

UA: UKRAINE ANALYTICA

Issue 3 (5), 2016



- CHANGE OF MILITARY BALANCE
- HARD SECURITY
- NATO COOPERATION

Military Security

Editors

Dr. Hanna Shelest
Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko

Publisher:

Published by NGO "Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation" (Ukraine), Centre of International Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine and International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine).

UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian academic/analytical journal in English on International Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, students interested in the international relations and Ukraine in particular.

Contacts:

website: <http://ukraine-analytica.org/>
e-mail: Ukraine_analytica@ukr.net
Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/ukraineanalytica>
Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica

The views and opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine Analytica or its editors and Board of Advisors.

ISSN 2518-7481

BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Visiting Scholar at Center for European Studies at Harvard University)

Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, Director of the Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Center)

Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National University by I.I. Mechnikov)

Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Deputy Director at the Caucasus Institute)

Stephan Meuser (Germany, Director of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Romania)

James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs)

Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence)

H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to France)

Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, Director Defence Transformation at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies)

Ivanna Klymush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice-Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic Integration of Ukraine)

Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director of the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey))

Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the Norwegian Nobel Institute)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

UKRAINE IS READY TO CONTRIBUTE INTO EUROPEAN AND EUROATLANTIC SECURITY	3
<i>Interview with Vice Prime Minister for European and Euroatlantic integration of Ukraine Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze for UA: Ukraine Analytica</i>	
THE (POST) WARSAW NATO STRATEGY AND THE EASTERN FLANK: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE SOUTH	7
<i>Ana Isabel Xavier</i>	
NATO PROJECTING STABILITY BEYOND EASTERN FLANK — POPULATION CENTRIC OPERATIONS	14
<i>Natalia Wojtowicz</i>	
CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION	20
<i>Grigoriy Perepelytsia</i>	
DYNAMICS OF RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PRACTICAL STRATEGY	29
<i>Sergey Minasyan</i>	
THE BLACK SEA SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN TIMES OF COLLAPSE: THE CASE OF ANNEXED CRIMEA AND MILITARY CHALLENGES FOR THE US, NATO, EU, TURKEY, AND UKRAINE	36
<i>Sergii Glebov</i>	
RUSSIA'S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA IN THE LIGHT OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN AGREEMENTS ON THE BLACK SEA FLEET	47
<i>Oleksandr Zadorozhnii</i>	
WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR NAVY COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA?	56
<i>Hanna Shelest</i>	
BELARUS IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEW COLD WAR: CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS	62
<i>Arseni Sivitski</i>	

WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR NAVY COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA?

Dr. Hanna Shelest
UA: Ukraine Analytica

Since 2014, the Black Sea regional navy cooperation has seen a dramatic change. From the “Turkish lake concept” and idea of active navy cooperation of littoral states, it has come to the freeze of all original cooperation such as BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony and a possibility of a greater NATO involvement in the region. Crisis in the Russian-Turkish relations also presented a chance for the Ukrainian-Turkish military relations intensification, and Romanian initiative on the Black Sea Fleet. Author argues that it is still early to speak about future navy configurations and frameworks of the cooperation in the Black Sea region, but it already should be considered not as an isolated war theatre but in a conjunction with the Caspian and Mediterranean basins.

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 has changed a security and military balance in the Black Sea region, not only by violating the basic principles of the international law (territorial integrity) but also by shifting the existed force deployments and frameworks. The Black Sea region is returning to the times of confrontation existed during the Cold War, but with a new paradigm of regional relations. Militarization of Crimea, possibility for nuclear weapon deployment, changes in the spheres of navigation responsibility, navy modernization in Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, break in the Russian-Turkish relations are just few elements of the new evolving order.

Navy cooperation in the Black Sea region

For a decade, there have been two navy cooperative initiatives in the Black Sea region — BLACKSEAFOR — a multinational naval task force that includes Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and

Bulgaria, and Black Sea Harmony — multinational naval operation initiated by Turkey, includes Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Romania. Both aimed for cooperation in a specific sphere — navy, in a limited geography — the Black Sea, and were perceived as a positive element of the military cooperation between the regional states, some of which had competing interests or conflicting views towards security.

Black Sea Harmony and BLACKSEAFOR had been in many things duplicating each other, rather than supplementing. For several years already, experts have been talking about a necessity to unite efforts and capacities of two initiatives. However, this process have not been started, and in a current situation, it will be beyond implementation. With the development of the Ukrainian crisis, it is possible to state that future cooperation in current formats is impossible, as Ukraine and Russia have been participated in both. Creation of a new format is not being considered yet, as if the Russian Federation excluded, so all other

states can concentrate their cooperation within the NATO framework.

