

UA: UKRAINE ANALYTICA

Issue 2 (16), 2019

LOWER DANUBE
REGION
AUTHORITIES
CENTRALIZATION
LOCAL INSTRUMENTS
ITALY
PARADIPLOMACY
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
EUROPE OF REGIONS
MACRO-REGION
COORDINATION
UKRAINE
EUROREGION
BLACK SEA
MOLDOVA
REGIONNESS
PERIPHERY
PROJECTS
EUSDR

- CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION
- EU DANUBE STRATEGY
- EUROPEAN REGIONS

Europe of Regions

Editors

Dr. Hanna Shelest
Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko

Publisher:

Published by NGO "Promotion of Intercultural Cooperation" (Ukraine), Centre of International Studies (Ukraine), with the financial support of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine, the Black Sea Trust.

UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian analytical journal in English on International Relations, Politics and Economics. The journal is aimed for experts, diplomats, academics, students interested in the international relations and Ukraine in particular.

Contacts:

website: <http://ukraine-analytica.org/>
e-mail: Ukraine_analytica@ukr.net
Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/ukraineanalytica>
Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica

The views and opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine Analytica, its editors, Board of Advisors or donors.

ISSN 2518-7481

500 copies

BOARD OF ADVISERS

Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Director of the European Policy Institute)

Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, Director of the Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Center)

Amb., Dr. Serhij Korsunsky (Ukraine, Director of the Diplomatic Academy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine)

Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National University by I.I. Mechnikov)

Amb., Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia to Romania)

Marcel Röthig (Germany, Director of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine)

James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs)

Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence)

Amb., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to France)

Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, Director Defence Transformation at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies)

Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice-Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic Integration of Ukraine)

Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director of the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey))

Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the Norwegian Nobel Institute)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EUROPE IS FACING BOTH INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION	3
<i>Interview with Andreas Kiefer, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe</i>	
EUROPE OF REGIONS: DO STRONGER REGIONS LEAD TO SEPARATISM SENTIMENTS?	10
<i>Dmytro Poble</i>	
ITALIAN PARADIPLMACY IN ACTION: THE ENGINE OF CONTRAST OR PURE SELF-INTEREST?	18
<i>Victoria Vdovychenko</i>	
FROM “EUROPE OF THE REGIONS” TO “THE REGIONS OF EUROPE”: DOES FRAGMENTATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION MAKE THE EU SAFER?	27
<i>Sergii Glebov</i>	
MACRO-REGIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE EU	36
<i>Rostyslav Tomenchuk</i>	
HOW CAN CHALLENGES BE TRANSFORMED INTO OPPORTUNITIES — LOWER DANUBE EUROREGION CASE	43
<i>Florentina-Natalia Budescu</i>	

FROM “EUROPE OF THE REGIONS” TO “THE REGIONS OF EUROPE”: DOES FRAGMENTATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION MAKE THE EU SAFER?

Dr Sergii Glebov

Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University

European integration faces internal resistance at least for the past decade. Accompanied by a tremendous external pressure – from illegal flow of migrants to direct and indirect destructive “arrows” from the side of Russia (especially after 2013), the European political space found itself directly threatened by fragmentation. Analysing the case of the Black Sea region vis-a-vis the EU, the author argues that any disintegration in Europe at the regional level is threatening its security. Thus, the EU and its neighbours, in line with Europeanisation, have to preserve and continue to use all the mechanisms of inter-regional cooperation to keep them as protective security measures, not letting anyone to turn post-bipolar regionalisation into an instrument of division and conflict.

European integration with its inspiring spirit and promising ideas (even if idealistic to some extent) appeared to be a business card of the post-bipolar globalisation in Europe. As a pan-European process at the junction of geo-economics and geopolitics on the basis of the so-called “European values”, it has passed different stages of manifestation and targeted various agendas simultaneously since the beginning of the 1990s. Beyond the initial enlargement of the European Union after Maastricht, the leaders of the EU on the way to a “New Europe” also tended to consider almost all non-EU European states, and not only the EU’s particular neighbours but entire European sub-regions, e.g. around the Black Sea, as part of the on-going process of Europeanisation (which seems already forgotten by some).

