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Resilience

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HYBRIDISATION OF STATE TERRORISM AND SECURITY CHALLENGES TO RESILIENCE IN TIMES OF PROXY-WARS

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In the era of hybrid threats, international security has become more complex in content and meaning, especially when dealing with state terrorism. When identifying key features of state terrorism, it is argued that hybridisation as a process of careful concealment of aggressive foreign policy objectives generates prerequisites for external aggression, as well as conditions for terrorist attacks of both a conventional and unconventional nature. This article investigates the correlation between the hybrid aggression of Russia and Ukraine's vulnerabilities to resile from state terrorism, as Russia's proxy-war against Ukraine at some point could be identified as such.

Introduction

Once hard security tensions on a global level decreased at the end of 1980s, a focus of the global concern shifted to the threat of international terrorism. With tremendous impulse on the eve of the new millennium, it culminated in the unprecedented terrorist attack of 9/11. International terrorism not only received a regular counter-terrorist response but also instigated a global war on terror. It was not accidental that the US called its foreign policy actions and those of its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001-2004 the "War on Terror" and established the Department of Homeland Security with a special focus on domestic anti-terror efforts in November 2002. It was a war indeed, because not only were anti-terror units and intelligence involved, but so were the military and other Special Forces, as well

as the public interest and national budgets to combat terrorists domestically and internationally.

At the same time, civilians appeared to be extremely vulnerable to asymmetrical attacks. Leaving aside a discourse on the general risks to democracy, and particular challenges to human rights, "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001"¹ could be seen as an integral part of a resilience strategy to pre-empt potential threats in the future. Parts of it, like enhancing the variety of law enforcement investigatory and other preventative tools, could be implemented into the resilience strategy of any other country today, in order to deter and punish terrorist acts worldwide and inside their own borders.

1 *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001*, U.S. Congress, 26 October 2001
[<https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf>].

Resilience vs. Terrorism: Political Dilemmas and Security Concerns

Twenty years after 9/11, in an era of hybrid global warfare, the world is facing even more diverse and complicated threats to security and stability than during the previous three decades, hence the necessity for a wider inter-disciplinary approach to security issues connected to various types of terrorism. For example, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) defined “resilience” in politics and international relations as “a new form of governance that endorsed the impossibility of predicting threats, shifting away from the logic focused on known threats and prevention of the (post) Cold War period.”²



Changes in the nature of security – a shift from the global to the human – almost erased the differences between “hard” and “soft” security and their respective threats, the military and non-military components of defence

In Ukraine, national resilience is a narrative that is slowly emerging as an alternative to the traditional approach of managing national security in which all threats are clearly identifiable, government is always in charge of responding to them and non-state actors – formal civil society organizations (CSOs) or informal volunteer movements

and networks – have only a minimal role³. At the same time, the state remains almost the sole actor when it comes to identifying, preventing and combating both domestic and international terrorism.

Changes in the nature of security – a shift from the global to the human – almost erased the differences between “hard” and “soft” security and their respective threats, the military and non-military components of defence. As Ambassador Uğur Ziyal admits, the EU identifies terrorism as one of the key threats being both hard and soft in nature in line with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime.⁴ Indeed, “in reality, there are no clear-cut dividing lines between hard and soft threats” as “a soft threat can easily turn into a hard one.”⁵ That demands engagement of all the resources, which only a state as a key international actor possesses.

At the same time, this does not mean that civil society should be excluded from the anti-terror strategy of a state: there are a lot of spheres where CSOs may be effective in dealing, for example, with brutal propaganda in a counter-propaganda mode, to prevent the incitement of hatred and the infiltration of fakes. The most vivid example is a Ukraine-based *InformNapalm* investigative initiative, a purely volunteer endeavour which does not have any financial support from any government or donor, wishing “to inform the world about the real role of the Russian government in ongoing hybrid conflicts in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries

2 *Resilience – Resilience Fact Sheet*, The European Partnership for Democracy, 2018 [<https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Resilience-Fact-Sheet.pdf>].

3 M. Boulègue, O. Lutsevych, *Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression*, Chatham House, 11 June 2020 [<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-06-09-resilient-ukraine-boulegue-lutsevych.pdf>].

4 U. Ziyal, *Re-Conceptualization of Soft Security and Turkey’s Civilian Contributions to International Security*, “Turkish Policy Quarterly”, 5 September 2004 [<http://turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2004-02-globalsecurity/TPQ2004-2-ziyal.pdf>].