It is worth mentioning that Turkey's views on maritime security in the Black Sea area have been for many years much closer to Russia's than to those of the United States. Ankara essentially regarded the Black Sea as a "Turkish lake" and opposed an expansion of both the NATO and the U.S. military presence there¹. Turkish officials usually argued that the Black Sea security should be provided by the littoral countries of the Black Sea. Instead of increasing the U.S. or NATO military presence, Ankara de facto blocked U.S. initiatives designed to increase the role of NATO's Operation Active Endeavour in the Black Sea in 2006, and proposed expanding of the BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony, which were almost copying Active Endeavour operation in Mediterranean. In this regard, Russia and Turkey found a perfect compromise, preventing others to be involved in regional affairs. The Romanian disagreement to such a state was mostly ignored.

Turkish dominance in the Black Sea and desire to lead and overview the region, resulted in a situation, when in 2014 there were lack of understanding of the threats and challenges in the Black Sea region by the NATO authorities. Despite the regular navy and military trainings, they have not resulted neither in a strategy, not in an action plan in case of a crisis. Having three member-states in the Black Sea, it has not turned in the NATO presence in the region. In some way it was suitable for Alliance

to rely solemnly on Turkey, delegating the responsibility, as no real threats or challenges had been expected.

Changes, triggered by the illegal annexation of Crimea, raised awareness among many European states, which believed that the EU must have a security response and reconsider their foreign and security policies, which must be reflected in a reviewed European Security Strategy, in the European Maritime Security Strategy and in the EU Strategy for the Black Sea². No such reaction was noticed within the NATO framework, which considered the Black Sea risks in a wider European context, emphasizing and enhancing security in the Baltics and at the Eastern flank, with the sea mostly left for the individual countries initiatives. The Allies failed to develop an effective Black Sea security architecture that could deter Russia's advances, which should be considered within the larger anti-NATO strategy in which naval forces play a significant and growing role³. However, the EU has also almost did not pay attention to the Black Sea region in its updated Global Strategy of 2016, concentrating mostly on global issues.

On the eve of the NATO Warsaw Summit, more and more experts urged for greater NATO involvement in the Black Sea region. A. Cohen from Atlantic council insists that NATO possesses economic and technological superiority over Russia, that does not translate into a regional military superiority that is sufficient to deter Russia, as it lacks an adequate policy, force structure, coordination, and command and

¹ Larrabee, F. Stephen, Peter A. Wilson and John Gordon IV. 2015. The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security: Implications for the United States and US Army. RAND Corporation, Accessed February 25, 2016. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR903/RAND_RR903.pdf

² European Parliament. 2015. Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the strategic military situation in the Black Sea Basin following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia (2015/2036(INI)). May 21. Accessed February 25, 2016. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2015-0171&language=EN>

³ Bugajski, Janusz, and Peter B. Doran. 2016. "Black Sea Rising. Russia's Strategy in Southeast Europe." Black Sea Strategic Report No. 1. Center for European Policy Analysis. February. Accessed February 25, 2016. <http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/Black%20Sea%20Rising.pdf>

control system in the Black Sea region⁴. Thus in the Black Sea it is generally present within a bilateral framework of cooperation with separate states. For example, the ideas to support Ukrainian Navy modernization is sound from time to time, but no information on a comprehensive NATO strategy development for the region, still predominantly focusing on a land and air defence of the Eastern Flank.



the ideas to support Ukrainian Navy modernization is sound from time to time, but no information on a comprehensive NATO strategy development for the region, still predominantly focusing on a land and air defence of the Eastern Flank

In 2016, Romania's President Klaus Iohannis expressed idea of the so-called "Black Sea Fleet", which could unite Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Ukraine's fleet. While Ukraine actively supported the idea of a new naval cooperation initiative, Bulgaria backed the idea by President Rosen Plevneliev and rejected by Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, afraid of irritating Russia. The absence of the clear concept, how this initiative would look like, made President Iohannis to explain, stating that an initiative designed for cooperation in the area of joint exercises and joint training and should be deployed under the NATO umbrella, because all the three Black Sea countries — Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey — are NATO allies, but not be seen as a creation of a new structure or a joint fleet.

Russian-Turkish relations and Montreux Convention

Neither Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, nor the illegal annexation of Crimea had serious influence on the Russian-Turkish relations. It has been Syria and conflicting interests of two partners that shook and almost derailed their engagement. For the opinion of the Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, it seems clear that Putin was sure that the Turks would be amenable and somehow two countries would divide things up, that was a fundamental mistake⁵. Additional reason for such considerations were Turkish adherence to Montreux Convention and previous behaviour during the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008.