The Black Sea region has been going through hard times since 2014, being if not a “Russian

lake” yet (basically due to the enlarged NATO presence) but definitely the first post-bipolar region where the “Water curtain” between the democratic world and Putin’s Russia has been remodelled to substitute the “Iron curtain” in just a quarter of a century after the latter was removed globally.

The Black Sea region started to reveal itself with the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). It appeared to be the first strong initiative in the region to unite countries that share regional interest and aim to turn the Black Sea into a zone of peace, stability, and prosperity. The *BSEC Declaration* with the *Bosporus Statement* of the same date, both adopted at the first Black Sea summit on 24 June 1992, have started regional cooperation for 11 countries which decided to consider themselves as the Black Sea states not only from the narrow geographical but also from

the functional point of view in the era of globalism. As Charalambos Tsardanidis, Director of the Institute of International Economic Relations from Athens, said, "For developing countries, like most of the BSEC states, participation in sub-regional and regional cooperation schemes alongside more developed and experienced states is a step towards integration into the broader global system. From this point of view sharing experience and mutual support from member countries in intraregional structures adds complementary elements to their development and helps them adjust to the competitive milieu of globalisation."¹

New Europe or Europe of Regions

At the same time, the intention to construct the "New Europe" has never been the end in itself (as well as the post-bipolar regionalisation as a process), but meant to involve European countries in a democratic, secure, and cooperative process of Europeanisation strengthened by institutionalisation of their formal ties. It was the getaway from the "Old Europe". BSEC, the Baltic Council, the Visegrad Group, the Barents Sea Council, the Danube Basin Group, the Central European Initiative, the Euro-Mediterranean Initiative were established almost simultaneously and represented centres of transnational cooperation on sub-continental level in Central, Eastern, South-eastern Europe.

All of them were "genetically" supplementing the new structural concept of the sustainable European system of security and cooperation since the mid-1990s. This conception is also known under the title of "Europe of the Regions". It was elaborated in the middle of the 1990s by such analytical

locomotives of European regionalism as the Foundation for International Understanding (Copenhagen, Denmark) and the European Center for Ethnic, Regional, and Sociological Studies (University of Maribor, Slovenia). This conception proposed a way for a fundamental transformation of international relations in Europe: Each region (locality) would be present in or accessible to the whole of Europe (the world), and Europe (the world) with all its diversity would be present in each region (locality).

The "Europe of the Regions" concept has been seen as practical means for reanimation of Charles de Gaulle's well-known thesis of "Europe from Atlantic to the Urals", developed later by Eve la Coste's school of regional geopolitics, by the "New Right" with Alain de Benoist, who proposed the thesis of "United Europe of a Hundred Flags." All these concepts could be seen as integral parts of Europeanisation. All mentioned sub-regional structures were widely open for Europeanisation and represented one of the most fruitful fields for globalist tendencies and innovations. In this regard, "regionalism can be used also as a stepping-stone towards more global or multilateral relations. In deepening integration, and in proceeding with reform, new vested interests can be created through regional liberalisation. Reforms can be secured and if backlashes are feared, regional arrangements can be created to ensure that there are no reversals."²

In one of the main OSCE documents of the 1990s - in the *Helsinki Summit Declaration* of 1992, "The Challenges of Change," in which the concept of European development before the third millennium is articulated - one can read:

1 C. Tsardanidis, *The BSEC: From New Regionalism to Inter-regionalism?* "Agora Without Frontiers", 2005, vol. 10 (4), p. 366.

2 Ibid.

“These and the other forms of regional and sub-regional cooperation which continue to develop, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Visegrad Triangle, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Central European Initiative, multiply the links uniting CSCE participating States... The participating States welcome the various regional cooperation activities among the CSCE participating States as well as transfrontier cooperation and consider them an effective form of promoting CSCE principles and objectives as well as implementing and developing CSCE commitments.”³