5 *Ibid.*

of Eastern and Central Europe, and in the Middle East.”⁶ On the other hand, CSOs are able to ensure internal support for a state in democratic transformation, and create conditions under which threats of both domestic and international terrorism would be if not totally excluded, at least minimised.

Many countries, after experiencing traditional and hybrid forms of aggression are facilitating their “resilience”, defined as “the ability to be happy, successful again after something difficult or bad has happened” by the Cambridge Dictionary⁷. At the same time, the challenge of elaborating an effective anti-terror strategy at the highest political level globally, regionally and domestically, is connected to the complicated essence of terrorism itself. Indeed, “the definition of terrorism is a difficult concept to map and has been the source of contention in academia and policy for several years now.”⁸ From the academic point of view, this is so because “where some scholars and experts have chosen to work with open-ended definitions, others have delineated several different types of definitions, all exploring and attempting to encompass the many elements that typify what terrorism is.”⁹

In practice, those who fail to achieve their goals by political means turn into terrorists. At the same time, those who achieve their goals by both political means and acts of terrorism usually proclaim

themselves as revolutionaries. History knows many examples. In the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks, supported by other revolutionary parties, had a special terror brigade inside the officially existing party at the beginning of the 20th century. Dualism in the nature of terror leads to dualism in the nature of a terrorist. For some people, desperate guerilla fighters, who carry out suicide bombings, are heroes. For others, they are terrorists, criminals, killers. On the top political level, there is also no clear understanding of what entities could or could not be classified as terrorist organisations. For example, most Western governments, including the European Union and the United States, have classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Norway and Switzerland are notable exceptions. Both adopt a strictly neutral position and maintain diplomatic ties with the organisation that has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007¹⁰. It looks even more challenging when trying to initiate a discourse on state or state-sponsored terrorism, setting aside quite a provocative attempt to give a clear definition of state terrorism.

Can the State Be a Terrorist?

It was not by chance that questions like “Can the state be a terrorist?” and “Can the state commit acts of terrorism?” entered an expert discourse in the 1990s, as the original titles of articles by Peter Alan Sproat¹¹, who

6 InformNapalm: core purpose [<http://informnapalm.rocks/>].

7 *Resilience*, Cambridge Dictionary [<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/resilience>].

8 Z. Stuurman, *Terrorism as Controversy: The Shifting Definition of Terrorism in State Politics*, “E-International Relations”, 24 September 2019 [<https://www.e-ir.info/2019/09/24/terrorism-as-controversy-the-shifting-definition-of-terrorism-in-state-politics>].

9 *Ibid.*

10 B. Restle, *What is Hamas? Who supports Hamas? What you need to know*, “DW”, 11 May 2021 [<https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-hamas/a-57537872>].

11 P. Sproat, *Can the state be a terrorist?* “*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*”, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1991, pp. 19-29 [<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109108435854?journalCode=uter19>]; P. Sproat, *Can the state commit acts of terrorism?: An opinion and some qualitative replies to a questionnaire*, “*Terrorism and Political Violence*”, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1997, pp. 117-150 [<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559708427433>].

complains that there is “a far smaller amount of academic literature on state terrorism than there is on insurgency terrorism.” Sproat also notes, that “the literature on state terrorism, like that on terrorism generally, suffers from a lack of work on the definition of the term.”¹²



when ensuring protective and recovery mechanisms as a platform for a sustainable resilience to preserve statehood, it is essential to analyse the much broader context of the potential objects of state terrorism, when primarily civilians are the targets

One of the key problems is about proper identification both of the subject and of the object of the terrorist activity. As Joseph M. Brown admits, “some scholars argue that the concept of terrorism should only be applied to the behaviour of nonstate actors. Others argue that certain government behaviours may be understood as terrorism if the intent of state violence and threats is to stoke fear and influence the behavior of a wider audience.”¹³ Steve Hewitt in answering a question “What is state terrorism?” explains that “it is similar to non-state terrorism in

that it involves politically or ideologically or religiously inspired acts of violence against individuals or groups outside of an armed conflict. The key difference is that agents of the state are carrying out the violence.”¹⁴ Indeed, as Joseph M. Brown points out, “analytical tools developed in the field of terrorism studies may be useful in helping us understand state behaviour, when violence and threats appear to have a broader communicative function in influencing an audience beyond the immediate target.”¹⁵

Thus, when ensuring protective and recovery mechanisms as a platform for a sustainable resilience to preserve statehood, it is essential to analyse the much broader context of the potential objects of state terrorism, when primarily civilians are the targets. Richard Jackson defined state terrorism as “the use or threat of violence, intimidation or frightening by a state or their proxies towards a broader audience.”¹⁶ As a distinctive feature of state terrorism, such authors as Mark Seldon and Alvin Y. So name civilians as the key subjects of terror: “In state terrorism, a state systematically directs violence against the civilian population of its own or another state.”¹⁷

One example is the case of the Salisbury Novichok poisoning. For Ian Blackford, a Scottish politician serving as Leader of

12 P. Sproat, *An Investigation of the Concept of State Terrorism*, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 1997, p. 4.

