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THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY'S EFFECTIVENESS ARE WHERE WE ARE ABLE TO EXPAND THEM

*Interview with H.E. Amb. Dmytro Kuleba,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*

New challenges of international relations require new methods of addressing them. Is diplomacy changing today or are its principles and instruments still valid?

In a broad sense, diplomacy has always been and remains an art of being persuasive. However, a lot has changed recently. Even visually. It used to be associated with men in black suits and ties. Not anymore. Diplomacy in the modern world equally belongs to women as well as men. Public diplomacy can outweigh negotiations behind closed doors. This is not surprising and reflects the general trend of democratisation. This is how democracies function. They serve interests of the people who become real stakeholders. That is why communication takes a central stage in decision-making. As they say, you win wars by winning hearts.

This is especially important for us right now, as the Russian aggression against Ukraine has entered its seventh year. In its military strategy, Russia pays critical attention to using non-military means. We would simply not have been able to survive in the past six years without gaining muscle in the new, modern tools of communication.

At the same time, classical diplomacy has not lost its importance. National positions need to be developed and outlined. Be it in a verbal note or a tweet. Public diplomacy

may help in shaping public opinion, but it is unlikely to succeed in convincing, let us say, judges of an international court. This is where classical paperwork is still very much needed. We sit down with our legal teams to thoroughly prepare documented claims. Because we still do believe that international law matters. Despite some countries tending to ignore it, experience shows they cannot entirely ignore court decisions.



Public diplomacy may help in shaping public opinion, but it is unlikely to succeed in convincing, let us say, judges of an international court

We also should not forget the much-needed consular protection, which still requires a lot of traditional fieldwork. Twitter will not really help much in protecting rights of our citizens abroad. Sometimes a consul needs to drive across the entire country to help a group of Ukrainian citizens in need.

As diplomacy changes with the world and from one generation to another, core ideas remain intact. "Represent. Protect. Promote", as Ukraine's MFA motto says.

Can Twiplomacy and informal negotiations be a substitute for classical diplomacy?

Twiplomacy and informal negotiations create extra space for creativity and non-conventional solutions. But they cannot fully replace classical diplomacy.

There are two schools of thought in Ukraine representing polar views on the matter. Some say classical diplomacy is not relevant anymore, and only informal channels help cut deals. Others insist there is no room for informal negotiations, and everything should only be discussed in a formal way. Both approaches seem terribly incorrect to me. Decent fact-based and result-oriented diplomacy is a carefully crafted mix of the two.



The limits of diplomacy's effectiveness are where we are able to expand them.

Meaning, practically, they are much broader than we can imagine

We used to say that all diplomatic documents must be double-checked up to the last comma. Because every word and punctuation mark matters. Now I would put it this way: "Every tweet must be double-checked up to the last emoji."

In the past, verbal notes were read out loud in front of a minister or an ambassador. Now they are forwarded by email or on WhatsApp. Channels, audiences, protocol, and etiquette may all change. But goals don't. They are basically about making people abroad admire, respect, and support your country. Be it governments, tourists, investors, or business. To that end, one can use the UN General Assembly tribune, its

sidelines, cafes, or online communications. I think it is not about replacing one with the other. We should think about it in terms of added value.

How much money should a state spend on diplomacy?

Each hryvnia spent on diplomacy saves two hryvnias on defence. Furthermore, diplomacy helps bring investment into the country and create opportunities for Ukrainian companies in foreign markets. For example, we have now relaunched our Investors and Exporters Council at MFA to help create opportunities for Ukrainian businesses abroad and assist foreign investors in entering Ukraine. We work closely with Ukrainian companies to help them liberalise trade with other countries, establish B2B contacts with foreign partners. At the end of the day, the better they do, the better it is for Ukraine's economy. Businesses will create more jobs, pay more salaries and taxes.

Is diplomacy costly? Well, the famous saying, "People who don't want to feed their army, will soon be feeding the enemy's one," is fully applicable in this case as well.

What are the limits of diplomacy's effectiveness in today's world?

The limits of diplomacy's effectiveness are where we are able to expand them. Meaning, practically, they are much broader than we can imagine.

Diplomacy primarily deals with difficult cases. All others simply do not need diplomacy. Looking from outside, sometimes it may feel like progress is lacking. In fact, diplomacy requires a lot of patience. When years of work culminate in just one strategic move or call. Consistent and focused work is absolutely essential to be able to use those opportunities appropriately.

The role of diplomacy in the post-WWII era has dramatically increased. It is not only about new institutions, alliances, and formats. One invention boosted it to unprecedented levels, which was aviation. Flights became widespread and affordable. For the first time in human history, leaders and diplomats gained an opportunity to meet at any place and any time within 10-15 hours of flight maximum. This had simply never been possible before. Previous global transportation models allowed incomparably fewer contact. In my opinion, it is not only due to the existence of nuclear arms that global conflict has been avoided for the past 75 years. It is also thanks to this enormous increase in the volume of diplomacy.

Modern communications are bringing the volume of diplomatic contacts to an even higher level. The invention of the internet surely has had a profound impact on it. I am now looking forward to seeing how artificial intelligence will change diplomacy. And it is up to us to make this impact work for global peace and stability, not vice versa.

Could you describe an ideal diplomat of tomorrow?

Hopefully, one not wearing a medical face mask.

An ideal diplomat is a cross-functional, agile person with principles. He or she is

able to learn and adapt constantly. He or she is flexible but holds his or her ground. Omni-purpose but being himself or herself. Persuasive but natural. These basic skills have only gained value over the past decade and will surely be even more valuable tomorrow.

Dmytro Kuleba, PhD, Amb. is Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. In 2003, Amb. Kuleba graduated with honours from the Institute of International Relations, Taras Shevchenko University (Kyiv, Ukraine), where he studied international law, and in 2006, he obtained a Ph.D. in Law. From 2003 to 2013, he worked in different capacities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, including at the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the OSCE. After quitting civil service in 2013, Dmytro Kuleba chaired the board of the UART Foundation for Cultural Diplomacy. In 2014, Amb. Kuleba returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as ambassador-at-large to introduce the concepts of digital diplomacy, strategic communications, cultural diplomacy, and public diplomacy into the ministry's work. In 2016, Amb. Kuleba was appointed Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe. From August 2019 to March 2020, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. Since March 2020, he serves as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Dmytro Kuleba is the author of the book "The War for Reality: How to Win in the World of Fakes, Truths, and Communities."

DIPLOMACY IN A WORLD TO COME

Dr., Amb. Sergiy Korsunsky

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Radical transformations both in the geopolitical landscape and in the way countries conduct diplomacy are obvious. It is more apparent than ever before that the liberal world order of the post-Second World War era is coming to an end. A new incarnation of realpolitik based on a pragmatic and sometimes rough approach to international affairs demands new diplomacy. It is to be based on understanding the struggle among three competing powers – the US, China, and Russia – for regional and global dominance, deep knowledge of new technologies, analytical and critical thinking, among other crucial skills. And yet the world is not ready for this new reality, as the COVID-19 pandemic has shown.

In March 1936, an influential British statesman, Sir Austen Chamberlain, addressing the annual meeting of Birmingham Unionist Association, spoke of the “grave injury” to collective security by Germany’s violation of the Treaty of Locarno. Sir Austen, who referred to himself as “a very old Parliamentarian”, said: “It is not so long ago that a member of the Diplomatic Body in London, who had spent some years of his service in China, told me that there was a Chinese curse, which took the form of saying, ‘May you live in interesting times’. There is no doubt that the curse has fallen on us”.¹

It appears Sir Austen Chamberlain was a real visionary. The Chinese curse has been upon us during all those years and never left this world, apparently. We do live in interesting times. These times include military conflicts, aggression, trade wars – and all that right in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, unseen in the history of humankind in

terms of both scale and influence on international affairs and economy. There had been severe infectious diseases before. Some of them were even more deadly and many of them had originated in China. But now, the pandemic is happening in a tightly interconnected world stitched together by transportation routes, logistical chains, communications, and social media as never before. Governments were caught absolutely unprepared either politically or economically, even in the most developed countries. As it turned out, we live in a world globalised beyond expectations. And diplomacy is a mirror to this globalisation.

There are different approaches to evaluate the role and place of diplomacy in a world of international politics. Among them, there are data on diplomatic presence in the world released by the Lowy Institute in Australia at the end of 2019. Those data are very useful. Now it is officially confirmed that China has overtaken the US as the biggest

¹ A. Chamberlain, *Lesson of the Crisis: Sir A. Chamberlain’s Review of Events*, “The Yorkshire Post” (British Newspaper Archive), 21 March 1936, p. 11, column 7.

diplomatic power in the world². As of this year, China maintains 276 diplomatic posts, compared to the 273 of the US, which consist of embassies, high commissions, consulates and consulates general, permanent missions, and other representations in countries where there is no diplomatic relationship.

The Lowy Institute's ranking is based on the number of diplomatic networks of 61 countries belonging to the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. First of all, it indicates geographic coverage and geopolitical reach, but also a level of globalisation and interconnectivity. There is an easily seen correlation between the number of people infected with COVID-19 in different countries and the list of 10 countries-leaders in the world in diplomacy by the number of diplomatic posts. So, diplomacy and globalisation go hand-in-hand: China – 276, United States – 273, France – 267, Japan – 247, Russia – 242, Turkey – 234, Germany – 224, Brazil – 222, Spain – 215, Italy – 209. There is no surprise that seven out of 10 on this list are former empires maintaining intensive relations with former colonies, and three others – the US, China, and Brazil – are playing crucial roles in politics and economy both regionally and globally.

Changes in Diplomatic Presence

Those recent data show the rapid rise of China over the past decade. In 2011, Beijing lagged 23 posts behind the United States. But six years later it had 271 diplomatic posts around the world – just three fewer than the US. And when it comes to China, those figures are not occasional, since Beijing attaches special attention to the formal diplomatic channels of communication in addition to unofficial ones, but not vice

versa. Xi Jinping is not known for his Twitter or Facebook use.

Those data mean that global Chinese presence is growing following the path of the “One Belt One Road” initiative, bringing more political influence, soft (and hard) power even to the smallest countries on Earth. And this is for a reason. For example, in 2018–2019, Beijing opened five new embassies: in El Salvador, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, and the Dominican Republic.



There is an easily seen correlation between the number of people infected with COVID-19 in different countries and the list of 10 countries-leaders in the world in diplomacy by the number of diplomatic posts. So, diplomacy and globalisation go hand-in-hand

Following a persistent campaign of what is commonly referred to as “chequebook diplomacy”, Beijing has succeeded in picking off a handful of Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic partners as well. Most recently, two countries in the Pacific Islands region – Kiribati and the Solomon Islands – broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and made the switch to China, reducing the number of countries recognising Taiwan from 22 in 2016 to just 15 today.³ For Beijing, this strategy has both tightened Taiwan’s growing political isolation and increased China’s ability to advance its own economic and strategic interests promoting the “One China” policy even further.