In this regard, post-bipolar regionalism in Europe maintained a wide panorama of features. It acted as both a process and a philosophical category. It was accepted by the states as an important cooperative instrument to solve common problems. On the one hand, this vision could be represented as a foreign policy philosophy of the states of one region. On the other, regionalism supplies countries of the region with concrete, practical directions of cooperation. As Michael Keating states,

the “region-building bears a strong resemblance to nation-building, with its mobilisation of symbolic values and its selective use of history. The key difference is that in this case we are not talking of the construction of a state or the mobilisation of state powers and resources. Rather, it is a question of building a system of social

regulation and collective action below the level of the nation-state, and lacking sovereign powers. This is being done in a context of globalisation and European integration, which place regions in direct contact with the global market and, to some degree, with European institutions.”⁴



regionalism supplies countries of the region with concrete, practical directions of cooperation

Underlining the importance of sub-regional structures in Europe with or without the involvement of particular EU members, one should take into account that the Black Sea region has been strategically addressed by the EU fairly recently – just since 2007, when the first two Black Sea littoral states became members of the EU. Formally, the EU’s first “turn” vis-a-vis the Black Sea region was institutionalised with the adoption of the Black Sea Synergy initiative,⁵ launched by the European Commission on 11 April 2007 under the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a materialisation of the EU’s “consciousness” of its new presence on the shores of the Black Sea and the EU’s “dual sense of responsibility and reliance”.⁶

For the EU, this new stage of regionalism meant that being itself the geopolitical

3 *The Challenges of Change: Helsinki Summit Declaration*, CSCE, 09-10 July 1992, [<https://www.osce.org/mc/39530?download=true> access: 04 August 2019].

4 M. Keating, *Rethinking the Region: Culture, Institutions and Economic Development in Catalonia and Galicia*, “Territorial Politics in the Age of Globalization”, ECPR Workshop: Regionalism Revisited, Mannheim, March 1999, [<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5589/9d61b0980511254127123ed20f34f81bd635.pdf> access: 03 August 2019].

5 *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*, COM (2007) 160 final, Brussels, 11 April 2007, [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf access: 02 August 2019].

6 B. Ferrero-Waldner, *Black Sea Synergy: The EU’s Approach to the Black Sea Region*, Black Sea Synergy Ministerial Meeting, Kiev, 14 February 2008, [<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/77&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> access: 05 August 2019].

space, it came into touch with another geopolitical space, interacting and partly integrating it. Thus, the essence of the EU's Black Sea "regionness" (in Björn Hettne's meaning),⁷ which was elaborated from just a regional policy into the entire Black Sea strategy, combined features of both internal integration and regional governance outside the EU at the same time. By the way and what later appeared quite symptomatic, in the beginning of October 2004 the former Austrian foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner (anticipating one of the top positions in the European Commission at that time) stated that the EU must be interested at least to keep Ukraine on its side not to appear in the Russian sphere of influence, because Russia was going back in terms of democracy.⁸ From the height of the year 2019, we may judge that all the events within the next 15 years, between 2004 and 2019, only confirmed that such a vision was accurate and applicable to the rest of the Black Sea region.

The EU Policy in the Black Sea Region

The EU's relationship to the Black Sea region was rather controversial from the very beginning. The key methodological puzzle for the EU policymakers was as follows: yes, indeed, the EU became part of the Black Sea region, while the Black Sea region did not become part of the EU. That meant that the EU's both Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy faced certain limitations in dealing with regional agendas to correspond to the EU's priorities fully. Having no direct jurisdiction over a major part of the region, excluding, of course, the territory of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU would have to face the alternative, even

contradictive regional approaches other Black Sea littoral states could have and pursue. It looked like to be "just part of the Black Sea region" was not quite enough to defend political, security, and economic interests and there were no guarantees they would not be threatened in the future due to the lack of power in outside regional governance mechanisms.

One should bear in mind that the EU, as a unique entity with certain features of confederation, had to be stuck in between national and international discourses on the European regionalism. Internal regionalisation inside the EU member states differs from the external one outside the EU, where the EU members cooperate with non-EU members at the level of Euroregions as well. In both cases, we acknowledge an inevitable appearance of multinational Euroregions in a cross-border cooperation framework. The principal difference is that the border regions of two or more EU member states at the top level are being regulated by *acquis communautaire*, while Euroregions, with the EU and non-EU members, are subjects to traditional intergovernmental agreements and/or respective multilateral agreements at the level of local authorities within their competences and under domestic and international regulations.