13 J. Brown, *State terrorism*, International Studies, Oxford University Press, 26 April 2021 [<https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-600>].

14 S. Hewitt, *Terrorism by the State is still Terrorism*, University of Birmingham, 2020 [<https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/terrorism-by-the-state-is-still-terrorism.aspx>].

15 J. Brown, *State terrorism*, International Studies, Oxford University Press, 26 April 2021 [<https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-600>].

16 R. Jackson, *The 9/11 Attacks and the Social Construction of a National Narrative*, [in:] M. Morgan (ed.), *The Impact of 9/11 on the Media, Arts, and Entertainment: The Day that Changed Everything?* Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke 2009 p. 26.

17 M. Seldon, A. Y. So, *Introduction: War and State Terrorism*, [in:] M. Seldon, A. Y. So (eds.), *War and State Terrorism: The United State, Japan & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, Md. 2004, p. 10.

the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the British House of Commons, it was clear that the attack against Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal on 4 March 2018 was an “act of state terrorism”.¹⁸ Investigation of the Salisbury Novichok poisoning has been carried out by the Counter Terrorism Police – a collaboration of UK police forces working with the UK intelligence community to help protect the public and national security by preventing, deterring and investigating terrorist activity¹⁹.

The U.S. Department of State defines state terrorism as acts of terrorism conducted by governments, or terrorism carried out directly by, or encouraged and funded by, an established government of a state (country), or terrorism practised by a government against its own people or in support of international terrorism²⁰. The official site of The FBI gives definitions both of international and domestic terrorism where the international one stands for “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organisations or nations.”²¹ The case of Russian policy towards Ukraine since 2014 may be disputable, but is still an attempt to elaborate more on the (in) direct interconnection of state policy with a number of aggressive tools for waging hybrid wars, with all the appearance of state-sponsored terrorism.

State Terrorism in Hybrid Aggression: The Case of Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine

In attempts to define state terrorism by academia and at the institutional level, there is a common approach to violence against individuals and society in general as a tool of suppression and submission by a state. In Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine, different types of violence have been applied. They range from the terrorist-like behaviour of the Russian “green men” during the attempted annexation of Crimea in 2014, through the hybrid war in Donbas with the involvement of the Russian military, and up to the selective terror of the Russian FSB against those Ukrainians who had to stay in Crimea after 2014.

Herewith, “military aggression is just one element of the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine. Other elements encompass: 1) propaganda based on lies and falsifications; 2) trade and economic pressure; 3) energy blockade; 4) terror and intimidation of Ukrainian citizens; 5) cyber-attacks; 6) a strong denial of the very fact of war against Ukraine despite large scope of irrefutable evidence; 7) use of pro-Russian forces and satellite states in its own interests; 8) blaming the other side for its own crimes.”²² Such instruments of the hybrid war as informational fakes, the propaganda of hate, and the manipulation of history by

18 *Salisbury Novichok poisoning: SNP MP calls for action against Russia*, “BBC.com”, 6 September 2018 [https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-45432713].

19 *Investigation into the Salisbury and Amesbury Novichok Incidents*, Counter-terrorism policing [https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/].

20 *Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism*, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, U.S. Department of State, 5 August 2010 [https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm].

21 *Terrorism Definitions, What we investigate, FBI* [https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism access 13 September 2021].

22 *10 facts you should know about Russian military aggression against Ukraine*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 19 December 2019 [https://mfa.gov.ua/en/10-facts-you-should-know-about-russian-military-aggression-against-ukraine].

the official state informational agencies and broadcasting institutions, could not, probably, be identified as terrorist acts. But such extreme and even marginal manifestations of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian moods in the Russian discourse in the mass media with engaged “experts”/propagandists do inspire some outsiders to arrive in Ukraine bearing arms as mercenaries. Their intention is to fight against the Ukrainian army, including carrying out acts of violence against civilians for whatever reasons.