2 A. Ma, *The US Is Losing Its Crown to China as the World’s Biggest Diplomatic Power*, Think Tank Says, “Business Insider US”, 27 November 2019.

3 B. Bley, *The New Geography of Global Diplomacy*, “Foreign Affairs”, 27 November 2019.

All that is happening while the US diplomacy has been frozen, understaffed, and insufficiently funded since the election of President Trump. Although the United States still holds its position of the most popular place for countries to maintain embassies and consulates, it is clearly losing its global outreach to China when it comes to international presence.



Will there be no more alliances and coalitions of the willing, universal human rights, trusted agreements, and institutions?

There are changes in other governments' diplomatic activities too. For example, Japan moved into the fourth place in 2019, finally overtaking Russia. Faced with a shifting power balance in its neighbourhood, including an increasingly assertive China, Tokyo has been quietly investing in its diplomatic presence for nearly a decade now. The addition of seven new posts in strategically pivotal countries such as Cambodia, the Philippines, Seychelles, and Vanuatu brings Tokyo's total posts to 247.

Brexit resulted in Ireland's boosting its network by eight posts. The Netherlands, too, has linked its recent diplomatic push to Brexit considerations, with seven new posts in two years and more openings expected by 2021. The United Kingdom, by contrast, has closed or downgraded 11 consulates and diplomatic offices since 2016, dropping from the ninth place three years ago to the 11th today. This runs counter to the commitments to open three new posts in the Pacific and additional 12 posts globally by the end of 2020.

New Challenges for Diplomacy

The pandemic of COVID-19 is a serious challenge. But there are other equally deadly issues diplomacy will be facing in the world to come. "Liberal world order, as we know it, discredited itself and is coming to an end" – that was the message President Putin sent to the world in his now famous 24-page interview with Financial Times on the eve of G20 summit in Osaka⁴ last year. No surprise, when it comes to Putin. But prior to him, dozens of publications by well-established Western scholars had appeared with similar conclusions. This is a strange example of unanimity between the East and the West, especially taking into account that President Putin himself did a lot to destroy the good old world order while Western scholars have done a tremendous job promoting liberal values, freedoms, and democracy.

But what does all that mean? Will there be no more alliances and coalitions of the willing, universal human rights, trusted agreements, and institutions? Will profit becoming first and principles second? Are we moving back to the times when brutal use of force rather than the rule of law was predominant in international affairs?

There is a broad consensus that a unipolar liberal world order ended in 2007, more visibly after Putin's now famous Munich speech. The war in Georgia, annexation of Crimea, invasion of eastern Ukraine, use of military force and covert operations in Syria and Venezuela, constant provocations against ships and planes of NATO countries, intrusion via computer networks and electronic systems around the globe, powerful disinformation campaigns, and direct support to right-wing and populist parties constitute just a short list of the new reality's features. We can add violation

4 L. Barber, H. Foy, A. Barker, *Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism Has 'Become Obsolete'*, "Financial Times", 28 June 2019.

of human rights, suppression of media, and brutal killings of critics of the Russian government both at home and abroad. And yet, as it is not enough, we have to recognise that there is a crisis of leadership in the West and there is an unprecedented rise of China. What reality are we going to face in a couple of years? What can we call this new emerging reality?

Some foreign policy experts say we live in times of chaos; others insist we have succumbed to anarchy. But chaos has its own rules, while anarchy means that nobody follows an order. In our reality, there are no rules and major powers are following their own orders. The Russians are fighting tooth and nail for a multipolar model with defined spheres of influence as it was two centuries ago. China is promoting its “One Belt One Road” concept, trying to secure trade routes from its inner provinces to the EU, extending its “neighbourhood” as far as to Italy. The United States is clearly reconsidering its role in world affairs under the slogan “America First”. All three major powers are involved in the construction of the new world.

We must recognise that this fight is quickly moving from the territory of economy and security to the sphere of ideology and social values. Russia is the world champion in creating parallel realities that undermine initial beliefs about the existence of truth. If there is no truth, then there are no values but a brutal force of a regime in power. China is trying to control how information spreads and influence it with soft power. Of course, it denies all wrongdoings, insisting that the Chinese social model best suits complex modern societies.

The World of New Realpolitik

So, what is it? It appears the answer is pretty clear – the current order brought upon us by three “majors” can be best described as the reincarnation of the world of new realpolitik. This term, coined by

the Germans long ago, can be considered nowadays in a much wider sense and scope. The modern version of *realpolitik* can be defined as a pragmatic, to the point of absurdity, attitude toward world affairs, combined with information control and distortion without any remorse toward weaker and poorer nations. There are a lot of examples to support this definition.



The modern version of realpolitik can be defined as a pragmatic, to the point of absurdity, attitude toward world affairs, combined with information control and distortion without any remorse toward weaker and poorer nations

The world of new *realpolitik* means you can have two (or even more) independent and contradictory tracks existing in parallel without intertwining. Yes, Russia is an aggressor, but France, Germany, and Italy will trade with it extensively. Yes, Germany supports Ukraine, but Nord Stream 2 will be built. Turkey is a strategic partner of Ukraine, and yet the TurkStream pipeline is built. Turkey is a strategic partner of the United States, and yet it has bought S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. It is a NATO member refusing to allow NATO fleet bases in the Black Sea even despite being threatened by Russia and the militarisation of Crimea.

The modern *realpolitik* can be characterised through several distinctive features. First of all, there is a growing mistrust among people, between people and governments, between governments and states, states and international institutions, and between institutions themselves. A signature under agreements means much less compared to that in the good old times. The leadership crisis is immense and widely spread around

the globe (and the pandemic has proved this again). Populism, nationalism, insufficiency of strategic vision and understanding, personal interests, and unaccountability have become so common that there is no need to specify the country or the region where they persist.

Recent reports presented at the World Economic Forum's Davos Summits of 2019 and 2020 screamed about unprecedented income and social inequality as a result of last decade's developments, whether we talk about a particular country or at the global level. Finally, we have to deal with virtualisation of literally everything. Augmented reality and artificial intelligence will soon rule our lives in both positive and negative manner. They are already here. That is why the Realpolitik invented by Ludwig von Rochau in the nineteenth century is a very simplified version of the current *realpolitik* we live in.

In this new reality, even such a conservative tool as diplomacy has to change. Formal and official negotiations are now substituted with one-on-one talks with fewer details available to the public. Twitter has already become an instrument to evaporate notes and formal proclamations. Social media tell diplomats more about events and tendencies than traditional news outlets do. Technologies similar to DeepFake are entering the real world while distorting it.

That means we will be living in interesting times in the world to come.

Diplomats should be smarter, better equipped with modern knowledge and technologies, think more critically and analyse more deeply than ever before. Diplomacy must be better represented and much more active in promoting dialogue and cooperation. Critical thinking should become a normal way of thinking, and situation analysis must be included in the list of crucial skills for training diplomats. This is the only way to preserve the culture of diplomacy and our common future.

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CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMACY VS. DIGITAL REALITY

Viktoriia Gulenko

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine ¹

Rapidly changing environmental conditions, technological development, and the emergence of artificial intelligence inevitably encourage diplomats to seek ways to remain relevant given the volume of information, speedup of the processes, and the need to improve the quality of services and change communication methods. Will diplomacy remain competitive in the era of new threats and opportunities? This article provides a glance at the alternatives to be used along with traditional tools of diplomacy to fulfil complex multifunctional diplomatic tasks for the benefit of foreign policy.

What Is Diplomacy and What Are Its Main Functions?

Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy is seen, in its conventional sense, as an art of conducting negotiations between representatives of states who help governments to implement, as well as protect, interests of their states abroad. According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961², the main functions of a diplomat are to represent a state in another state, protect its interests and interests of its nationals, negotiate, promote friendly relations between the states, and develop economic, cultural, and scientific relations.

However, the context of diplomatic work is changing constantly. If we take a bilateral format, there are many cases of transformations in the foreign policy of the state depending on the change of the

government or one or the other policy direction. Nuances of politics, culture, and worldview based mainly on age-old traditions and sometimes on the religion of the receiving state can differ considerably from those of the sending state. This makes it more difficult to search for common grounds and interests between the two states.

Promotion of national interests of the sending state with an eye on policy and interests of the receiving state may vary significantly. This should envisage the generation of alternative scenarios for the promotion of national interests in a particular state. A multilateral format provides for negotiation in the interests of the home state.

Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more parties with an aim to reach a beneficial outcome. The Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary defines negotiation as

1 The views expressed in the article are the author's only and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

2 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, "United Nations Treaty Collection", 1961 [https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en].

a “formal discussion between parties who are trying to reach an agreement”.³ The UN Charter considers it as a “peaceful mean of the pacific settlement of disputes”.⁴ At the same time, negotiation is a challenging process and its success depends on the political will of the parties as well as the preparedness of the diplomats involved.



Global Affairs Canada and the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been already effectively using geo-coding and social media mapping to identify the needs of their nationals abroad and to develop the most resonating messages

As a general rule, negotiations lead to a conclusion of an international agreement that should take into consideration the interests of all parties, leaving a little gap for the parties to approve it at the national level. However, enforcement of international agreements requires the goodwill of the governments to respect them due to the natural sovereignty of states and the lack of international coercive mechanisms. In this context, diplomacy represents a complex tool with a purpose to get an adversary or an ally on one’s side at least for some time.

The bigger part of diplomatic work also involves providing consular services and protection. This includes facilitating travel, including disaster and crisis management, acting as notary and civil registrar, performing other administrative functions, safeguarding the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity, representing nationals before tribunals

and other authorities, exercising rights of supervision and inspection, extending assistance to vessels and aircraft registered in that state and to their crews, and many others.

All these complex processes provide diplomats with the need to set multifunctional tasks. However, the classic performance of complex diplomatic tasks is facing in the recent decade the fastest ever evolution of the information accompanied by a change of mindsets of the people, governments, and the way business is done.

What the World Looks Like Today in the Information Age

Rapidly changing environmental conditions, technological development, and emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) lead to the need to adapt to new realities. There is an urgent need to simplify processes, increase efficiency due to the enormous volumes of information and speeding up of the processes, improve the quality of services in consular protection, and change the way messages are delivered.

AI and Big Data

One could argue about a disruptive impact of AI applications on our societies, but we had better look for opportunities that AI can bring to facilitate the management of the increasing data volumes that an ordinary person cannot cover. AI machines are programmed to process big data with a multitude of algorithms, but they can be used to spread massive disinformation campaigns and as a tool to predict possible humanitarian crises, forecast election results and economic development, design multilevel negotiations, and help to provide efficient public services.

3 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, n.d. [<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/>].

4 *Charter of the United Nations*, 26 June 1945 [<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/>].