The effectiveness of the European regionalisation between the EU and the non-EU counterparts appears to be even less when it touches upon interregional cooperation with entire sub-regions. In the case of the Black Sea sub-region of Europe, one can find a multinational mixture of 12 BSEC members, which differ in size, economic capacity, and overall regional

7 B. Hettne, *Theorising the Rise of Regionness*, "New Political Economy," 2000, vol. 5, pp. 457-472.

8 Op. cit. S. Glebov, *The EU Policies Toward the Ukraine*, [in:] B. Balamir-Coskun, B. Demirtas-Coskun (eds.), *Neighborhood Challenge: The European Union and Its Neighbors*, Universal Publishers: Boca Raton, Florida 2009, p. 343.

and even global influence. The EU, with the assistance of a variety of conceptual approaches to the modern European regionalism basically connected to “conceptualization of the ‘new regionalism’ and accounts of the changing territorial structure of the state”⁹, more or less has adopted internal European regionalism and its understanding. As Iain Deas and Alex Lord from the University of Manchester, making “attempts to interpret the resealing of governance and the reterritorialisation of the state” in the EU, pointed out, the current discussion on European regionalism is influenced “by the growth of interest in European spatial planning over the course of the 1990s” and is elaborated upon by “the array of new regional configurations which now extends across the territory of the European Union”, in the context of which it is essential to understand “the degree to which readings of new regionalist rhetoric have informed both the creation and substance of a number of recently conceived regional entities”.¹⁰

But the external regionalism in Europe is out of the EU’s monopoly on understanding of its own “new regionalism” within the EU: Once the EU tries to join regional agendas outside its jurisdiction, it loses the monopoly on “new international regionalism” because of meeting new actors. It means that at the first stage of the EU’s geographical penetration into the Black Sea region (where, let us recall, the EU is part of the region, but the region is not part of the EU), the EU must be interested in using as many mechanisms of regional governance that are in the EU’s disposal at the moment as possible.

From that perspective, it was important for the EU policymakers to resolve the second part of the geopolitical puzzle in the region: to balance the relationship in order to have the Black Sea region as part of the EU to secure peace, stability, and economic cooperation for Europe. Recalling the already mentioned thesis on the controversial nature of the combination of the Black Sea region and the EU, the mission of the Black Sea Synergy at that time could be presented as a complementary instrument to the already existing bilateral policies towards the countries in the region. Its added value was that it was trying to “wrap up” the region into one system to construct a new single partner for the EU, a structured European sub-region with the Black Sea and shared values at the centre.



the mission of the Black Sea Synergy at that time could be presented as a complementary instrument to the already existing bilateral policies towards the countries in the region. Its added value was that it was trying to “wrap up” the region into one system to construct a new single partner for the EU

On the one hand, it was not “the Commission’s intention to propose an independent Black Sea strategy, since the broad EU policy towards the region is already set out in the pre-accession strategy with Turkey, the ENP and the

9 I. Deas, A. Lord, *From a New Regionalism to an Unusual Regionalism? The Emergence of Non-standard Regional Spaces and Lessons for the Territorial Reorganisation of the State*, “Urban Studies”, 2006, vol. 43(10), p. 1847.

10 Ibid.

Strategic Partnership with Russia.”¹¹ On the other, having Bulgaria and Romania inside the EU, the European Commission had to present an effective instrument to identify the western part of the Black Sea region as part of the EU. Elements of the European integration and, at the same time, outside regional governance could be seen in the proposed Synergy as a starting point for the EU and may be illustrated by another original extract from the document:

*“What is needed is an initiative complementary to these policies that would focus political attention at the regional level and invigorate on-going cooperation processes. The primary task of Black Sea Synergy would therefore be the development of cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region as a whole and the European Union. This fully transparent and inclusive initiative is based on the common interests of the EU and the Black Sea region and takes into account the results of consultations with all Black Sea states.”*¹²

Common interests were the key to the Black Sea region for the EU. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner highlighted back in 2007, the EU had an intention to go deeper inside the most acute regional agendas: “The time is ripe to focus political attention at the regional level and invigorate on-going co-operation processes, opening an additional space for cooperation with Russia, Turkey and our eastern ENP partners. I am also hopeful that Black Sea Synergy will contribute to creating a better climate for the solution of the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the region.”¹³

Especially in connection with the last concern in the sphere of regional security, one simply had no chance to underestimate a number of regional problems, threats, challenges all the neighbouring EU sub-regions include. Thus, speaking about Europeanisation and the Black Sea region after 2007 up to now, we are still not setting off two objects to confront each other. The Black Sea sub-system, to our mind, must be judged as a part of the wider European system of international relations, whether Russia wants it or not.

