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- CRIMEAN PLATFORM
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## Crimea

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# MAKING THE CRIMEAN SANCTIONS WORK: WHAT UKRAINE AND THE WEST CAN DO TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SANCTIONS REGIME

Yuliya Kazdobina

Ukrainian Foundation for Security Studies

*The Crimean package of Western sanctions is supposed to stay in force until Russian troops leave the occupied peninsula. It has had a significant economic impact on Crimea's economy but has failed to check the continuing militarisation of Crimea as well as human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The package is rather strong; yet, Russia has adapted to the restrictive measures and has learned to bypass some of them. The article argues that the occupation of Crimea has to be viewed in a wider context; violations of the sanctions should be investigated and corrected where necessary, and additional sanctions should be imposed.*

## The Goal and Impact of the Crimean Sanctions

The Crimean sanctions imposed by Western countries on the Russian Federation in 2014 in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity have been in place for over six years. Although individuals and entities have been added on several occasions, the general framework has stayed the same. Restrictions on economic relations with the occupied peninsula were imposed to send a message to Russia and the world that the illegal occupation of another state's territory was unacceptable and had to be reversed. Western countries pledged that the sanctions would stay in place until the occupying state complied.

Over the six years, Crimea has become almost isolated, and its economy has significantly deteriorated. Its banking sector – the economy's backbone – is reduced to only six Russian banks. All Ukrainian and foreign banks as well as 27 Russian banks that had been present on the peninsula prior to the occupation have left. Compared to 2013, the throughput of goods through the Crimean ports has decreased more than five times. Foreign direct investment has dried up, and about 70% of construction and development (worth USD 6.03 billion for Crimea and 1.34 billion and Sevastopol) is carried out with the money coming directly from the Russian state budget. In 2019, only 32.6% of Crimea's revenue came from its own earnings; the remaining 67.4% were Russian subsidies.<sup>1</sup>

1 A. Klymenko, T. Guchakova, O.Korbut, *The Real Impact of Crimean Sanctions (6-8). The Peculiarities of Economic Processes in Occupied Crimea under Sanctions*, "Black Sea News", 20 May 2020 [<https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/163314>].

Nevertheless, no reversal of the occupation is in sight. Russia claims that Crimea's annexation is a *fait accompli*,<sup>2</sup> flouts international court rulings, and continues integrating and militarising the peninsula.



***Restrictions on economic relations with the occupied peninsula were imposed to send a message to Russia and the world that the illegal occupation of another state's territory was unacceptable and had to be reversed***

While some argue that the Crimean sanctions regime is weak, this is not the case. The initial designations indeed concerned only individuals and specific entities. However, the approach swiftly hardened. Executive order no. 13685 signed by US President Obama on 19 December 2014<sup>3</sup> imposed comprehensive sanctions on the occupied peninsula, banning all investment, all exports and imports, and provision of services. The European Council decision 2014/933/CFSP of 18 December 2014<sup>4</sup> finalised the EU Crimean sanctions package. It currently includes a ban on Crimean exports unless they have a Ukrainian certificate of origin; a ban on

investment in Crimea; sectoral sanctions banning EU exports in the transport, energy, and telecommunications sectors; a ban on supply of equipment used for extraction of oil, gas, and minerals; and a ban on provision of tourist services. A number of other states, such as Canada, Australia, Norway, etc., have mirrored the EU and the US measures.

A better explanation of why the sanctions have failed to produce the desired effect is the size of the Russian economy. Although severely affected in 2014 by depreciating rouble, capital flight, and decreased oil prices, it proved resilient and already in 2016 started showing modest growth. After a 4.3% contraction in 2020, mostly due to the coronavirus pandemic, the country is expected to grow 2.6% in 2021.<sup>5</sup> Russian GDP in 2020 was 106.61 trillion roubles (about USD 1.4 trillion).<sup>6</sup> Although Russia does have to spend significant sums of money on both planned and unplanned infrastructure projects in Crimea, the amount is sustainable, and so are the Russian annual subsidies to Crimea, which comprise about 2% of Russia's GDP.<sup>7</sup>

### **Ukrainian Economic and Sanctions Policy toward the Occupied Crimea**

Ukraine's economic policy in relation to the occupied peninsula has been a lot less consistent than the Western one. In August

2 *Putin: Russia Will Not Give up Crimea under Any Circumstances* (Путин: Россия не уступит Крым ни при каких условиях), "TASS", 04 June 2018 [<https://tass.ru/politika/5262626>].