While some countries are struggling with human rights and promotion of democracy, and Russia and Brazil are still depending on foreign internet companies to sustain the Web, the liberal democratic order is facing a new reality as China is investing in AI, intending to be the world leader in AI theories, technologies, and applications by 2030⁵. Information and data security are at the heart of Chinese national security and defense strategies. Facial and voice recognition technologies, drones and automated submarines, social networks and payment systems are the main features of its authoritarian governance exercising tight control over population. That may be a reason why the United States and most EU countries are highly opposing the dissemination of 5G on their territories.

Global Affairs Canada and the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been already effectively using geocoding and social media mapping to identify the needs of their nationals abroad and to develop the most resonating messages. Using the good practices of our colleagues from the UK – such as apps that gather hundreds of thousands of multilingual news sources from around the world and local publications and translate them into your language, remove extremist behaviour information and disinformation targeted campaigns – could ease a huge load of diplomatic work, allowing diplomats to focus on a more proactive approach to crisis management and promotion of national

interests. According to Graham Nelson, the founder of the UK Foreign Office's Open Source Unit (OSU), "It's not about what data can do for diplomacy. It is how diplomacy can remain relevant unless we embrace data".⁶

Social Media

Social networking is one of the most popular online activities worldwide. Social media companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo are very influential in terms of online interaction and targeted messaging. They are not only a tool to connect people; all of them have their audience, purpose, and outcome.

To understand the tendency and the share of social networks worldwide, one should look at such criteria as the social network itself and the purpose of its creation, country of usage, distribution by age and gender. A look at countries' profiles can also help reveal some differences among major geopolitical players.

Facebook, primarily created as a networking tool for students, is now the biggest social network worldwide with more than 2.5 billion global monthly active users that enables a well-targeted space for promoting ideas and interests whether they are commercial or others. In the beginning of 2020, Facebook accounted for 76% of all social media site visits in the United Kingdom⁷, just like in India⁸. Facebook is

5 *Mapping the Challenges and Opportunities of Artificial Intelligence for the Conduct of Diplomacy*, DiploFoundation, January 2019 [https://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/AI-diplo-report.pdf].

6 N. Rohaidi, *Exclusive: Meet the UK's 'Data Diplomat'*. Interview with Graham Nelson, Founder of the Open Source Unit in the Foreign Office, "GovInsider", 12 March 2019 [https://govinsider.asia/innovation/uk-foreign-office-open-source-unit-data-diplomat-graham-nelson/].

7 J. Johnson, *Leading Social Networks by Share of Visits in the UK as of April 2020*, "Statista", 15 May 2020 [https://www.statista.com/statistics/280295/market-share-held-by-the-leading-social-networks-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/].

8 S. Diwanji, *Social Network Penetration India Q3 2019*, "Statista", 07 May 2020 [https://www.statista.com/statistics/284436/india-social-network-penetration/].

actively used in the United States⁹ and in Russia¹⁰.

Since its launch in 2005, YouTube has grown from a repository of amateur videos into the biggest online video platform worldwide, featuring a wide variety of content that ranges from music videos to educational clips, political discussions, and journalistic investigations. In 2019, YouTube recorded an estimated 1.68 billion users and is particularly popular with younger internet users. YouTube is the most active social network among internet users in the United Kingdom¹¹, India,¹² and Russia¹³.

Ranking behind Snapchat, Instagram is one of the most popular social networks among teenagers in the United States and has one billion followers worldwide. Instagram is dominated mostly by younger users below the age of 35¹⁴.

Twitter has become an increasingly relevant tool in domestic and international politics, with many elected officials, governments,

and ministries having official Twitter accounts to make announcements and engage with the general population. US President Donald Trump is known to be a prolific Twitter user¹⁵. In February 2020, Twitter ranked second of all US¹⁶ social media site visits, following Facebook. It is also very popular in the United Kingdom¹⁷ and Russia¹⁸.

While social networking in the United States, India, and some European countries looks pretty much the same, statistics in such countries as China and Russia are a bit different.

Although Western social networks have significant user bases in Russia, Russians tend to display a preference for home-grown services such as VKontakte and Ok.ru, or formerly Odnoklassniki¹⁹. Ok.ru, created as a platform for finding former classmates, was popular among the older rather than younger population of the country²⁰. In contrast, VKontakte is used mostly by younger users below the age of 35²¹.

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- 9 J. Clement, *Social Media Usage in the United States – Statistics & Facts*, “Statista”, 19 May 2020 [https://www.statista.com/topics/3196/social-media-usage-in-the-united-states/#dossierSummary_chapter2].
 - 10 A. Melkadze, *Ranking of Social Media Platforms in Russia Q3 2019, by Users Share*, “Statista”, 03 Mar 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/284447/russia-social-network-penetration/>].
 - 11 J. Johnson, *YouTube: Share of Social Network Website Visits in the United Kingdom (UK) 2015-2020*, “Statista”, 7 May 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/280314/youtubes-social-network-market-share-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/>].
 - 12 Johnson, n7.
 - 13 Clement, n9.
 - 14 J. Clement, *Countries with the Most Instagram Users 2020*, “Statista”, 24 April 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/578364/countries-with-most-instagram-users/>].
 - 15 J. Clement, *World Leaders with the Most Twitter Followers 2020*, “Statista”, 06 May 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/281375/heads-of-state-with-the-most-twitter-followers/>].
 - 16 J. Clement, *Countries with the Most Twitter Users 2020*, “Statista”, 24 April 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-active-twitter-users-in-selected-countries/>].
 - 17 Rohaidi, n6.
 - 18 Clement, n9.
 - 19 Clement, n9.
 - 20 D. Elagina, *Age Distribution of Ok.ru Users in Russia in 2018*, “Statista”, 07 November 2019 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1065018/russia-odnoklassniki-users-share-by-age/>].
 - 21 A. Melkadze, *Vk.com Users in Russia 2019, by Age*, “Statista”, 09 April 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/990462/vk-users-age-distribution-russia/>].

Due to the Chinese government's internet censorship, Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube, the leading international social media players, are all blocked in China. However, China's social media landscape is not incomparable with its Western counterparts. Tencent's Qzone, one of the best-known social network sites, microblogging site Sina Weibo, video sharing app Youku Tudou, short-form video app Douyin (aka TikTok) are just a few among the most popular Chinese social media examples²².

Today, the delivery of information should not necessarily be direct but should be designated to the right audience. The youngest Americans will hear a message delivered not through Twitter but rather via Instagram; the youngest Russians would prefer to receive it through VKontakte; the Chinese will not hear it through any of Western social networks. And it doesn't matter if one writes a no-name single tweet or if it is one of the famous politicians as long as one writes the things that people are worried about in a specific country, using the right platform and language. Today we can no longer ignore the presence of social media in our lives, and that will last for a long time.

Mindset of a New Generation

The increasing role of social networks should be owed to the generation of millennials, who were born at the time of active development of the Information Age. This is a generation that cannot imagine their life without digital technology and social media. At the same time, their superficial knowledge does not make them foolish but forces millennials to be critical about the massive amount of the information they receive through the Web.

The way in which the generation X or baby boomers perceive them differs a lot from their view of the world.



Understanding the audience gives diplomats the power to manage it and to lead in the needed direction

In *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation*, Neil Howe and William Strauss wrote that millennials “will correct what they will perceive to be the mistakes of boomers, by placing positivism over negativism, trust over cynicism, science over spiritualism, the team over self, duties over rights, honor over feeling, action over words”. A 2000 *New York Times* review of this book, titled “What’s the Matter with Kids Today? Not a Thing”, described millennials as “a cohort of kids who are smarter, more industrious and better behaved than any generation before”.²³

Understanding the audience gives diplomats the power to manage it and to lead in the needed direction.

Desired Outcomes and Alternatives for Traditional Diplomacy

The main purpose of diplomacy is to establish mutually beneficial cooperation between states using peaceful means. No one would disagree that the traditional tools of diplomacy like negotiations are effective for this purpose. But today we have to consider that due to the continuous digital transformation of the world and the value of social media in everyday lives, the concept

22 J. Clement, *Global Social Networks Ranked by Number of Users 2020*, “Statista”, 24 April 2020 [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/>].

23 *New York Times Book Review “What’s the Matter with Kids Today? Not a Thing”*, 05 November 2000 [<https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/00/11/05/reviews/001105.05brookst.html?mcubz=3>].

of delivering the message has completely changed. Social media play a prominent role in fostering a true dialogue between decision makers and citizens, diplomats and foreign publics.

This flips upside down the communication between governments. Today it appears if you want to reach out to your counterparts in a foreign government, first you have to deliver your message to the foreign public, which will automatically ensure that your message has been heard. Without realising the effectiveness of this process, policymakers may lose their advantage in negotiations.



Today it appears if you want to reach out to your counterparts in a foreign government, first you have to deliver your message to the foreign public

“Public diplomacy”, “cultural diplomacy”, or “strategic communication”, whatever you call it, is seen today as the most promising sphere of diplomacy in general. Sometimes also called “people’s diplomacy”, it is a direct communication between government and foreign public. The concept was invented by a former US diplomat Edmund Gullion in the mid-1960s to distance Western information campaigns from the Soviet propaganda. Unlike propaganda, *public diplomacy* is considered a transparent tool that a state uses to communicate with the foreign public to inform and influence overseas audiences, aiming at promoting national interests and implementing foreign policy’s strategic goals.

As experience shows, the formation of a person’s position or change of his/her opinion on a particular issue is a long and difficult process. Public diplomacy is used in the framework of building a long-term

strategy to influence the formation of mass consciousness to change certain frameworks of worldview and behaviour.

The promotion of state interests only in the political sphere is ineffective due to the conservatism of some societies, their nationalist orientation, consideration of partners through the prism of their interests, reluctance to progressive change, the pursuit of stability that is generally normal for modern societies. Politics in its purest form is not interesting to the public, which is not accustomed to compromising the comfort today for a better future imposed on them from abroad.

Public diplomacy can be differentiated into two types, according to long-term or short-term desired outcomes.

A long-standing strategy of promotion of national interests includes branding or cultural communication that is closely linked with the image of a country in the world. It helps to build cultural and social ties with a foreign audience, which would facilitate long-term cooperation in multiple domains. During the Cold War, for example, the United States used public diplomacy to promote freedom and human rights as components of democracy and alternatives to the Soviet authoritarian regime. Voice of America broadcasted directly into the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe to dispel myths about the West and to support values of Western democracies among European states.

Along with state branding exchanges of schoolchildren, scholars, and students, school and university partnerships used by the US during the Cold War until now have proven their effectiveness and made millions of people change their attitude towards the West. The main objective of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), created by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, is “in support of

America's foreign policy" to "strengthen democratic governance abroad", "promote American prosperity through investments that expand markets for U.S. exports, create a level playing field for U.S. businesses".²⁴

Other good examples of foreign cultural diplomacy are: Institut Français, with its aim to spread the French language and culture, as well as establish long-term partnerships with host-country actors in the fields of education, science, culture, and creativity; British Council, with a purpose to strengthen interstate ties in the arts, English, higher education, and society; Goethe Institute, aimed at spreading the German language abroad, information about Germany, its cultural, social, and political life, promoting intercultural cooperation and dialogue, supporting the development of civil society structures, and promoting global mobility.