Moreover, the importance of the problems in the Black Sea region after 2014 forces us to speak about European insecurity, which finds deep roots in history and threatens stability of the whole Trans-Atlantic space. In this regard, it is only natural that the Black Sea region is an area of concern to the EU, the USA, and NATO as a strategically important component of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Thus, alongside the heated debates over the future of security parameters in the Trans-Atlantic and directly in Europe in the 1990s, with the internal discussion on the essence of the EU’s deepening and widening strategies in the 2000s, after the failure of the EU’s initial constitutional process in 2007, and especially after the annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea by the Russian Federation and the Brexit saga, chances for European stability in the frame of the Europeanisation maxima from the side of the Black Sea became even more blurry than they were before.

11 *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*, COM (2007) 160 final, Brussels, 11 April 2007, [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf access: 02 August 2019].

12 Ibid.

13 *Black Sea Synergy – Bringing the Region Closer to the EU*, European Commission Press Release Database, IP/07/486, Brussels, 11 April 2007, [<http://www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/486&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> access: 06 August 2019].

Integration vs Regionalisation

Insofar as the Black Sea system has been inevitably falling apart especially after 2013, there are fewer chances left for the Europeanisation to succeed and keep the regionalisation in Europe on the integrative track on the basis of democratic values and shared security mechanisms with all actors involved. Not only has the Kremlin wanted to destroy European unity and to turn European regionalism into European separatism. There are destructive forces in Europe that tend to consider regional autonomy inside the EU and in some particular member states not as panacea against separatism but as a step toward fragmentation and further secession. As Frans Schrijver pointed out, "Promises that regional autonomy will bring an end to regionalism and separatism are matched by warnings or hopes that it will only push the country onto a slippery slope leading to fragmentation of the state and will be threat to national unity."¹⁴

That is not by chance, there was a huge fear and heated debate on the constitutional status of Crimea with its internal autonomy inside unitary Ukraine in the mid-1990s, which was treated by anti-federalists as a first step to secessionism (even if this fact had less influence on the annexation of Crimea by Russia two decades later). Nevertheless, that is why even today all the calls to grant and fix in the Ukrainian Constitution the autonomous status of Donbas region within integral Ukraine inside and outside Ukraine are dangerous to the Ukrainian statehood and undermine

Ukrainian territorial integrity potentially due to the Russian on-going aggressive involvement.

There is a clear clash between globalism with its mechanisms of integration and regionalisation on the one hand, and fragmentation on the other. In the current international environment, regionalism may be also used by the apologists of fragmentation as a tool of anti-globalism and disintegration. Of course, globalisation can be perceived as an identical concept of denationalisation and desovereignisation. This approach well explains the relationship between globalisation and sub-national regionalisation: Both processes deprive the state of a part of its traditional sovereignty, and borders perform strictly separative, protectionist functions.¹⁵

Moreover, it provoked the appearance of the notion that regionalism bears a threat to state centralisation and national unity. The internal complexity of the regional mechanism of "harmonious combination" of national and international in a state was noted by Nikolai Mezhevich:

"An appearance of territorial subjects and regions at the international level caused the emergence of a form of international regionalism. Interstate regionalism is viewed from various points of view. As a rule, it is regarded as an element of modernization and progress. At the same time, regionalism is often recognized as a threat to the state, which carries the danger of fragmentation and separatism. In fact, regionalism differs in character,

14 F. Schrijver, *Regionalism after Regionalisation: Regional Identities, Political Space and Political Mobilisation in Galicia, Brittany and Wales*, Conference paper, 08 April 2009, [<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.518.131&rep=rep1&type=pdf> access: 06 August 2019].