3 *Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine*, USA, Executive Order 13685 of 19 December 2014 [<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/12/24/2014-30323/blocking-property-of-certain-persons-and-prohibiting-certain-transactions-with-respect-to-the-crimea>].

4 *Council Decision 2014/933/CFSP Amending Decision 2014/386/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures in Response to the Illegal Annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol*, EU, 18 December 2014 [<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014D0933&qid=1613567914859>].

5 *Russia Economic Report*, The World Bank, 16 December 2020 [<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer#:~:text=Russian%20economic%20growth%20is%20projected,than%20the%20forecast%20of%20September.&text=In%20such%20a%20case%2C%20GDP,by%202.8%20percent%20in%202022>].

6 *Russia's GDP Down 3.1 Pct in 2020*, "Xinhua", 02 February 2021 [[http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/02/c\\_139713919.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/02/c_139713919.htm)].


7 Author's own calculation based on the numbers in Klymenko et al., n.1.

2014, it adopted a law creating a free economic zone in Crimea and regulating economic relations with the occupied territory.<sup>8</sup> Per Ukrainian authorities, the legislation was meant to provide for Ukraine's national security and the interests of Ukrainian entrepreneurs working under the occupation.<sup>9</sup> The law proclaimed that despite Russia's attempted annexation, Crimea remained a Ukrainian territory along with the enterprises registered there in accordance with Ukrainian legislation. However, trade operations between Crimean enterprises and those located in mainland Ukraine were treated as exports and imports for the purposes of taxation and customs control. The law also freed Ukrainian enterprises working in Crimea from the obligation to pay taxes in Ukraine and made those supplying goods to Crimea eligible for 20% VAT returns and excise tax exemption.

As a result, the amount of trade with Crimea has significantly increased. In the first 10 months of 2015, Ukrainian companies "exported" USD 702 million worth of goods to Crimea.<sup>10</sup> This was clearly a way to sell goods to Russia while bypassing regular customs and taxation rules, and the situation led to protests. The "Crimea Civic Blockade" organised by the Mejlis – the self-governing body of the Crimean Tatar people – resulted in termination of cargo transportation

from mainland Ukraine, a ban on trade with Crimea, and termination of electricity supplies. On 16 December 2015, the cabinet of ministers adopted resolution no. 1035 to meet protesters' demands.<sup>11</sup> The resolution is still in place along with the law on free economic zone.

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The law of Ukraine "On Sanctions"<sup>12</sup> was also adopted in August 2014 and has been criticised ever since for its failure to produce a coherent and transparent sanctions policy. Presidential decrees imposing sanctions do not specify why and according to which criteria individuals and entities are added to or removed from the sanctions lists. Imposition of sanctions does not seem to apply pressure on the Russian Federation, as the sanctions lists often include Ukrainian citizens or low-level officials (such as the lowest level election commissioners involved in conducting the illegal referendum in 2014), and often looks like an attempt to punish individual perpetrators. The enforcement mechanism is rather patchy.

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8 *Law of Ukraine "On Creation of a Free Economic Zone 'Crimea' and on Peculiarities of Economic Activity in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine"*, Ukraine, No. 1636-VII, 12 August 2014 [<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1636-18#Text>].

9 *FEZ "Crimea". What Does This Legislation Actually Provide for?* Representative Office of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 10 August 2014 [<http://www.ppu.gov.ua/vez-krim-shho-zh-naspravdi-peredbachaye-daniy-zakonodavchiy-akt/>].

10 *Goods Transported into Crimea 2.7 Times Exceed the Goods Transported out of Crimea*, "Ukrainska Pravda", 16 December 2015 [<https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/16/7092700/>].