The second type of public diplomacy includes various policies aimed at fostering more rapid results, sometimes called political advocacy. Political advocacy campaigns are aimed at convincing quickly foreign audiences to support one or the other policy direction. For these purposes, the use of social media and opinion leaders should be essential.

Whether we like it or not, we should not underestimate the role of social networks in shaping the opinion of social groups and encouraging the governments to take popular or unpopular decisions, justified or not. Knowing how to write a *note verbale* is not enough anymore to be a brother-in-law among the foreign public and to be able to form an opinion. Instead, 280 characters of a tweet cope better with this task and can roll the world upside down. It is amazing how unknown bloggers create a new reality that the governments have to face in their politics.

While searching for opinion leaders, it is important not to forget religious leaders and communities, which may play a very strong political and ethical role in a society, as well as the diaspora, which may be influential in the receiving state.



our main job should be to identify the opportunities that new technologies could bring to better serve diplomacy and foreign policy goals

However, using the wrong social network or language may lead to serious mistakes that the ministries of foreign affairs are not always informed about. So it is better to be aware and use the opportunities of new technologies to facilitate better results in promoting national interests.

Conclusions

Diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy requires setting multifunctional tasks. Facing rapidly changing environmental conditions, technological development, and the emergence of artificial intelligence, our main job should be to identify the opportunities that new technologies could bring to better serve diplomacy and foreign policy goals.

The urgent need to simplify the processes and increase efficiency encourages diplomats to seek ways to remain relevant and not to get confused given the large volumes of information. Improvement of the quality of services, as in the case of consular protection, is a key to securing trust of the citizens and may be used for political

²⁴ *Mission, Vision, Values*, United States Agency for International Development, n.d. [<https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values>].

advocacy. There is no need to reinvent the wheel, but it is essential to use the best practices of our counterparts and private sector companies.

The use of different social media by applying an analytical approach identifying its purpose, desired outcome, popularity in the country, language of communication, social and gender distribution could foster a long-standing dialogue with foreign publics, aiming at the promotion of foreign policy goals. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube remain the most popular social networks in the Western part of the world. Instagram and TikTok are dominated mostly by younger users below the age of 35. In Russia and China, people prefer domestically produced networks such as VKontakte, Weibo, and Youku Tudou.

As defined in the *Sustainable Development Agenda*, the main goal of diplomacy is to serve future generations for better living. Understanding the needs of new generations and mostly younger people gives policymakers and diplomats the true power to reach their hearts and build self-reliant relationships.

Change in the way of message delivery forces governments to compete for wider influence by changing worldview and

behaviour frameworks of the foreign public. Public diplomacy gives us effective tools for competitiveness, self-defence, tackling disinformation campaigns, and promoting a positive image of a country abroad.

It is extremely important to convey to foreign audiences the diversity of modern Ukrainian culture and create a new vision of Ukraine in the world. This could be possible by means of a long-term strategy for cultural and social cooperation around the world with hidden elements of political messaging that would expose common grounds between cultures and traditions of different societies and Ukraine and create long-lasting ties between the people of different states in the future.

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DIGITAL DIPLOMACY: HOW INTERNATIONAL ACTORS TRANSFORM THEIR FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY

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Communication technologies have created new opportunities for the promotion of states' interests, ensuring interactive dialogue with the world. Digital diplomacy has gone beyond foreign policy institutions, reaching more target groups and changing the efficiency of the diplomatic missions' activity abroad. After the first meeting between diplomats and officials, online technologies enable further communication through devices or social platforms as well as ensure regular receipt of information by potential audiences. As a result, the role of ambassadors is being reviewed, not in legal terms, but in the sense of transforming their activities in the host country. Sometimes diplomats can be transformed into media stars or lifesavers. The article also presents current positive practices of the USA, the EU, and Ukraine in digital diplomacy.

Technologies are changing the traditional understanding of communication in foreign policy, which contributes to the transformation of feedback, conversion of one-way communication into interactive conversations, and development of new international ties. The interactive components of modern communication technologies have modified the classical concepts of “sender” and “receiver” of information, turning them into active political actors. As a result, international actors can have intense and unlimited informational and political influence on the audience, regardless of its location and

nationality, taking into account cultural or social characteristics of the communities¹.

Impact of the Internet on Diplomatic Activity

The development of the information space has led to an increase in the number of international participants. The state remains one of the leading actors as the initiator of international communication, which controls and manages the spheres of foreign and domestic policy. Transnational corporations expand their external influence through collaboration with

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national media or investment in foreign regional and local media, efficiently lobbying the interests of the transnational owners. Global media corporations mediate between the source of information and the audience, disseminating their corporate interests through news. Civil institutions or non-profit organisations can shape an alternative political and economic ideology in host states, protecting the interests of social groups, supporting human rights, carrying out charitable or environmental activities, and promoting social activity. Social and political movements of anti-globalists, environmentalists, pacifists, or other groups without formal legal status interact with their members and external audiences mainly through the internet and can influence foreign or domestic policies of states.²



Technologies are changing the traditional understanding of communication in foreign policy, which contributes to the transformation of feedback, conversion of one-way communication into interactive conversations, and development of new international ties

As a result, a new model of international politics is emerging on the internet, where commercial companies and civil organisations, together with states, act as political actors; therefore, influential states

do not always manage the processes in the global information space and should follow the trends created by leading online companies. At the same time, the role of an individual is also growing because each person with a minimum of communication skills can be a political actor using a social media account. Besides, such “new actors” as hacker associations, quasi-states, or gaming communities have an impact on international relations and a state’s positioning in the world. Using internet communication instruments allows non-state international participants to efficiently conduct foreign policy activities as well as demonstrate private influence on international political and economic processes by attracting supporters and spreading ideas in the global network.

Under the influence of communication instruments, a state’s power is determined by the possession of information and communication technologies as well as the status in the modern information space. This leads to a new international confrontation where a country’s desire for global information domination creates resistance and opposition from others.^{3,4} Internet governance has now become a political context because government officials are aware of the impact of information infrastructure on increasing international interaction and negative effects of the network for development of the world community. However, the creation of double infrastructure at the national level cannot be a counterbalance for the existing internet system, since states are not ready to spend money on an additional information

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2. A. Гуменский, *Управление международной информацией, “Международные процессы”* (A. Gumensky, *International Information Management, “International Processes”*), vol. 8, no. 1(22), 2010 [<http://intertrends.ru/system/Doc/ArticlePdf/585/Gumensky-22.pdf> access: 15 April 2020].
 3. K. N. Cukier, *Internet Governance, National Interest and International Relations*, [in:] D. MacLean (ed.), *Internet Governance: A Grand Collaboration*, “Collection of Papers Contributed to the United Nations Global Forum on Internet Governance”, United Nations: New York 2004, p. 276.
 4. M. Ermert, C. Hughes, *What Is in a Name? China and the Domain Name System, China and Internet Politics of the Digital Leap*, Routledge: London 2003, pp. 134-135.

infrastructure that is still imperfect and poorly developed. The ideas of Russia and Brazil on the creation of a separate national segment of the internet remain unimplemented. Therefore, governments should solve current international legal issues in network regulation because key network resources (domain names, IP addresses, internet protocols, etc.) have practical political significance and are not neutral.

Given the prospects of growing impact of the internet on international relations, diplomatic staff should not only use the network as a communication instrument but also understand the mechanism of its operation and foresee the consequences of its use. Knowledge of the basic resources of the network allows diplomats to manage and efficiently use online platforms, blogs, or social media for supporting national interests or conducting foreign policy activity. Also, they have to understand the consequences of using the internet in the area of free speech, security, protection of intellectual property rights, and privacy. We should take into account that the activity of ministries of foreign affairs cannot be open to a wide audience, so the rules of external and internal communication help diplomats to interact with the target groups, ensuring a balance between privacy and openness.

The essence of digital diplomacy is the use of methods, technologies, and instruments with a profound soft ideological influence on the global public as well as the creation of fundamental political values and ideas perceived by people as own beliefs. As a result, we can see the changes in the activities of diplomatic missions and the professional training of diplomats, who need to have special communication tools and

skills. The advantages of digital diplomacy include overcoming political, economic, cultural, and social barriers between countries and nations, even in the face of asymmetric technological development in the world. Digital diplomacy furthers the integration of political values and peaceful dialogue between different countries and could be used as a basis for shaping world public opinion through the interplay of context and content of online messages.



The essence of digital diplomacy is the use of methods, technologies, and instruments with a profound soft ideological influence on the global public as well as the creation of fundamental political values and ideas

A combination of traditional foreign policy activities with modern communication technologies allows presidents, prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors to actively use social media for communicating with external and internal public. We can monitor their impact on international political processes. For example, BCW (Burson Cohn & Wolfe) conducted several studies called the Twiplomacy Study⁵ for analysing social media accounts of officials and institutions and identifying not only the number of followers but also ways of efficient communication of political leaders with the audience. According to BCW, Twitter is the most popular platform used by government and foreign policy institutions for communicating and informing audiences; Facebook is in the second, and Instagram is in the third place.

5 *Twiplomacy Study*, "Burson Cohn & Wolfe", 2019 [<https://twiplomacy.com/blog/category/studies/> access: 15 April 2020].

Facebook pages are more popular among users than Twitter accounts.

Such advantages of social media as multimedia, personification, and interactivity are used by the ministries of foreign affairs, diplomatic missions, and cultural institutions for disseminating official information, coordinating the activity of different structures, providing online services, and communicating with target groups. At the same time, activities of the communication departments of the ministries of foreign affairs deal with providing various information on national interest; the partner with whom diplomats interact is an independent actor associated with any organisation. The ministry cannot randomly set communication rules and be fully open to the general public.

Thus, social media platforms are instruments of foreign and domestic political activity that can create conditions for developing friendly relations between countries or have a destructive influence on political, economic, and social processes in the country, region, or the world. The use of social media in foreign policy allows:

- to shape ideas on the country, state power, and political leader;
- to provide up-to-date information for existing and potential audiences;
- to attract the attention of several target groups for discussing current topics;
- to support direct communication with different groups (feedback);
- to increase the volume of quality traffic on the official Web portal.

Virtual Ambassador, Virtual Embassy, and Web Portal of Diplomatic Mission: Pros and Cons

Nowadays, a non-profit organisation titled DiploFoundation presents the types of diplomatic missions on the internet, among which are: Virtual Ambassador, Virtual Embassy, and Web Portal of Diplomatic Mission abroad. The difference between a virtual embassy and a diplomatic online platform is that Web portals are additional means for providing diplomatic activity in the host country, while a virtual embassy exists only online.⁶ Such a virtual embassy not only provides a full range of diplomatic services but also plays the role of the official diplomatic mission abroad. A virtual embassy could be established for^{7,8}:

- solving the issues of representation of small or poor countries in the world;
- providing diplomatic and consular services to citizens in countries where there is a small number of diplomatic missions;
- issuing e-visas;
- supporting low-intensity bilateral relations;
- developing bilateral economic ties;
- advocating special political interests, etc.

