrupted, the economy is inefficient and unable to reform. Russia uses all sorts of illegal practices such as trade wars, cyber-attacks, threats to use nuclear weapons, propaganda, political agitation and bribes to achieve its aims. Russia has imperial ambitions and seeks to transform Eastern Europe into its own sphere of influence. The country will not restrain from the use of military force to reach its foreign policy objectives, as evidenced by the wars in Georgia and Ukraine. Through its activities, Russia exposes Poland's neighbourhood to political, economic and social danger.[47] Moreover, Russia engages in anti-Polish rhetoric and turns historical disputes between Poland and Israel or Ukraine to its advantage for propaganda purposes.[48]

- **The Discourse of the Clash of Civilizations**

Another biased discourse identified during the analysis is the discourse of 'the Clash of Civilizations'. The clash of civilizations is a thesis which claims that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.[49] The central theme of the book "The Clash of Civilizations" is a statement that identity will define conflicts in the post-Cold War world. The departure point in the discourse is the view that Polish and Russian cultures, perception and mentality are different and historically incompatible. Thus, highlighting the strict and sharp differences between Poland and Russia, and underlining that both belong to different civilisations, can be considered as supporting the discourse. The Clash of Civilization shapes the security debate and choice of foreign policy, the choice of allies and enemies.

The presence of discourse in narrative structures the perception of current political affairs and describes conflict with Russia along civilisational lines. The justification and foundation of the conflict (The Annexation of Crimea 2014) are seen in civilisational differences and the choice

45 Robinson A. *Jean Baudrillard: A new System of Meaning*, Ceasefire, 2012.

46 Koziej S. *New Cold War on NATO's Eastern Flank – Security Scenarios for Central and Eastern Europe*, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, 2019.

47 *Strategy of Polish Foreign Policy 2017-2021*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland.

48 Benedyczak J. *The Influence of the Domestic Situation on Russia's Foreign Policy*, PISM, April 2019.

49 Huntington S. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Penguin Books, 1997.

of values. This structure poses a serious consequence for future conflict analysis or resolution. When the conflict is defined along civilisational or identity lines it becomes nearly impossible to propose an effective solution to growing tensions.

The presence of both discourses defines aims and goals in foreign policy and bases of political strategy. The discourse structures the political assessment and calculation along geopolitical lines between 'Western' and 'non-Western' civilisations, where 'Western' is seen as familiar, friendly, aspirational, and 'Eastern' as foreign, suspicious, far off. The representation, characteristics and description of actors are constructed along simplistic lines. Moreover, they function as an overreaching paradigm that guides the formation of opinion among broader circles and communities. Within time, the discourse rises into the narrative of unquestioned authority, which narrows down political choices. The debate and narratives influenced by the discourses tell us not only that 'Western' is friendly but also that it is 'good'. The 'Clash of Civilizations' elevates the values of one civilisation over others.

- ***Myth of Intermarium and the Myth of Piłsudski***

The myth of 'Intermarium' entered the Polish political debate around 2012. It is largely associated with the publications issued by institutions which advocate for the primacy of transatlantic relations in Polish foreign policy.[50] Intermarium refers to a mythical creation, the land between three seas, the Adriatic, Baltic, and the Black Sea. It refers to

The Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth, The Crown of The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania., one of the biggest and most powerful European countries in the 16th and 17th centuries. By the creation of the Union, Poland was powerful enough to counterbalance the strong position of Russia, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. The geopolitical project of Intermarium was developed by Józef Piłsudski, a Polish Chief of State (1918 -1920) and envisioned a federation of Eastern European states which together may create a strong union similar to The Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Józef Piłsudski, in cooperation with Sir Harold Mackinder, was trying to implement the idea of counterbalancing Russian influences in the 1920s.[51] While today the main foreign policy projects such as the EaP and TSI focus on economic issues, the main approach is largely anchored in both Intermarium and the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth. The key assumptions and core strategy are closely interconnected. The influence of this myth of Piłsudski is probably the most significant. In this mythical narrative, Piłsudski is seen as a founding father of the Second Polish Republic, which regained independence in 1918 after 123 years of partition carried out in 1795 by Austria, Prussia and Russia.