Modern information wars waged by state institutions and state information agencies with their propaganda and disinformation could be, at some point, identified as “soft” terrorism

The involvement “of foreign fighters – whom the Russian side presented as ‘volunteers’” concerned about “the fate of Russian speakers in Ukraine” – played into Moscow’s narrative that Russia is ready to stand up for its compatriots abroad.”²³ They do perform different functions, “ranging from information-propaganda to (para)military (a.k.a. mercenary) functions. As such, non-Russian mercenaries and “volunteers” in Russia’s shadow wars have served as both a tool of “soft power” and an actual instrument of “hard power” politics.”²⁴

Modern information wars waged by state institutions and state information agencies with their propaganda and disinformation could be, at some point, identified as “soft” terrorism. It appears to be part of the conventional proxy war as an unconventional part of hybrid warfare. Following Steve Hewitt’s approach to the definition of state terrorism, some of the characteristics of that kind of state behaviour could be seen and heard well enough when observing the (dis) informational flows of the Russian state both domestically and abroad.

All these require not only external military reaction, but internal counteraction. The stability of the Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine depends on the ability and willingness of the local authorities to counteract external threats and disinformation from the aggressor – the Russian Federation. This is just one of the key conclusions reached by the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in the just-released report in the framework of their “Resilient Ukraine” programme.²⁵

By annexing Crimea the way Russia did in 2014, the Kremlin has introduced a new type of warfare, one which Mykhailo Honchar has abbreviated as *hybresia* – the aggression of hybrid type warfare “where military means are not dominant, their use is carefully disguised and denied, and the act of aggression itself generates uncertainties that complicate its identification”.²⁶ According to the Global Terrorism Index 2020 “Ukraine

23 S. Sukhankin, *Foreign Mercenaries, Irregulars and ‘Volunteers’: Non-Russians in Russia’s Wars*, Jamestown Foundation, 9 October, 2019 [<https://jamestown.org/program/foreign-mercenaries-irregulars-and-volunteers-non-russians-in-russias-wars/>].

24 Ibid.

25 *Стойкая Украина – хрупкая мозаика? Сентябрь 2021 Общество, медиа, безопасность и перспективы*, International Centre for Defence and Security, Report, September 2021 [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ICDS_Report_Resilient_Ukraine_Delicate_Mosaic_Teperik_et_al_September_2021_RU.pdf].

26 *Війни – XXI: полігібресія Росії [Wars – XXI: polyhybression of Russia]*, М. Гончар (ред.), Авега: Київ 2017, с. 34.

remains the country in the region with the highest impact of terrorism,²⁷ reaching a peak in 2014 with 407 attacks and 651 deaths, jumping from 3.14 points in 2013 up to 7.2 and remaining at a level of 7.13 in 2014 and 2015 respectively²⁸.

This *Hybresia* of Russia against Ukraine in the East of Ukraine does include certain features of state terrorism, as could be seen within the approach elaborated by Gus Martin. In "Essentials of Terrorism",²⁹ he considers state terrorism with the help of two models of state sponsorship: the patronage model and the assistance one. "State patronage for terrorism," as Martin explains, "refers to active participation in and encouragement of terrorist behaviour. Its basic characteristic is that the state, through its agencies and personnel, actively takes part in repression, violence, and terrorism. Thus, state patrons adopt policies that initiate terrorism and other subversive activities – including directly arming, training, and providing sanctuary for terrorists."³⁰ "State assistance for terrorism," as Gus Matrín continues, "refers to tacit participation in and encouragement of terrorist behaviour. Its basic characteristic is that the state, through sympathetic proxies and agents, implicitly takes part in repression, violence, and terrorism. In contrast to state patrons of terrorism, state assisters are less explicit in their sponsorship, and links to state

policies and personnel are more ambiguous. State assistance includes policies that help sympathetic extremist proxies engage in terrorist violence, whereby the state will indirectly arm, train, and provide sanctuary for terrorists."³¹ He suggests identifying terrorism as a foreign policy tool of a state when it has been manifesting itself in the form of Moral support (politically sympathetic sponsorship), Technical Support (logistically supportive sponsorship), Selective Participation: (episode-specific sponsorship), and in the form of Active participation (joint operations).