Ankara is strongly opposed to any initiative that might imply a change in the status of the convention or that could disturb the maritime status quo in the Black Sea region. In August 2008, Turkey declined entrance to the Black Sea for two U.S. Navy hospital ships, the USNS Comfort and the USNS Mercy, through the Dardanelles with humanitarian aid for Georgia, because their tonnage exceeded the limits allowed for foreign warships under the Montreux Convention. The United States eventually sent the aid aboard the destroyer USS McFaul, the USCGC Dallas, and the USS Mount Whitney, all of which were well below the tonnage limits allowed under the Montreux Convention⁶. Even after the annexation of Crimea, when many experts started to search variants on greater US or NATO Navy presence in the Black Sea

⁴ Cohen, Ariel. 2016. NATO Should Stand Up Black Sea Command Before It's Too Late. The Huffington Post. July 6. Accessed July 6, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-ariel-cohen/nato-should-stand-up-blac_b_10831440.html

⁵ Coalson, Robert. 2016. "News Analysis: Russian Buildup Focuses Concerns around the Black Sea." Radio Free Europe, February 23. Accessed February 25, 2016. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-black-sea-military-build-up-turkey/27569877.html>

⁶ Larrabee, F. Stephen, Peter A. Wilson and John Gordon IV. 2015. The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security: Implications for the United States and US Army. RAND Corporation, Accessed February 25, 2016. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR903/RAND_RR903.pdf

region, the Turkish position remained the same, any presence only according to the Montreux Convention, no changes to which are envisaged.

Russia's build-up in the Black Sea occurred during the time of good relations between Moscow and Ankara, complemented with the personal relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The incidents with Russian military airplanes and different perception of the Syrian conflict has changed these relations dramatically, and influenced not only the Middle East, but even more — the Black Sea region possible scenarios. Despite the recent change of the situation and improvement in the Russian-Turkish relations, the previous example of the rapid transformation and absence of a compromise on main conflicting points (Syria, Crimea, etc.), still allow to separate economic-political dimension, from military-security and navy cooperation between the two states.

Some experts suggests that with both countries prominently present in the Black Sea, the possibilities for more dangerous incidents are high⁷. Considering the fact that Turkey is a NATO member, any serious incidents can involve the Alliance. Clear Turkish orientation and reliance on NATO⁸ rather than searching excuse from Russia, demonstrated Turkish security priorities. This rift in Russian-Turkish relations

presented a chance for the deeper NATO involvement in the Black Sea region, and for a search of a new security configurations and partnerships in the region.

The opinion exists, that in the case of the Black Sea, Russia can concentrate its forces in a relatively small area to gain advantage, whereas NATO has limited access to these waters largely because of stipulations in the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the naval presence of non-littoral states in the Black Sea⁹. As a result, most of the existed research are comparing only Russian-Turkish military balance in the Black Sea region, not considering accumulative efforts of three NATO littoral member states that currently received better stimulus for enhanced cooperation both on bilateral and multilateral basis. Despite the fact that according to the Montreux Convention, Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there¹⁰, the NATO ships can elaborate an operation based on a continuous rotation of the different states' ships. Another option can be reinforcement of the littoral NATO members by the additional ships and arms, for example, on a leasing basis, what will not be considered under the Convention's restrictions. Some experts propose establishment of a NATO regional command capable of coordinating all defensive activities in the theatre¹¹.

⁷ Coalson, Robert. 2016. "News Analysis: Russian Buildup Focuses Concerns around the Black Sea." Radio Free Europe, February 23. Accessed February 25, 2016. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-black-sea-military-build-up-turkey/27569877.html>

⁸ MacFarquhar, Neil, and Steven Erlangernov. 2015. "NATO-Russia Tensions Rise After Turkey Downs Jet". New York Times, November 24. Accessed February 25, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/europe/turkey-syria-russia-military-plane.html?_r=0

⁹ Bugajski, Janusz, and Peter B. Doran. 2016. "Black Sea Rising. Russia's Strategy in Southeast Europe." Black Sea Strategic Report No. 1. Center for European Policy Analysis. February. Accessed February 25, 2016. <http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/Black%20Sea%20Rising.pdf>

¹⁰ Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits Signed at Montreux. July 20. 1936

¹¹ Cohen, Ariel. 2016. NATO Should Stand Up Black Sea Command Before It's Too Late. The Huffington Post. July 6. Accessed July 6, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-ariel-cohen/nato-should-stand-up-blac_b_10831440.html



Big ships of war within the Black Sea waters is more an issue of the prestige rather than effectiveness.