A virtual embassy should not take over the functions of traditional diplomatic missions. The creation of a virtual embassy is necessary in cases when there is a need for interaction between the foreign policy institution and high-ranking officials with the host country's foreign policy office, and there is no physical embassy in the host country.

6 J. Kurbalija, *E-Diplomacy and Diplomatic Law in the Internet Era*, "DiploFoundation", 2013 [https://www.diplomacy.edu/sites/default/files/PeacetimeRegime-JK%20Chapter.pdf access: 15 April 2020].

7 D. Kappeler, J. Kurbalija, A. Matteucci, et al., *Virtual Embassies: Different Perspectives*, "Second International Conference on Web Management in Diplomacy", DiploFoundation, 2002.

8 D. Kappeler, *Websites as an Instrument of Diplomacy*, "Second International Conference on Web Management in Diplomacy", DiploFoundation, 2002.

Besides the described virtual diplomatic missions, there is also a Data Embassy⁹, defined as the possession of a server outside the state's territorial boundaries. The initiative is being developed since 2017 by the Estonian government for ensuring state e-services and data continuity as well as avoiding negative effects of natural disasters, cyberattacks, power outages, or other crises. Such an "embassy" builds on the principles of cloud technologies, but the state retains complete control and jurisdiction over the data and systems. The Data Embassy will have the same protection and immunity as a traditional embassy, meaning the Estonian government proposes to apply the principles of the Vienna Convention regarding "physical" embassies and their territorial affiliation to cyberspace.

Creating virtual embassies or virtual task forces allows us to involve experts in several programmes at once. Virtual meetings of officials do not replace confidential diplomatic meetings but save time and money. Therefore, information technologies are necessary for modern diplomacy and allow non-stop interacting with the public, diplomats, and governments.

Current Practices of the USA, the EU, and Ukraine in Digital Diplomacy

Since the mid-1990s, the US Department of State has been using the internet for multilingual communication with the international community and has created a separate intranet for secure communication with missions abroad. The current Strategic Plan for 2019-2022¹⁰ focuses on deepening IT modernisation of diplomatic missions

abroad and enhancing security of Web infrastructure and data sharing based on cloud technologies. In particular, the MyServices platform now supports the administrative activity of 95,000 users in 275 US diplomatic missions abroad. In addition, it is planned to develop the platforms for service (PaaS) and service infrastructure (IaaS) that will integrate the US Department of State into a common cloud @State system.



from 2003 to 2011, approximately 40 virtual US representations were established, but after analysing their activity in 2011, it was decided to discontinue such websites because they were not popular

Virtual Presence Posts (VPP)¹¹ without full-time employees belong to the official US diplomatic missions. Such missions represent the country in a region through websites for supporting the diplomatic relations or holding public events, while the diplomats make targeted visits as needed. In general, from 2003 to 2011, approximately 40 virtual US representations were established, but after analysing their activity in 2011, it was decided to discontinue such websites because they were not popular. In 2019, the State Department retained five virtual diplomatic missions abroad – the US Virtual Embassies to Iran (ir.usembassy.gov) and San Marino (sm.usmission.gov), the US Virtual Consulate in Guinea-Bissau (gw.usmission.gov), as well as the US Virtual

9 *Data Embassy*, Estonian government, 2017 [<https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-governance/data-embassy/> access: 15 April 2020].

10 *IT Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2019–2022*, United States Department of State, 2018 [https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/FY-2019-2022-ITSP_FINAL-508_with-Signature.pdf access: 15 April 2020].

11 *U.S. Government's Overseas Presence, Office of Origin: M/PRI*, 2 FAM 130, United States Department of State, 2019 [<https://fam.state.gov/FAM/02FAM/02FAM0130.html> access: 15 April 2020].

Presence Post in Seychelles (mu.usembassy.gov) and Comoros (mg.usembassy.gov).

The State Department develops innovative projects and services on the use of social media for promoting US foreign policy interests. In particular, accounts have been created on such media platforms as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and Instagram. For example, seven official accounts on Twitter provide information in Arabic, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Russian, Farsi, and Urdu. US diplomatic missions have 1,159 accounts on various social media; therefore, for better management, official rules of using social media by the US government agencies have been developed. In addition, separate online platforms, the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (step.state.gov) and MyTravelGov (travel.state.gov), have been created for travelling Americans.

The essence of the EU digital diplomacy is to form a positive media space on the regional development of the European community and foreign policy initiatives of the Union using online tools. In particular, more than 216 accounts open on various social media platforms (Facebook, MySpace, Hyves, LinkedIn, Twitter, Blip, Flickr, Picasa, Daily Motion, YouTube, and Vimeo) for numerous EU institutions, allow European officials and European thematic projects to keep the first place in the world for reaching the audience. The European External Action Service, without replacing national foreign ministries, successfully complements the activity of diplomatic missions of the EU member states through effective communication with the world community using social media.

About 142 official accounts of the EU delegations abroad have been created on social media; in addition to the globally popular profiles on Facebook, Twitter, and

YouTube, thematic accounts have been opened on national social media (Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo, Flickr, or Storify), indicating that the EU wants not only to communicate with its audience in native languages but also to take into account cultural features of different regions of the world. For the correct Web presence of the European Commission, the Europa Web Guide,¹² which defines the official editorial, legal, technical, visual, and contractual rules, has been created. Within the European Union, digital diplomacy instruments are used for supporting the EU's political priorities, developing a common position on international events, promoting economic attractiveness of the European region, or personal and professional communicating.

Among the digital diplomacy tools of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, there is an online platform "Friend" (friend.mfa.gov.ua) for registering Ukrainian citizens and providing support in case of emergency. The directorate-general for consular service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine developed an online platform "Trip Advisor" (tripadvisor.mfa.gov.ua), which together with "Friend" promotes safe travel of Ukrainians abroad, protects their rights and interests, as well as seeks to create a positive attitude toward the work of Ukrainian consuls within the idea of #ConsulNearby. Based on these platforms and accounts of Ukrainian diplomatic missions on Facebook, the programme "Protection" has been launched for helping Ukrainian citizens who were stranded abroad after the closure of borders and the interruption of passenger traffic since March 2020.

In the programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, among the tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine attributed to digital diplomacy, there are the following:

12 *The Europa Web Guide*, European Commission, 2019 [https://wikis.ec.europa.eu/display/WEBGUIDE access: 15 April 2020].

- the development of existing consular information systems (Visa, e-Consul, EU Visa Information System, “Friend”) for the purpose of providing online consular services;
- the integration of consular information systems into public registers and the provision of data exchange in “Trembita,” which is developed and implemented with the support of the EGOV4UKRAINE and funded by the EU and its member states (Estonia, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and Sweden);
- the introduction of e-consular registration in Ukraine’s missions abroad.

The use of social media as an important diplomatic tool for informing foreign audiences about Ukraine and its foreign policy is carried out through active communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Telegram. Since 2014, as a result of the aggravation of Ukrainian-Russian relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revised the instruments for supporting Ukraine’s foreign policy interests and initiatives, as well as intensified the work of Ukrainian diplomatic missions. The ministry improved information content of its online platforms, introduced thematic sections on foreign policy initiatives, carried out a rebranding, and intensified multilingual dialogue with the public.

Innovations change the intellectual parameters of international relations and the nature of foreign policy institutions, shaping global awareness on the course of international events and influencing the efficiency of the MFA and diplomatic missions abroad. The location of a diplomatic mission during the development of ICTs is not so important because the access to the necessary information can be ensured through diplomatic online platforms. The beginning of 2020 demonstrated that ICTs and their skilful use can assist diplomats during organising day-and-night support of citizens abroad, conducting online meetings at various levels, creating online platforms for diplomatic activity, and disseminating thematic cultural, economic, or social information about the country.

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CYBER DIPLOMACY: AN INTANGIBLE REALITY OR A FAIT ACCOMPLI?

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A constantly changing international environment and a fast-paced advancement of information and communications technologies (ICTs) essentially modify the traditional ways of diplomacy. In the digital age, the use of e-tools has become a daily routine for diplomats, and the developments in the cyber realm define the global political agenda, transforming the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, the digitalisation of diplomatic interactions is intrinsically tied with cyber risks. The lack of a solid legal framework for regulation of the virtual space inevitably leads to conflicts. This article highlights new features that cyber diplomacy brings into international relations, raising the issue of online security, appropriate response to cyberattacks, and a right for self-defence.

Theoretical Background and Case Studies

For many centuries, diplomacy has been a privileged kind of statecraft in the spotlight with nation-states and political elites. But ever since information and communications technologies (ICTs) began to play a crucial role in guiding public opinion, diplomacy seems to have been simplified through the use of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or YouTube for communication with a vast audience. The need to integrate digital technologies into the diplomatic process gave way to cyber diplomacy. States tend to adopt broad strategies for addressing various issues and use wide networks of ICTs to express their current views and ideas about the future. They incorporate virtual reality into their foreign policies and use cyber diplomacy to promote their concept

of an international society.¹ However, before continuing with the analysis of cyber diplomacy implications, I would propose first to sort out the sometimes overlapping terms such as *public*, *digital*, and *cyber diplomacy*. Clear definitions may be useful in order to avoid confusions and misunderstandings.

Let's start with *public diplomacy* and its direct link to the soft power of states with a wide range of determinants, among which are political values, culture, foreign policy, and, of course, public diplomacy. It is focused on nation branding and at the same time is a part of a national identity. This is a strategy of a government aiming to shape public opinion and attitudes to its country abroad, which could affect the foreign policy course of other states. Public diplomacy puts an emphasis on two-way communication and open dialogue.

1 F. T. Burroughs, *The Diplomatic Tower of Babel*, "Public Diplomacy Magazine" (University of South California, Center for Public Diplomacy), 22, 2019, p. 52.

As for *digital diplomacy*, it can be viewed as an extension of soft power and public diplomacy, and is equipped with a new digital toolkit and techniques. It calls attention to a broader perspective of the role of digital technology in diplomacy as not only an instrument or medium of communication but also as a different mode of thinking about and practicing diplomacy.²

And finally, to distinguish between digital and *cyber diplomacy*, the latter puts stress on the use of diplomatic tools, and the diplomatic mindset, to resolve issues arising in cyberspace.³ Of course, the number of those matters can be enormous. They vary from completely peaceful initiatives such as multilateral forums or global climate campaigns to highly damaging ones such as propaganda and espionage.