11 *Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "About Restriction of Deliveries of Specific Goods (Works, Services) from the Temporarily Occupied Territory to Other Territory of Ukraine and / or from Other Territory of Ukraine to the Temporarily Occupied Territory"*, Ukraine, No. 1035, 16 December 2015 [<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1035-2015-%D0%BF#Text>].

12 *Law of Ukraine "On Sanctions"*, Ukraine, No. 1644-VII, 14 August 2014 [<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1644-18>].

Both the Ukrainian parliament and the cabinet of ministers are currently developing necessary amendments to the law.

## **Enforcement of the Crimean Sanctions**


Imposed on a territory occupied by a foreign state, the Crimean sanctions turned out to be vulnerable to bypassing via entities registered in the Russian territory. Evidence collected by the Centre of Journalist Investigations – a Crimean media organisation that was forced to relocate to mainland Ukraine after the occupation – suggests that there are at least several ways in which Crimean residents manage to engage in activities prohibited under the sanctions regime.

Financial sanctions are bypassed by opening correspondent accounts of Crimean banks in the Russian banks which, in turn, have their correspondent accounts abroad. To make internet purchases, residents of Crimea can open accounts in the neighbouring Krasnodarskiy Krai of the Russian Federation across the Kerch Strait and get credit cards, such as Visa and MasterCard, mailed to them without even having to leave their homes. Operations with the cards are cleared in the territory of the Russian Federation. The ban on passenger transport, trucks, and large machinery exports to Crimea is bypassed via a leasing scheme. A leasing company registered in Russia can make a deal with both a bank in the occupied territory and a machinery supplier. Both Russian companies, such as KAMAZ, and joint enterprises, such as PSA Peugeot Citroën Russia, are involved in these operations<sup>13</sup>. Similar schemes exist in the Crimean military industry that

allow Crimean enterprises to participate in export-import operations.

Ukrainian experts such as Yuriy Smelyanskiy of the Maidan of Foreign Affairs believe that all Russian entities involved in such intermediary operations with Crimean entities should also be sanctioned. The monitoring group of the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies, the Maidan of Foreign Affairs, and *Black Sea News* has compiled several lists of the Russian enterprises working with military enterprises in Crimea and Sevastopol and advocates for their inclusion in the sanctions lists.<sup>14</sup>

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 ***Imposed on a territory occupied by a foreign state, the Crimean sanctions turned out to be vulnerable to bypassing via entities registered in the Russian territory***

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One of the most egregious cases of sanctions regime violation was the sale of four Siemens gas turbines for production of electrical energy to Russia, with their subsequent installation in Crimea. Although Siemens claimed that it was misled into believing that the turbines were meant for the Russian territory, an investigation by *Euromaidan Press* clearly demonstrates that the sale was most likely intentional. The contract was concluded in secret with a company that had started building power plants in the occupied Crimea, and the capacity of the turbines to be supplied did not match the need of the Taman power plant, for which

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13 *Schemes to Bypass "Crimean Sanctions"*, Center for Journalist Investigations [https://investigator.org.ua/ua/cr-sanct-ua-schemas/].

14 A. Klymenko, T. Guchakova, O. Korbut, *The Real Impact of Crimean Sanctions (9)*. The Updated "Crimean Sanctions Package", "Black Sea News", 06 June 2020 [https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/163357].



they were purportedly intended.<sup>15</sup> The EU, however, did not fine Siemens. Instead, it added three Russian nationals and three companies responsible for the purchase and transfer of the turbines to their end owner to the sanctions lists.<sup>16</sup>

## Recalibration of Crimean Occupation

Sanctions packages against the Russian Federation over its aggression in Ukraine were imposed in 2014 in several instalments to resolve two problems that had emerged at that time – namely, to reverse the illegal occupation of Crimea and to stop Russian aggression in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Since then, the situation has evolved, and it has become clear that the Russian aggression in Ukraine was just an episode. It was followed by the Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria, interference in the US elections and political processes in other countries, the use of weapon-grade nerve agent in the British territory, and so forth. It has become clear that the world is facing an aggressive and revisionist Russia keen on undermining the West and extending and protecting its sphere of influence.