In addition, Ukraine and Turkey received a chance to add significant military and security component to their relations, which were mostly based on economic interests. According to Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council Secretary O. Turchynov, "Ukraine and Turkey have a unique historical opportunity to combine political, diplomatic, military-technical and economic resources for the efficient and coordinated response to the destruction of the balance of forces in the Black Sea region"¹². This idea was supported by his Turkish counterpart Seyfullah Hacimüftüoğlu, stating that two countries must play a leading role in creation of the efficient system of regional security, where combination of the potentials of countries can provide a very efficient synergy¹³.

As for the Russian Federation, the Black Sea region is not perceived as a separate region, but as a part of the Black Sea-Mediterranean zone, so the operation is impossible without smooth passage of Bosphorus and Dardanelle. Despite the demonstration of force by launching missiles from the Caspian Sea to reach targets in Syria¹⁴, possibilities of such operations are very limited and not very effective in a current combat situation. However, for the opinion of the US officials: "this launch from the Caspian Sea was more

than just hitting targets in Syria, they have assets in Syria that could have handled this. It was really about messaging to the world and us that this is a capability that they have and they can use it"¹⁵. In some way, it was a response to the appeared propositions, to close the Black Sea straits to the Russian Fleet, so not to allow Crimean base to be a headquarter for the Syrian operation. Some experts explained it by high-cost and timing that Russia would need for sending forces from the Northern Fleet navy bases, so hoping it would either prevent or limit Moscow engagement in Syria. Strike from the Caspian Fleet to Syria proved that closing the straits is not an option. Neither from the legal point of view, nor strategic one.

This incident demonstrated that the Black Sea could not be considered anymore as a single-sea security system. For years, there were definitions of the Black Sea — Caspian cooperation, or the Black Sea-Mediterranean marine system, but in terms of security, it is time to consider three seas as a package.

As all regional countries currently consider navy modernization and increase training, one of the conclusions can be made, that most of the tasks can be done by smaller ships but with a proper equipment and rapid reaction. Big ships of war within the Black Sea waters is more an issue of the prestige rather than effectiveness. However, their existence should be considered, in case possibility of spreading the conflict to the Mediterranean is envisaged. The

¹² Censor. 2016. "Turchynov and Turkish NSC Secretary-General Seyfullah Hacimüftüoğlu discussed cooperation in military-technical sphere." January 21. Accessed February 23, 2016. <http://en.censor.net.ua/p370364>

¹³ Censor. 2016. "Turchynov and Turkish NSC Secretary-General Seyfullah Hacimüftüoğlu discussed cooperation in military-technical sphere." January 21. Accessed February 23, 2016. <http://en.censor.net.ua/p370364>

¹⁴ BBC. 2015. "Russian missiles 'hit IS in Syria from Caspian Sea.'" October 7. Accessed February 25, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34465425>

¹⁵ Cavas, Christopher P. 2015. "Is Caspian Sea Fleet a Game-Changer?" Defence news, October 11. Accessed February 20, 2016. <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/10/11/caspian-sea-russia-navy-mis-siles-attack-strike-military-naval-syria-frigate-corvette-lcs-littoral-combat-ship/73671188>

future implementation of the new ships acquisitions (type, tonnage, weaponry) will be the main indicators for the countries' strategies evaluation, including such plans as extension of the navy power beyond the Black Sea region.

At the current stage, it is early to speak about future navy configuration in the Black Sea region. While the old arrangements of the BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony are frozen, the new initiatives, such as the Romanian Black Sea Fleet idea, have not been elaborated properly to envisage their future effectiveness. NATO coming to a conclusion that its role in the Black Sea region should be increased, does not have a strategy and a vision of its regional presence and policy, due to the long reliance on Turkey as a leading actor in the region. Nevertheless, the recent crisis in Ukraine and Syria, as well as fleet modernization

plans and understanding of the challenges, has been leading to a necessity to start considering the Black Sea region and possible navy cooperation in it, not as a single theatre but in conjunction with the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

Dr. Hanna Shelest, *Editor-in-chief at UA: Ukraine Analytica*. Prior to this, she had served for more than 10 years as a Senior Researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine, Odessa Branch. In 2014, she was a Visiting Research Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. Her main research interests are conflicts resolution, security and cooperation, especially in the Wider Black Sea Region and the Middle East, foreign policy of Ukraine. She has more than 50 academic and more than 100 articles in media published worldwide. Dr. Shelest is a John Smith Fellow 2012 and Marshall Memorial Fellow 2016.