However, the primary concern here is not only to draw attention to the wording but also to dwell on the practical examples of cyber diplomacy in action. In this regard, the case of Kosovo is a notable example. Despite the fact that Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 and has been recognised by many countries, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council (the UK, France, and the US), for most of the EU states and Canada, it still remains an online limbo. To date the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has been refusing to grant Kosovo its own country code top-level domain (ccTLD). For this reason, Kosovo has to run its internet traffic either under “foreign flags” or route it through third countries. Under these circumstances, a ccTLD is not just a symbolic indicator

of independence. Through the existence of private ccTLDs, Kosovo would control an essential part of their information and technological infrastructure that can affect telecommunications, power grids, banking, and electronic surveillance.

National governments recognise the internet domain as a component of their sovereignty. Furthermore, through its domain, Kosovo can lobby for recognition of the country.⁴ On the one hand, this situation leaves little room for manoeuvre on the global stage; on the other hand, it stimulates the use of its soft power and focus on the promotion of Kosovo’s culture and history by means of online tools. In this regard, a matter of nation branding is a crucial problem, because foreigners view the country as associated with corruption, social unrest, and territorial disputes.



National governments recognise the internet domain as a component of their sovereignty

It is worth mentioning that the MFA of Kosovo has elaborated a National Strategy on Digital Diplomacy, which includes such interesting and ambitious projects as App Camp, Wiki Academy, Digital Kosovo Initiative, Kosovo Diaspora Agency, and #InstaKosovo (its diplomats around the world are engaged in propagating the young republic as the New Europe). Kosovo’s political leadership also succeeded in being added to the Microsoft list of supported countries and was, so to

2 C. Bjola, *Digital Diplomacy 2.0: Trends and Counter-Trends*, “Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior”, 113, 2018, p. 3 [<https://revistadigital.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/numeros/n113/bjola.pdf> access: 02 May 2020].

3 S. Riordan, *Cyber Diplomacy vs. Digital Diplomacy: A Terminological Distinction*, University of Southern California, Center on Public Diplomacy, 12 May 2016 [<https://www.uscpubdiplomacy.org/blog/cyber-diplomacy-vs-digital-diplomacy-terminological-distinction> access: 07 May 2020].

4 M. J. Randazza, *Kosovo’s Digital Independence: Time for Kosovo’s ccTLD*, “Wisconsin International Law Journal”, 33(4), 2016, p. 670.

say, “recognised” by Facebook. Today, you can find Kosovo on Google Maps. Their digital diplomacy is enforced by YouTube, Flickr, and Google+. In 2017, a Twiplomacy report announced the MFA Kosovo account ranked 31st out of 50 “Best Connected World Leaders” in terms of interconnections with other diplomacies on social media.⁵ Thus, it means that gradually ICTs have enabled Kosovo to move beyond the borders of the regional conflict, to be more present in the global processes, and to be perceived by the wider public as a fully sovereign state without the unanimous *de jure* recognition.



relations between states in cyberspace may positively or negatively affect even partnerships established long ago

The case of such self-proclaimed states as Transnistria, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia is different. Their “independent” status was gained by means of hard power. These state formations succeeded to establish governments and courts; they control their territories and possess the other characteristics of statehood without being recognised. However, they are much less active in the cyber domain. We are not even able to talk about any strategic vision in this respect, which could be a backup means in terms of their international recognition.

A big trend for the *de facto* states is to create websites from which they espouse the virtue of their territories. They claim two things: that they already function as stable, effective entities and that they are democratic. They seek to attract foreign investment and tourists but admit that it is extremely hard to do so. Skype and Amazon do not include these territories, and they do not feature on Google Maps or similar sources. And definitely the online progress is prevented by the absence of ccTLD. For this reason, Nagorno-Karabakh usually borrows Armenia’s domain, Somaliland uses .com, and Transnistria – .org.⁶

One more interesting example is Estonia, a small Baltic state that has succeeded in making the digitalisation of public life a part of its soft power, a driving force of public diplomacy, and today sets trends in the cyber realm. Estonia became the first country in the world to open a Data Embassy in another country. In 2018, the Estonian Parliament passed an act that allowed it to host critical databases in Luxembourg. This is not an embassy in the traditional diplomatic sense, and while the founding agreement does take into account the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, it is something completely new under international law. It is fully under the control of Estonia but has the same rights as physical embassies, such as immunity.⁷ Certainly, it is a breakthrough in cyber diplomacy.

Yet another signal of interest resides in the merging of the state and private sectors in cybersphere. For instance, Data Embassy is

5 A. Visvizi, D. L. Miltiadis (eds.), *Politics and Technology in the Post-Truth Era*, Emerald Publishing Limited: Bingley 2019, p. 200.

6 N. Caspersen, *The Politics of Getting Online in Countries that Don’t Exist*, “The Conversation”, 14 January 2014 [https://theconversation.com/the-politics-of-getting-online-in-countries-that-dont-exist-21399 access: 11 May 2014].

7 *Data Embassy*, e-Estonia Briefing Centre, n.d. [https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-governance/data-embassy/ access: 08 May 2020].

an extension in the Cloud of the Estonian government, designed in collaboration with such companies as Cybernetica, Dell, EMC, OenNode, Telia, and Ericsson.⁸ This is a new tendency with the direct implementation of a multistakeholder approach, which can be adopted worldwide.

From Cyber Diplomacy to Cyber Politics

Today we can spend long hours arguing whether the cyberspace is as virtual as we used to think or has a direct impact on what is happening in real life. In this context, I would suggest considering it as another dimension of reality, and contemporary politics is not an exception. All known forms of political interaction, be it cooperation or conflict, demand from the world leaders to be ready to jump in. Taking into account the growing number of people who have access to the internet and advanced technologies, the cyber domain turns into a critical security issue and should be attributed to high politics.

Cyberspace requires a different level of address in addition to the other three already existing – “human”, “states”, and “international system”, emphasising the separation between the “social system” and the “natural environment”.⁹ And this new level is characterised by a plethora of interdependent players. It makes diplomacy more vulnerable and fragile. In other words, relations between states in cyberspace may positively or negatively affect even partnerships established long ago. If during the Cold War, the Soviet-American rivalry

was predominantly resulting in an arms race, today states possessing technical capabilities compete in cyberspace.

Both strong and weak actors try to control this “battlefield” by various means, whether setting “the rules of the game” or filtering the internet content with the view to defend themselves from malicious actions and even cyberattacks. But it is an outstanding issue: whether cyber threats can or should be perceived as a peril for state sovereignty and what is more – call for a military response.



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Cybersecurity remains a matter of national security and protection of a country's interests, although governments are gradually moving the debates over safe and stable connectivity infrastructure ever more toward intergovernmental fora and bilateral agreements. Along this line, the UN has formalised a multilateral approach to cybersecurity, specifically through the establishment of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)¹⁰ in 2004, intended to “advance responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”. The group's mandate covers the following topics:

8 Ibid.

9 S. Abedi, *The Priorities of Cyber Diplomacy in the Rouhani's Government*, “Modern Diplomacy”, 02 December 2019 [<https://modern diplomacy.eu/2019/12/02/the-priorities-of-cyber-diplomacy-in-the-rouhanis-government/> access: 10 May 2014].

10 A. Calderaro, *Overcoming Fragmentation in Cyber Diplomacy: The Promise of Cyber Capacity Building*, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 02 April 2020 [<https://www.ispionline.it/en/publicazione/overcomingfragmentation-cyber-diplomacy-promise-cyber-capacity-building-25418> access: 04 May 2020].

- Existing and emerging threats;
- How international law applies in the use of ICTs;
- Norms (non-binding), rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States;
- Confidence-building measures;
- Capacity building.¹¹

Basically, the GGE works on the elaboration of principles that states should obey in cyberspace, generating recommendations that can stimulate further consultations on their implementation. But one drawback that significantly slows down the process is that the GGE operates on the consensus basis, and if at least one of its members were against, a jointly prepared final report wouldn't be released, which happened in 2017.

Previously, in the *GGE Report 2013*, it was concluded that the international law and the UN Charter should be applicable in cyberspace, but disagreements arose about how to do it. The discussion collapsed when the group could not find common ground over the rights of states to respond to internationally wrongful acts committed through the use of ICTs and the applicability of international humanitarian law in cyberspace.¹² The opposing parties were the United States and the Russian Federation, which were aggravated by the extremely unfavourable geopolitical environment connected with the illegal annexation of Crimea. An additional variable in this already complicated equation became China, which has been the Russian ally in promotion of a *Draft Code of Conduct for Information*

Security at the UN since 2011. Thus, the two countries demonstrated a concern that information content itself could represent a threat to national security and set out a series of measures for maintaining sovereign control of their "information space".¹³

Indeed this contradicted the Western approach to "cyber security", but what is notable is that it mirrored the situation in the UN Security Council with the voting on important political issues. Thus, a certain ideological split, fuelled by the primacy of national interests, resulted in the "refashioning" of the GGE format and establishment in 2019 of an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). It actually reaffirmed the abovementioned confrontations, but was framed as a forum where any interested UN member state could participate, underlining the inclusiveness of the recently founded entity. Civil society and industry representatives became the new stakeholders in this process, and may definitely contribute to the negotiations around international law and internet governance models.

But what gives a cause for concern is that from now on the work on the future binding norms for cyberspace will be conducted on two parallel tracks and this may dilute the main focus. Under these circumstances, it is very easy to massively politicise the problem, and in such a way that the workflow will simply get stuck with terms and definitions.

The UN still remains a unique international platform for the identification and mitigation of global issues. It is possible to say with

11 *Group of Governmental Experts*, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, n.d. [<https://www.un.org/disarmament/group-of-governmental-experts/> access: 12 May 2020].

12 S. T. Colatin, *A Surprising Turn of Events: UN Creates Two Working Groups on Cyberspace*, NATO CCD COE Law Branch, n.d. [<https://ccdcoe.org/incyber-articles/a-surprising-turn-of-events-un-creates-two-working-groups-on-cyberspace/> access: 10 May 2020].

13 D. Stauffacher, *UN GGE and UN OEWG: How to Live with Two Concurrent UN Cybersecurity Processes*, "ICT4Peace to Jeju Forum", 30 May 2019 [<https://ict4peace.org/publications/un-gge-and-un-oewg-how-to-live-with-two-concurrent-un-cybersecurity-processes/> access: 09 May 2014].

confidence that the world community is far from developing legally binding norms for cyber domain, but every joint effort helps building trust between the actors, raising awareness of the coming threats, and enhancing transparency and predictability among the states. At this point of time, we need a clear road map, which defines the “red lines” in cyberspace, answering the questions of what is allowed and what is not, who is responsible, and what the punishment for a particular cybercrime should be. In this case, the pieces of state practices are highly important.