To make Russia leave the Crimean Peninsula, the issue has to be recalibrated. Practitioners, such as the former deputy assistant secretary for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the Department of Defense and former director for Russia at the US National Security Council Michael Carpenter, stress that to be effective in changing another state's behaviour, sanctions have to meet

several criteria. First, they need to have a serious impact; second, they have to be tied to concrete behaviour and be reversible; and third, they have to be part of a larger framework.<sup>17</sup>

Another useful way to look at sanctions is suggested by a former member of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff at the US State Department, Edward Fishman. He believes that sanctions should be subdivided into four categories, namely "*deterrent sanctions*, focused on discouraging future malfeasance; *coercive sanctions*, aimed at building leverage that can be traded for proactive concessions; *normative sanctions*, intended to 'name and shame' bad actors and signal that their behavior is unacceptable by imposing punishments on them; and *attritional sanctions*, designed to advance long-term goals".<sup>18</sup>

How do both of these frameworks apply to the situation in Crimea?

## Russia's Policies on the Peninsula and Possible Sanctions

The most obvious policy pursued by Russia on the occupied peninsula following its occupation was aimed at integrating Crimea into the Russian state system. The smart sanctions approach taken by the European Union (as opposed to the comprehensive sanctions imposed by the US) was intended to make the integration more difficult and to highlight the non-recognition policy. However, once the peninsula came under

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- 15 A. Shandra, *How Siemens Chose to Ignore the Obvious. An Investigation into the Crimean Sanctions Break*, "Euromaidan Press", 24 July 2017 [<http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/07/24/how-siemens-chose-to-ignore-the-obvious-crimea-turbines/>].
- 16 *Crimea: Siemens Gas Turbines Delivery Penalties*, "Brussels Diplomatic", 05 August 2017 [<https://brusselsdiplomatic.com/2017/08/05/crimea-siemens-gas-turbines-delivery-penalties/>].
- 17 M. Carpenter, *How to Make Sanctions on Russia Work*, "The American Interest", 18 December 2018 [<https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/12/18/how-to-make-sanctions-on-russia-work/>].
- 18 E. Fishman, *Make Russia Sanctions Effective Again*, "War on the Rocks", 23 October 2020 [<https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/make-russia-sanctions-effective-again/>].

the Russian control, it became clear its occupation and integration were not the only purposes.

Militarisation of Crimea and the Sea of Azov, which has turned it into a major threat to regional security, started immediately after the occupation. Security analysts note that Russia can now project its power as far as the Mediterranean and to most of Europe. A recent address to foreign states and international organisations adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 16 February 2021<sup>19</sup> also stressed the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. The peninsula's nuclear infrastructure has been mostly restored, and there is a risk that nuclear warheads may be relocated to its territory.



***Symbolic sanctions, however, remain a viable and necessary option. Respect for human rights and the rules of war is key to the rules-based international order Russia seeks to undermine***

Violations of international humanitarian law, which started with the decision to enforce the Russian rather than Ukrainian law on the occupied territory and to force its residents to adopt Russian citizenship, entail multiple violations such as drafting Ukrainian young men into the army, private and government property redistribution, etc. Another big issue often cited by Ukrainian officials is the violation of the 1954 Hague Convention for

the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

Human rights violations have also become a regular feature of Crimean life. They include forced disappearances, politically motivated persecution of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, persecution of religious communities, persecution of human rights defenders, suppression of media freedom, freedom of expression and information, etc.

As the analysis above has shown, sanctions imposed on Crimea per se are rather strong. Imposing more economic sanctions on the peninsula is likely to have a strong adverse effect on the peninsula's population. Its economy has already significantly deteriorated. One has to keep in mind that it is the behaviour of the Russian state that the policy seeks to change. Crimea in this case is not a subject – it is an object. Closing up the loopholes and preventing possible violations, however, is a necessary measure. Leaving the current framework in place and fine-tuning it to make sure it is properly enforced will serve as an attritional measure.