In fact, the constant inflow of Russian troops, weaponry, ammunition and fuel to the occupied territory through the uncontrolled section of the Ukrainian-Russian state border, in order to strengthen the units of its regular troops, deployed in Donbas, as well as the illegal armed formations it backs, is the main obstacle to peace in Donbas.³² Not going deeply into examples of Russia fitting into both models of state-sponsored terrorism, we may find certain features of both models of state-sponsored terrorism (which include moral, technical, and direct participation) in relations of Russia with the so-called "LNR" and "DNR", which the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice have referred to as "terrorist organizations" since 2014³³.

27 *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Institute for Economics & Peace, Sydney, November 2020
[<https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf>].

28 *Terrorism Index*, Trading Economics: Ukraine, 2020
[<https://tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/terrorism-index>].

29 G. Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*, SAGE Publications Inc. 2010.

30 G. Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*, SAGE Publications Inc. 2010, p. 68.

31 *Ibid.*

32 *10 facts you should know about Russian military aggression against Ukraine*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 19 December 2019
[<https://mfa.gov.ua/en/10-facts-you-should-know-about-russian-military-aggression-against-ukraine>].

33 ГПУ, СБУ і Мін'юст готують позови про визнання «ДНР» та «ЛНР» терористами, "Radiosvoboda.org", 19 січня 2015 [<https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/26801594.html>].

The Ukrainian government's attempts to restore sovereignty in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblast were officially entitled as "Anti-Terrorist Operation" from April 2014 until February 2018.

The Academic approach to describing state terrorism correlates with the identification of state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. Department of State: "State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to many non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, these groups would have greater difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations."³⁴ There are doubts if the so-called "LNR" and "DNR" would be able to express any decent resistance to the Ukrainian Joint Forces Operation without Russian patronage and assistance. Nevertheless, even when Russia does not officially recognise the quasi-state structures of the so-called "LNR" and "DNR", alongside a loud anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narrative, it openly supports separatists by all possible means, up to granting locals Russian citizenship and the right to participate in elections. This also falls in line with the behaviour of the governments, which corresponds to the evidence of state-sponsored terrorism. As Martin admits, "terrorism by states is characterized by official government support for policies of violence, repression, and intimidation. Such violence and coercion are directed against perceived enemies that the state has determined threaten its interests or security."³⁵

Even if the official adjudication is still ahead, the ongoing investigation of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 crash could also be seen as a process of identifying Russian traces in a chain of other terrorist acts sponsored by Russia. As long as there is no officially proclaimed status of war between Ukraine and Russia, and Russia is permanently denying any kind of connection to the shooting down of the Malaysian airplane, and any other manifestation of terrorism on the territory of Ukraine, it is important that the UN International Court of Justice in 2019 accepted that there was a case in Ukraine's claims under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism against Russia³⁶. Ukraine had alleged that Russia supplied funds, weapons and training to illegal armed groups that have engaged in acts of terrorism in its territory. Thus, Russia also allegedly caused or supported the downing of MH17, among other violent acts.

The behaviour of the Russian president is quite telling. First stating that there was no Russian involvement, the Russian president, during a question-and-answer session on April, 17th, 2014 with Russians in a studio audience, had to confess twice in the end, that those "green men", masked Russian troops without insignia who took over the local Crimean parliament and captured strategic sites across Crimea, were Russian soldiers. The Russian president pointed out, that special armed groups of the Russian Armed Forces "did back the Crimean self-defence forces"

34 *Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism*, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, U.S. Department of State, 5 August 2010 [<https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm>].

35 G. Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies*, SAGE Publications Inc. 2010, p. 66.

36 *Top UN court will consider Ukraine allegations against Russia of treaty violations*, United Nations News, 8 November 2019 [<https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1051001>].

and “created conditions” “for the free expression of the will of the people living in Crimea and Sevastopol”³⁷ during the so-called “Crimean status referendum” on 16 March 2014. Such an approach to combine “free expression of the will” with “the help of special armed forces” to reach Putin’s goals through the illegal and illegitimate referendum backed by the guns of Russian servicemen is also part of the Russian *hybresia*, where “everything looks different, nonlinear. A key role plays, together with the factor of suddenness, the factor of uncertainty. For the enemy and third parties it is difficult to identify and classify what is happening.”³⁸