Publishing of national strategies and action plans, exchange of experience in repulsing cyberattacks domestically will set the precedents that can complement international law. Capacity building is an essential component in this regard. Supporting the establishment of national structures and internal mechanisms on countering cyber threats, sharing the lessons learned on resilience measures, organising specialised courses of study, professional trainings, conferences, and workshops are not only useful for the bridging of digital divides between the parties engaged but also a big investment in their sustainability relevant to cybersecurity.

Security Dilemmas in Cyberspace

There is no doubt that the internet is the most powerful information source, which not only is used for communication or entertainment but also poses certain security risks connected with data protection, human rights violations, and breach of international law. Thus, we observe a shifting of focus from the societal aspect of information dissemination to its protection. The “weaponisation” of data creates a new space

for rivalry and warfare, where the interests of states may clash.

When it comes to “offline” or “classical” international conflict, the parties have clear guidelines to follow (treaties, customary law, general principles of law, etc.) or official institutions to appeal to (International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court). But what should be done if a cyber conflict is beyond the threshold of the use of force? Or how is this virtual borderless space – where vital national interests of states are infringed upon and the repercussions are noticeable in the physical world – regulated? This is exactly the discourse in the frame of which the discussion flows. Of course, it does not mean that the absence of a cyber-specific system of international legal rules leaves the cyberspace uncontrolled. As was mentioned before, the UN Charter serves as the basic set of norms, but it does not give a comprehensive answer to all emerging questions.

Let us explore more precisely the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack against Estonia in 2007 and refer to the UN Charter Article 51, which says that states can legitimately use force in self-defence in response to “a significant armed attack” and in proportion to the injury suffered.¹⁴ The first point at issue is whether we can equate an armed attack with a cyber one. Against this background, legal experts advise to turn to the measurement of the material damage that has been caused. In this case, the cyberattacks targeted websites of the Estonian president, government, parliament, and prime minister, political parties, media outlets, and major banks. Some of them were blocked, degraded for days, or slowed down their work. And despite the fact that the functioning of virtual entities was harmed,

14 S. Soesanto, S. F. D’Incau, *The UN GGE Is Dead: Time to Fall Forward*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 15 August 2017 [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_time_to_fall_forward_on_cyber_governance access: 03 May 2020].

the disruptive actions came at a high cost, with an estimated economic impact between 27 million and 40 million US dollars.¹⁵ In view of this, we cannot call it an “attack” with non-material effects, but still, was it enough to apply legally binding norms to the perpetrator?

Another matter of concern is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In 2007, Estonia had been already enjoying its full membership in NATO. Legal instruments to prove that the abovementioned cyberattack should be treated in the same way as a military one could have enabled the Estonians to trigger Article 5. However, it did not happen, not even because of legal collisions, but most likely due to the unwillingness to start a real-life military conflict when there were no civil casualties and the economy of the victim party was not devastated at large.

To bridge existing legal gaps, an international group of experts under the initiative of the Tallinn-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence issued the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* in 2013, with an expanded 2nd edition – *Tallinn Manual 2.0* – in 2017. The textbooks represent a comprehensive study, covering both the most severe cyber operations and common cyber incidents between states. With regard to the use of force in cyberspace, Rule 11 of the *Tallinn Manual* states: “A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to noncyber operations rising to the level of

a use of force”.¹⁶ In the commentary to the rules, the authors note that generally “[a]cts that injure or kill persons or damage or destroy objects are unambiguously uses of force” and where cyberattacks have similar consequences, they are “highly likely” to constitute use of force.¹⁷ In reality, these statements echo the main principles of the UN Charter named before but, unfortunately, have no legal power and may be used as a theoretical basis for future work in this area.

In terms of the ongoing global discussion on responsible state behaviour and international law in cyberspace, the EU is an active contributor as well. In June 2017, EU ministers of foreign affairs came up with a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities under the title *Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox* (CDT). The idea is about the application of sanctions mechanism aiming to develop signalling and reactive capacities at the EU and member state level with the aim to influence the behaviour of potential aggressors, taking into account the necessity and proportionality of the response.¹⁸ Of course, the concept is not new by itself, because the EU has been using it for the past three decades. This kind of restrictive measures may become a universal remedy to “punish” those who do not play by the rules. Here the problem also lies in how to turn sanctions into an effective external action (the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy), implementing them proportionally to the committed crime, and this would certainly require unanimity among member states on the Union’s cyber engagement.

15 S. Li, *When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense?*, “Yale Journal of International Law”, 38, 2013, p. 182.

16 M. N. Schmitt (ed.), *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, Cambridge University Press: New York 2013, p. 47.

17 S. Haataja, *The 2007 Cyber Attacks against Estonia and International Law on the Use of Force: An Informational Approach*, “Innovation and Technology”, 9(2), 2017, p. 166.

18 E. Moret, P. Pawlak, *The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox: Towards a Cyber Sanctions Regime?*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (Brief Issue), July 2017 [<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/eu-cyber-diplomacy-toolbox-towards-cyber-sanctions-regime> access: 09 May 2020].

Conclusion

In the twenty-first century, cyber diplomacy will not replace the “old style” practices but will certainly become an inalienable part of them. While enhancing communication and establishing strong linkages between politicians and people, it will further function as an international platform for producing new ideas, social movements, and global trends. This is a moment of transition – an era of rapid change at the intersection of technology and foreign policy, where the work of diplomats is to increase the speed at which governments can respond to that change.¹⁹



The development of legally binding norms and international law in cyberspace remains a challenge for global leadership

In this sense, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic gives an additional impetus to these transformations, pushing the whole world into cyberspace. It is certain that nobody could predict online diplomacy becoming the only possible way to interact even for a limited period of time. The value of “personal diplomacy” increased significantly, making reliable partnerships stronger than ever before and accelerating the decision-making process.

It is clear enough that in the post-coronavirus world, the digitalisation of diplomacy will continue, facing all the threats coming from the cyber domain. The protection of critical infrastructure will be a primary task, placing the problem of cyber hygiene on both domestic and international agenda.

For this reason, it is urgently needed to keep the dialogue going within the UN GGE and OEWG, despite the substantial differences of opinions.

The development of legally binding norms and international law in cyberspace remains a challenge for global leadership. There is no certainty about their attribution, the conditions under which countermeasures should be taken, and their proportionality. It may be reasonable to use sanctions as a tool to constrain those who seek to compromise international legal principles in virtual reality. But the sanctions mechanism is rather sophisticated and demands a single approach to cybersecurity and digital policy. Due to this, it is necessary to intensify the collective efforts of the like-minded partners (not only states but non-governmental actors as well) in order to share their experiences regarding the use of cyberspace. Only by expanding their cyber capacity building can the diplomatic channels of communication via the internet be safer and more reliable.

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19 21st Century Statecraft, “Diplomacy in Action”, the US Department of State, 20 January 2017 [https://2009-2017.state.gov/statecraft/overview/index.htm access: 02 May 2020].

TIME FOR A NEW DIPLOMACY?

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This article reflects the impact of economic fallout and the coronavirus pandemic on diplomacy. The paper focuses on the current state of international relations, work of international organisations, and the tools of diplomacy. One of the aspects mentioned is digital diplomacy and how it will change the diplomacy we are used to.

Introduction

The history of diplomacy is usually dated back to the fourteenth century BC. In the earliest periods, special missions were being exchanged between ancient civilisations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Later diplomacy changed and improved. A particularly important event that caused a change in medieval diplomacy and developments in international relations (IR) was the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The treaty finally brought the Thirty Years' War to end and established a new system of IR based on its fundamental principles – a state's sovereignty, collective (European) security, the balance of power. In essence, it meant the birth of new rules of conduct among sovereign and "equal" states. This system survived for about three hundred years. Several key elements of diplomacy had been elaborated: resident ambassadors, secret negotiations, ceremonial duties and protocol, and professional approach to diplomacy.

In the nineteenth century, the concept of the balance of power in IR was reconstructed by Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich (who opposed the forces of liberalism and democratisation and defended the old

order) and was brought down by Bismarck's politics and the Franco-Prussian War (1871). European diplomacy turned into a cold-blooded game of power politics.¹

During the twentieth century, diplomacy and the world changed very quickly. A new type of diplomacy emerged after World War II. It consisted of bilateral or multilateral relationships, traditions of protocol and etiquette, and powerful international organisations as a forum for peaceful settlement of disputes and a deterrent to the waging of aggressive wars. This process opened doors for small and post-imperial states. The character of diplomatic interaction between old and new players at different levels was determined by international law as a defining part of the new world order.

Today there is a global international system with 193 member states in the UN. Global communication has become much easier and faster; humans have become more internationalised.

Digital Diplomacy

"My God, this is the end of diplomacy!" said Lord Palmerston, British prime minister

1 H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster: New York 1994, pp. 17, 121.

and foreign secretary, after receiving the first telegraph message in the 1850s². On 04 February 1994, the first email between heads of government was sent. Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and US President Bill Clinton couldn't have known how quickly communications would change in the near future. On that same day ten years later, Mark Zuckerberg founded Facebook, which has rapidly become one of the biggest social networking sites in the world. On 21 March 2006, @jack (aka Jack Dorsey, Twitter's founder) sent the first tweet. These new platforms have become tools for digital, public, and Twitter diplomacy.

"Twitter and other social media tools are a way to abstract foreign policy from state-to-state interaction and instead 'pivot to the people,'" said Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former director of policy planning in the US State Department (2009–2011).³ These are artfully chosen words. Nowadays, when traditional diplomacy is under quarantine, the digital diplomatic realm is booming. Ministries of foreign affairs have turned to social media to communicate with stakeholders; governments have launched social media campaigns that feature their coronavirus-related activities. Digital tools have two big positive effects on real policy. They foster the exchange of ideas between policymakers and civil society. Diplomats and public servants' are using the internet to find, analyse, and manage relevant information, react to events, as well as communicate with colleagues and negotiate draft texts in electronic

format. Now all of these practical skills are important in daily diplomatic work, and there is no other way.



A new type of diplomacy emerged after World War II. It consisted of bilateral or multilateral relationships, traditions of protocol and etiquette, and powerful international organisations as a forum for peaceful settlement of disputes

The United States has cancelled at least two summits it planned to host in 2020, including the meeting of G7 foreign ministers that is now happening online. As the global crisis threatens to alter the world balance of power, NATO's top diplomats abandoned plans to meet in person; the European Union has scaled back its schedule; a major international conference on climate change in Scotland was called off, and many lower-level UN gatherings have been scrapped entirely.⁴ On 24 March 2020, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba made the first virtual visit by a foreign minister in Europe.⁵ Diplomacy at the United Nations, including in the UN Security Council, and elsewhere has now moved to phones, emails, and virtual meetings. With face-to-face meetings increasingly rare, diplomacy by teleconference and secure video has become the norm, offering easy

2 *Digital Diplomacy; E-diplomacy; Cyber Diplomacy*, DiploFoundation, 2019 [https://www.diplomacy.edu/e-diplomacy access: 19 April 2020].