Militarisation of Crimea and the Sea of Azov appears to be the policy that calls for both deterrence to stem the continued Russian aggression and coercion to make Russia and its troops leave the peninsula. Although sanctions may play a role in this approach, applied to Crimea alone they will not be strong enough. Therefore, they have to be applied to individuals and entities in mainland Russia. Some ideas regarding additional individuals whose appearance on the sanctions lists may

19 Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On the Appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the United Nations, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the BSEC Parliamentary Assembly, Governments and Parliaments Condemning the Temporary Occupation of the Autonomous Republic and the Autonomous Republic Human Rights and Freedoms in the Temporarily Occupied Territories and on the Release of Political Prisoners - Citizens of Ukraine", Ukraine, No. 1229-IX, 16 February 2021 [[http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4\\_2?id=&pf3516=4655&skl=10](http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_2?id=&pf3516=4655&skl=10)].

change Putin's calculus can be found in the work of the International Centre for Policy Studies.<sup>20</sup> In addition, the response to this problem has already been bumped up the escalation ladder, and such collective entities as NATO as well as national militaries are working on it.

Symbolic sanctions, however, remain a viable and necessary option. Respect for human rights and the rules of war is key to the rules-based international order Russia seeks to undermine. In addition, punishing human rights violations in the occupied territory does not raise the issue of sovereignty since the occupying country does not have one. The US and Europe have not applied the measures under the Magnitsky Act to the situation on the peninsula. Ukrainian NGOs have recently submitted a list of names to the US government calling to highlight the fate of three human rights defenders.<sup>21</sup>

The West should consider reversing its policy on not sanctioning judges. In Russia, courts are not independent judiciaries; they are a part of the ruling regime, often making politically preordained rulings. This is especially the case in Crimea in relation to Crimean Muslims. These instances are well documented both domestically in Ukraine and at the international level.<sup>22</sup> Often, judges

are also corrupt and may in fact have some assets outside the country.

Another area where mostly symbolic sanctions can be useful is the area of cultural property. Ukrainian cultural heritage gets transported out of Crimea to the Russian territory. Russia issues permits to conduct excavations in Crimea without Ukraine's permission. People involved in this need to be named and shamed and also denied visas to travel outside of the Russian Federation. After many years in the Soviet Union, with no ability to travel abroad and to work with their foreign colleagues, they value this opportunity, and, as experience has shown, they are capable of organised protest.<sup>23</sup>

A situation that may call for international attention is the water shortage on the peninsula. Following the occupation, Ukraine stopped supplying water to the peninsula through the Eastern Crimea Canal as a display of the non-recognition policy. In addition, it is the occupying power's duty to provide for those residing under the occupation. Due to the draught of 2019-2020, reservoirs had dried up and water in Crimean cities is currently being rationed. In early February 2021, the decision was made in Russia to go ahead with a water desalination project in Crimea.

20 M. Kapitonenko, A. Galoushka, Y. Kiyan, M. Stepanenko, *Sanctions against Russia: Current Status, Prospects, Successes and Gaps in the Multilateral International Sanctions Regime against the Russian Federation*, ICPS - Kyiv 2019 [[http://www.icps.com.ua/assets/uploads/images/files/t\\_sankcii\\_rf\\_a4\\_eng\\_final.pdf.pdf](http://www.icps.com.ua/assets/uploads/images/files/t_sankcii_rf_a4_eng_final.pdf.pdf)].

21 M. Tomak, *Russia's Crimean Crimes Demand Tougher Sanctions*, The Atlantic Council, 19 January 2021 [<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-crimean-crimes-demand-tougher-sanctions/>].