In fact, links between regimes and terrorism can range from very clear lines of sponsorship to very murky and indefinable associations. According to Gus Martin, “governments inclined to use terrorism as an instrument of statecraft are often able to control the parameters of their involvement, so that they can sometimes manage how precisely a movement or an incident can be traced back to personnel. Thus, state sponsorship of terrorism is not always a straightforward process. In fact, it is usually a covert, secret policy that allows states to claim deniability when accused of sponsoring terrorism.”³⁹ Later Putin did not deny the usage of terrorist tactics on

the part of those “polite people” who dared to use “human-shields” in a “decisive and professional manner”: “I want to be very clear on that. If we make this decision we’ll do it to protect Ukrainian citizens. And we’ll see afterwards if any of their servicemen will dare to shoot on their own people who we’ll stay behind, not in front, but behind! I dare them to shoot women and children – I’d like to see who would give such an order in Ukraine.”⁴⁰

Such an approach to one of the elements of the Russian *hybresia* could even be identified as a fragment of this war of a new type which is notable for its “barbarism, violence and total disregard for established norms and laws.”⁴¹ As Matt Killingsworth from the School of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania continues, “new wars” which are distinguished by avoidance of large-scale battles, are “thought to consist of rolling skirmishes, objectives advanced through control of the population, population displacement and violence directed against civilians. The new war literature emphasizes that force is no longer directed ‘against the enemy’s armed force, but against the civilian population, the aim being to either drive it from it a certain area [...] or to force it to supply and support certain armed groups on a permanent basis.”⁴² This is also true about the use of terrorism.

37 *Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s April 17 Q&A*, “Washingtonpost.com”, 17 April 2014 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-vladimir-putins-april-17-qanda/2014/04/17/ff77b4a2-c635-11e3-8b9a-8e0977a24aeb_story.html].

38 *Війни – XXI: полігібриція Росії [Wars – XXI: polyhybression of Russia]*, М. Гончар (ред.), Авега: Київ 2017, с. 30.

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42 *Ibid.*

Conclusion

After 9/11, since the start of the global war on terror, terrorism has persistently changed its course from an extreme tool of marginal groups towards the key instrument of the foreign policy of marginal political regimes. That does not mean that non-state and state terrorism is something new to world politics, but that both types of destructive behaviour by aggressive actors are making a new splash in the advanced technological environment and international law(lessness) of the present world disorder.

Counter-terrorism today is not just about “hard” security measures, military components, and 24/7 surveillance; it is about strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights, transparency, informational clarity, cyber security, beneficial economic interaction, environmental safety, sanitary and medical sustainability, ideological and geopolitical pluralism, etc., all of which modern resilience strategies should be equipped with.

The hybridisation of terrorist acts, which such political regimes as that in Russia are trying to use as a tool in their foreign policy, undermines all the above-mentioned conditions for the sustained long-term human, national and international security, and complicates resilience as such, particularly for Ukraine. In this context, hybridisation is understood as an artificial policy to hide aggressive intentions under the cover of uncertainty, double standards, “empty signifiers”, but “good intentions” – all that complicates and weakens the ability of the objects of the violence to resist. Hybridisation as a process of careful concealment of these extreme foreign policy objectives, makes neither actors nor methods of its achievements clear at first sight to outsiders. Hybridisation generates prerequisites for aggression, as well as conditions for the terrorist attacks of a different nature (ranging from military to

humanitarian) in the targeted areas of the initiated proxy-wars. As long as the main targets of terrorist attacks are civilians, it is vitally important to expand more on the interaction between hybrid threats, hybrid aggression, and the resilient capacity of state institutions in unified tandem with civil society to combat both “hard” and “soft” terrorism in a frame of the commonly accepted “national interests.”



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Depending on the scale of a hybrid act of aggression, the actions of state-sponsored terrorism could range from just pinpoint strikes like the one in Salisbury, up to a full-scale hybrid act of aggression with the use of a variety of “hard” and “soft” offensive mechanisms and techniques. Following this, all the appropriate methods, tools, and procedures to resile from attacks should be driven by an existential idea – by a goal that the state be restored to previous conditions by regaining its original shape as much as possible, taking into account irreplaceable losses, including the casualties of hybrid terrorist attacks.

In the case of Ukraine, resilience strategically means complete peace and restoration of territorial integrity and the state’s sovereignty over the temporarily occupied territories. The Crimean Platform – a recent diplomatic initiative

of the Ukrainian President – which is designed to be turned into an international coordination mechanism on the way to full and complete restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea, may serve as an example of today’s Ukraine’s resilient strategy, alongside a number of activities of the Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories. As soon as the hybridisation of state terrorism combines a number of “hard” and “soft” security threats, resilience should also foresee and include mechanisms of strengthening both conventional and unconventional components of defence (especially in the field of information, energy, and cyber security) in both pre-emptive and preventive formats, in order not to let them relapse again either from abroad, or from inside the country.

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