15 А. Макарычев, *Пространственные характеристики трансграничной безопасности: концептуальные контексты [Spatial Characteristics of Cross-border Security: Conceptual Contexts]*, «Безопасность и международное сотрудничество в поясе новых границ России», под ред. Л.Б. Вардомский, С.В. Голунов, 2002, [<http://www.obraforum.ru/book/chapter1.htm> access: 06 August 2019].

*as well as in strength, and it is impossible to create a single model (or theory) that explains all options.*¹⁶

If we do recognise the existence of a conflict between sub-national regionalism and the unity of the state, then Schrijver's abovementioned assumption that regional autonomy leads to the death of regionalism and separatism coincides with warnings that it puts the country on a "slippery slope", which leads to fragmentation and poses a threat to state unity, should be taken into deep consideration.



formally being part of geographical Europe, some of the regions, both at the national and international levels, are ready to use their centrifugal forces to fragment the previously integrated spaces

Thus, we should be very cautious when speculation on regionalism may be weaponised by those eager to use it as a tool for not unity but separatism, disintegration, and fragmentation. At the domestic level, and coming back to the case of Ukraine, this thesis at least in theory seems to be relevant for this country, when strengthening of the regional autonomy of eastern or western Ukraine could be viewed through the prism of federalisation. At the same time, as we could judge now, it was external involvement, not decentralisation aimed at strengthening local communities with self-government authorities in the unitary state, which led to a split of the country.

Conclusion

Following this, the case of the Black Sea region as an integral part of Europe brings us to the fundamental trends and at the same time unresolved dilemmas (rhetorical questions so far) both in theory and in practice. They should be resolved as soon as possible for the sake of peace and de-escalation of the military tensions in the region.

Firstly, do such ideological concepts of a more speculative idea of the "United States of Europe" and a less elusive "Europe of the Regions", which were directed at the integration of many into one, give in to the opposite process? Insofar as the direction from many to one (to simplify Charles de Gaulle's vision of Europe "from Lisbon to Vladivostok") met its limits even inside the EU, one should notice a wave that is going to ruin even the idea of the United Europe at a theoretical level. Fragmentation on the basis of national interests, foreign policy preferences of domestic political elites, populism, economic rationalism, flirting with local marginal and nationalistic groupings, especially during election campaigns at all levels, egoism on the energy market, tolerance in response to violation of international law and even to military aggression – all this threatens the objectives of the process of integration on both the collective and cooperative levels; it leads to the failure of the mechanism of "new regionalism" which gave the post-Cold War world a chance to overcome all the shortcomings of the super-power dominance.

Thus, secondly, formally being part of geographical Europe, some of the regions, both at the national and international

16 Н. Межевич, *Основные направления региональной политики Российской Федерации [The Main Directions of the Regional Policy of the Russian Federation]*, Ч.1. Теория регионального развития: Учебное пособие. Современный регионализм: теоретическое содержание. С.-Петербург. гос. ун-т телекоммуникаций, 2005 [<https://pureportal.spbu.ru/en/publications> access: 06 August 2019].

levels, are ready to use their centrifugal forces to fragment the previously integrated spaces (united inside the country – by history and national governments or on the international arena – as a product of regional intergovernmental bodies). In any case, the ongoing fragmentation in the Black Sea region does not make the EU safer either. That means that the EU and those who do share European aspirations should get together and use European regionalisation as an instrument of not division of the European democratic space but of its unity.

Dr. Sergii Glebov is an Associate Professor and Deputy Dean of the Faculty of International Relations, Political Science, and Sociology at Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University, where he has been teaching a course on the Black Sea security. In 2000-2001, he was a visiting scholar at the Centre for European Studies, University of Exeter (UK) and in 2013 at Columbia University, Harriman Institute (New York City, USA). Glebov spent the academic year of 2018-2019 at the University of California, San Diego (USA) as a Fulbright Visiting Scholar with the School of Global Policy and Strategy. He published more than 60 scientific works on foreign and security policy of Ukraine, international relations in the Black Sea-Caspian region, European and Euro-Atlantic security, foreign policy of Russia, NATO-Ukraine, and EU-Ukraine relations.

UA: UKRAINE
ANALYTICA

Issue 2 (16), 2019

ISSN 2518-7481