Piłsudski believed in the ideals, traditions and culture of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, and hoped to establish the same union with Ukraine and Lithuania.[52] His strong leadership skills earned him the status of Polish strongman. This type of governance brought him a specific

50 Atlantic Council, *Remarks by General James L. Jones, Jr. at the Dubrovnik Three Seas Initiative Presidential Roundtable*, Atlantic Council, 2016. [http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/completing-europe-from-the-north-south-corridor-to-energy-transportation-and-telecommunications-union]. Chodakiewicz M. J. *Intermarium: The Land Between the Black and Baltic Seas*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2012.

51 Pelizza S. *The Geopolitics of International Reconstruction: Halford Mackinder and Eastern Europe*, 1919–20, The International History Review 38:1, 174-195, Routledge. 2016

52 Czubiński A. *"Józef Piłsudski i Jego Legenda (Józef Piłsudski and His Legend)"*, Państowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw, 1988. Davies N. *"Heart of Europe, The Past in Poland's Present"*, OUP, Oxford, New York, 2001.

cult of personality which has lasted until the 21st century. His main foreign policy strategies were aimed at enhancing the existing security measures and securing a newly regained independence. He wanted to strengthen national independence movements among nations that had become part of the Soviet Union. His second aim was the creation of a tight cooperation or union of the Eastern European states, the countries located in an area between the three seas.[53] Both goals remain the axioms of Polish foreign policy up to this day. They are also condensed in the main objectives of the TSI and the EaP.

> ❝ *identity politics and the use of strategic political communication in the form of political myths and moral framing may not only harm the creation of resilient policies but also create an unfavourable institutional setup*

The symbols present in the political debate developed into mythologised, sacred, and divine strategies and aims, which are rarely questioned. It was the nature of Ukrainian economic relations that postponed their integration with the European Union. Russia at that time was the main importer from the Ukrainian economy. The economic and infrastructure interdependencies in Eastern Europe do not always permit smooth and swift integration with European structures. The uncritical attachment to the main security paradigm prevented the formation of more adequate and resilient foreign policy and security responses to the unfolding events.

The highly respected reference to the concept of Intermarium and the personality cult of the chief of State Piłsudski justified and legitimised the government's choices. Yet, the project suffers from the same shortcomings as its predecessor. The presence, cultivation and use of myths, excluding sufficient deliberation or inclusivity, does not allow for the creation of more nuanced and resilient policies. The shortcomings of the EaP and TSI remain the same as the shortcomings of the previous Intermarium project.

a. Over-reliance on Western allies.

b. Insufficient economic funds to fulfil the main goals and objectives of the projects.

c. Ideological approach.

d. Different political and economic realities among Eastern European countries, as presented in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary and Moldova.

Conclusion

The analysis has demonstrated that identity politics and the use of strategic political communication in the form of political myths and moral framing may not only harm the creation of resilient policies but also create an unfavourable institutional setup.

The pressures exerted on the military, judiciary and the media in effect limit deliberation in the public debate. Alternative voices and interpretations, policy proposals, and formulations are not widely spread and heard, as they are unable to sustain the fierce criticism aligned with the government agenda. Furthermore, the public debate constrained in this way

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53 Czubiński, 1988, Davies, 2001.

allows for the broader dissemination of those messages created by the government to mobilise society and legitimise its own policy choices. In these circumstances, the voices of experts and pundits and other civil society organisations are marginalised, and policy creation relies in a majority of cases on government sources and analysis. When state leaders dominate the agenda, policy recommendations oscillate around those solutions which are aligned with government values, moral judgment, and interests. But they do not necessarily constitute the most needed or most adequate policy responses.

The analysis has shown that the public debate in Poland in 2008 – 2021 has been dominated by biased discourses and policy choices based on mythical interpretations. Therefore, the proposed solutions and approaches as expressed in the most important foreign policy projects, the Eastern Partnership and the Three Seas Initiative have continuously attempted to re-apply the uniform outdated paradigms. Although the projects suffer from consistent shortcomings, a similar course of action and direction of politics is continuously chosen.

The simplification of the political reality and appeal to values and political myths present political affairs through the prism of a glorious past and historically familiar concepts. Strategies and concepts, no matter how great or popular, have to be constantly reassessed and adjusted to the changing nature of international relations, especially in the post-Cold War world. Some axioms and paradigms may be outdated due to increasing interdependencies between countries in the international political economy. Attachment to mythical, historical concepts and formulations, as well as past strategies does not allow for the implementation of a fully resilient policy based on wide-ranging and comprehensive political, economic and security assessment, which includes the perspectives of various actors and stakeholders, to achieve the most adequate and best-tailored solutions.

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