22 Ukrainian human rights organisations such as Crimean Human Rights Group (<https://crimeahrg.org/en/category/monitor-2/>) and Krym SOS (<https://krymsos.com/en/reports/analitichni-zviti-po-krimu/>) in their monthly reports stress the role of courts whose judges regularly make rulings without sufficient evidence and are biased toward the prosecution. Starting from 2016, the UN General Assembly adopts an annual resolution on the "Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine", documenting systematic human rights violations on the peninsula. The latest resolution A/RES/75/192 of 16 December 2020 (<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3894858?ln=en>) and the UN secretary-general's report on the human rights situation in Crimea ([https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A\\_74\\_276\\_E.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_74_276_E.pdf)) can be found on the UN website. They also indicate that courts in Crimea and in Russia make politically preordained rulings in cases involving Crimean prisoners.

23 S. Mokrenyuk, *Cultural Heritage: Sanctions and Their Role in Countering the Russian Aggression*, "The Voice of Crimea", 24 November 2020 [<https://voicecrimea.com.ua/main/mainnews/kulturna-spadshhina-sankcijni-mexanizmi-ta-%D1%97x-rol-u-borotbi-z-rosijskoyu-agresiyeyu.html>].

According to the *Deutsche Welle* report<sup>24</sup>, Russia does not have all the necessary technology to implement the project on its own. Imports, most likely from Europe, will be needed. As of today, supply of the necessary technology is banned. The Ukrainian foreign minister has said that Ukraine is going to block Russia's attempts to build desalination plants in Crimea.<sup>25</sup> Leaving sanctions in place may lead to accusations of human rights violation; lifting them to allow the necessary equipment in may lead to accusations that the West has recognised the annexation while at the same time stimulating additional spending by Russia.

## Wider Framework

As mentioned above, Crimea's occupation is only one of the displays of the Russian aggressive behaviour. It is also a sign of the deteriorating liberal world order. This means that the issue of Crimea's occupation cannot be resolved by narrowly focusing only on Crimea. It also cannot be resolved without involving other powerful players. Russia has to be coerced into leaving the peninsula, and a new settlement needs to be negotiated to make sure Russia does not try to come back.

In two consecutive national security strategies, Ukraine stated that it was going to rely primarily on political and diplomatic means to liberate Crimea. The Crimean Platform, positioned as "our initiative to consolidate international efforts for the de-occupation of Crimea"<sup>26</sup> is a step in this

direction. It is not clear whether Russia is going to join – most likely not, at this point, since it continues claiming that Crimea's annexation cannot be reversed and refuses to talk about it – but Ukraine has already extended an invitation. Negotiations are a significant part of the coercive diplomacy approach. Negotiating only with like-minded players, however, is not likely to yield the desired results.

China and India, posed to become the largest economies in the world along with the United States, have taken a neutral stance on the occupation of Crimea. Both of them had abstained on the 2014 UN resolution in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity. India currently continues to abstain on the human rights resolutions, and China votes against them. Neither of these countries has imposed sanctions. While expecting their full support and participation in pressuring Russia is not realistic, these countries are going to play a significant role in the future global architecture. Engaging with them and widening the focus of the Crimean Platform agenda to include discussions of the future settlement could not only add more legitimacy to the effort but also serve as an additional incentive for Russia to join.

## Conclusion

Crimea cannot be freed from the occupation by either only applying pressure or applying it to Crimea alone. The issue of Crimea's occupation is part of a much

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24 A. Gurkov, *Desalinating Water in Crimea: How Much Is This Going to Cost Crimea and Its Residents*, "Deutsche Welle", 02 February 2021 [<https://www.dw.com/ru/opresnenie-vody-v-krymu-kak-dorogo-ono-obojdetsja-rossii/a-56399577>].

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larger problem – Russian revisionism and aggression seeping through the cracks of the deteriorating world order. Consequently, while the Crimean sanctions are important as an attritionary measure and have to be fine-tuned and expanded, additional measures are needed. First and foremost, Ukraine needs to put its economic and sanctions policy in order, align it with the Western non-recognition policy. Second, additional pressure on Russia has to be applied. Third, the Crimean Platform initiated by Ukraine needs to expand its focus to include discussions of the future settlement and reach out to the countries that may not be its primary allies on the issue of territorial integrity but that are going to have a significant role in the future global architecture.

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