3 A. Sandre, *Twitter for Diplomats: A Guide to the Fastest Growing Digital Diplomacy Tool*, DiploFoundation, 10 February 2013 [https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/twitter-diplomats-guide-fastest-growing-digital-diplomacy-tool access: 06 May 2020].

4 M. Lee, E. M. Lederer, *Global Diplomacy under the Gun in the Time of Coronavirus*, "The Associated Press", 04 April 2020 [https://apnews.com/d61a53d19d262c3cf604cec6f4e52fad access: 19 April 2020].

5 *Germany to Help to Ukrainians in Distant Countries to Return Home*, "Interfax-Ukraine", 04 April 2020 [https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/649624.html access: 22 April 2020].

outs for those unwilling or unable to engage in delicate or controversial negotiations.⁶

Particularly in the case of digital diplomacy, there are many questions regarding diplomatic protocol, etiquette, and data security of the exchange of information between parties. There are many examples of cyberattacks known for their influence on a country, especially on decision-making during elections. Virtual reality is an important part of national security. That is why platforms used in diplomatic work or online communications of a head of state or government must be protected. Effective organisation of multilateral summits and international conferences online requires not only high-tech platforms but also new methods of work.

Use of Pandemic in Diplomatic Endeavours

In the absence of in-person diplomatic discussions, some countries, such as Russia and China, seek to exploit the crisis to further weaken international institutions. Russia's disinformation is designed to sow distrust among the allies of the West. Russia drafted two UN General Assembly resolutions aimed not so much at defeating COVID-19, but more at weakening sanctions. Those attempts were blocked at the United Nations.⁷

China has been in the coronavirus disinformation game too. China's

diplomatic corps played the leading role in this campaign. "‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus," said Robin Niblett, director of Britain's Chatham House.⁸ But China's actions have done more harm than good. The Chinese diplomats used Twitter and Facebook (blocked in China) for this, and sometimes their publications were undiplomatic. In Venezuela, Chinese diplomats tweeted that the officials in Caracas should "put on a face-mask and shut up". That retort was in response to Venezuelans referring to COVID-19 as the "Chinese" or "Wuhan" virus.⁹

Analysts say the pandemic revealed China's willingness to expand its use of disinformation campaigns – previously focused on undermining pro-democracy voices in Taiwan and Hong Kong – to the wider world. As early as 2015, scholars from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies predicted that the People's Liberation Army would use Twitter to deliver propaganda to new audiences "to influence the global conversation about China".¹⁰ This and other similar cases give rise to questions about the role of diplomacy in a world where reality and the virtual sphere are combined. Political experts and data scientists are speaking about the importance of new topics on the diplomatic agenda and features of international negotiations in areas such as cross-border

6 Lee, Lederer, n4.

7 *Ukraine Blocks Another Russian Draft UN Resolution Aimed at Sanction Lift*, "UNIAN", 22 April 2020 [https://www.unian.info/politics/ukraine-blocks-another-russian-draft-un-resolution-aimed-at-sanction-lift-10969064.html access: 30 April 2020].

8 J. Dettmer, *China's 'Wolf Warrior' Diplomacy Prompts International Backlash*, "VOA News", 06 May 2020 [https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-prompts-international-backlash access: 07 May 2020].

9 S. Bengali, A. Su, *Put on a Mask and Shut up: China's New 'Wolf Warriors' Spread Hoaxes and Attack a World of Critics*, "Los Angeles Times", 04 May 2020 [https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-05-04/wolf-warrior-diplomats-defend-china-handling-coronavirus access: 06 May 2020].

10 Ibid.

privacy, e-commerce, and international cybersecurity, to name a few. They call it “data diplomacy”.¹¹

The key will be the accuracy and reliability of the information, provided by combining all aspects of data diplomacy and science diplomacy. Any successful diplomatic mission will depend on it. The contemporary phase of globalisation, which has created an unprecedented era of technological change, has led to a revolution in communication, which requires diplomats to be cautious and fast thinkers.¹²

Information is received and sent faster than ever before. Human activities are generating large volumes of data with a big potential, especially for diplomats. Big data could benefit the fields and functions for which they are most relevant: information gathering and reporting; meeting the expectations of government service delivery (consular affairs); better understanding people’s perceptions and behaviour (communication, public diplomacy, and negotiation); tracking programmes and progress over time and space (trade and development); tracking developments over short timeframes (humanitarian affairs and emergency response); identifying new forms of evidence and accountability (international law).¹³ Countries and governments should invest in technical infrastructure, cyber protection systems, and training.

But some countries use data as a tool to influence and manage citizens’ behaviour, and try to spread it to other countries. They are using cyber force to gather intelligence, spread disinformation, or steal research. China sells large-scale surveillance in Africa and Asia. Russia uses troll armies and hacker collectives as a new face of Moscow’s international policy.¹⁴ Nowadays we see news about hacker attacks on pharmaceutical companies, medical research organisations, and universities that are working on COVID-19 vaccine development.¹⁵ This factor changes everything related to geopolitics and world economics, but it also sets a precedent for the future upgrade of international law and world organisations.



The key will be the accuracy and reliability of the information, provided by combining all aspects of data diplomacy and science diplomacy. Any successful diplomatic mission will depend on it

On the basis of this situation, diplomats should use diplomatic experience and negotiating skills to strengthen transatlantic digital policy dialogue, especially around 5G, artificial intelligence, future of the UN, and multilateral diplomacy.

11 B. R. Jacobson, K. E. Höne, J. Kurbalija, *Data Diplomacy: Updating Diplomacy to the Big Data Era*, DiploFoundation, February 2018, p. 4.

12 K. Mayer, *Open Science Diplomacy to Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic*, S4D4C, 17 April 2020 [<https://www.s4d4c.eu/open-science-diplomacy-to-tackle-the-covid-19-pandemic/> access: 30 April 2020].

13 Jacobson et al., n11, p. 6.

14 C. Clüver Ashbrook, *From Digital Diplomacy to Data Diplomacy*, International Politics and Society, 14 January 2020 [<https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/global/article/show/from-digital-diplomacy-to-data-diplomacy-3993/> access: 05 May 2020].

15 S. Lyngaas, *State-linked Hacking Continues amid Race for Coronavirus Treatments, US and UK Agencies Warn*, “Cyberscoop”, 05 May 2020 [<https://www.cyberscoop.com/coronavirus-research-hacking-warning/> access: 06 May 2020].

Quarantine Diplomacy

In the last two years, economists and financiers have been talking about the approaching economic crisis and a global recession. But nobody could say what would be the reason behind it. The new coronavirus pandemic has become the cause. The world has changed dramatically in the three months since the last update of the *World Economic Outlook*. Countries are implementing necessary quarantines and social distancing practices to contain the pandemic, while the world has been put in a lockdown. April Fitch Ratings expects world GDP to contract by 3.9% in 2020, with contractions of 5.6% and 7% in the US and Eurozone, respectively.¹⁶ All these aspects of economic, social, and medical policy have also instantly changed diplomacy and foreign policy.



the leading place has been taken by medical diplomacy, which includes high-level negotiations between national leaders and international public health actors and their counterparts in the field, including host country officials, nongovernmental organisations, private sector companies, and the public

The global coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated that globalisation and human activity are not only about climate

change but also about the emergence of new deadly viruses. The lessons of the Ebola outbreak have not been learned by either leaders of states or international organisations. The level of health care continues to be inadequate, especially in developing countries. In this situation, the leading place has been taken by medical diplomacy, which includes high-level negotiations between national leaders and international public health actors and their counterparts in the field, including host country officials, nongovernmental organisations, private sector companies, and the public. The exchange of information on the treatment of the infected, as well as obtaining the necessary medical equipment and personal safety equipment, is an important part of diplomats' work nowadays.

A striking example of contemporary Ukrainian medical diplomacy was sending a team of Ukrainian doctors to Italy to help combat the COVID-19 pandemic and share experiences.¹⁷ Furthermore, Ukrainian planes "Mriya" and "Ruslan" owned by the state-run Antonov Airlines have been working with several countries and providing air transportation of the crucial personal protective equipment from Asia to Europe and other destinations. They include Canada, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Kuwait, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and the US.¹⁸ The importance of this cooperation with Ukraine during the pandemic has

16 *Coronavirus Impact: Research Highlights (Links to a Selection of Fitch Ratings' Coronavirus Content – Week Ending April 24, 2020)*, "Fitch Ratings", 24 April 2020 [<https://www.fitchratings.com/site/re/10119870> access: 27 April 2020].

17 *President Signed a Decree on the Assistance to Italy in Combating the Coronavirus Pandemic*, The Presidential Office of Ukraine, 03 April 2020 [<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-pidpisav-ukaz-pro-dopomogu-italiyi-v-borotbi-z-pan-60489> access: 29 April 2020].

18 C. Miller, *Trump Called Ukrainians "Terrible People". They Are Airlifting Tons of Lifesaving Medical Supplies to the US with the Biggest Cargo Planes in the World*, "BuzzFeed News", 17 April 2020 [<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/coronavirus-ukraine-biggest-plane-in-the-world> access: 20 April 2020].

been noted in his video speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.¹⁹

But not only Ukraine is using the time of crisis to gain political points on the international stage. Active medical diplomacy is used as a soft power in foreign policy by China, the USA, France, and Cuba. Each state has its own goals. China and the US continue to compete for world leadership, especially in Europe and in relation to the World Health Organization.

During March and April, China sent medics, masks, ventilators, and shipments of other precious protective equipment to the countries in the midst of the coronavirus outbreak. But all these actions were coupled with diplomatic request for foreign officials to praise China in public. Observers say China is embarking on “mask diplomacy” because it prefers to be seen fighting the virus around the world to suffering criticism as the country where the disease had begun. This campaign was a success in some countries, such as Serbia, Hungary, Cambodia, and others. But most leaders, experts, and medical professionals remain wary of China’s coronavirus data, and nobody has forgotten its missteps in the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak. They include suppressing early warnings and hiding information from its citizens and the rest of the world.²⁰

“China is carefully reshaping its image damaged by the outbreak, but the fact that the Chinese government delayed a timely response and led to an international crisis will make the mission almost impossible,” said Alfred Wu, associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.²¹

France and Germany make statements on the reform of WHO and try to manage the situation in the EU on their own. But in a situation prevailing in the world, the EU continues to balance between the US and China. French President Emmanuel Macron has questioned China’s virus response, telling the *Financial Times*, “There are clearly things that have happened that we don’t know about”. At that time Britain’s Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said it could not go back to “business as usual” with China.²²

As for Cuba, this country has still succeeded in playing a key role in the war against COVID-19. Havana has sent medical teams to 19 countries including Italy, Andorra, Angola, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela – a total of about 900 doctors and nurses so far. The numbers are increasing. It is not a new story: For nearly 60 years, Cuba has been sending health care professionals around the world as part of a concerted campaign of medical diplomacy.²³

19 Ukraine Helps NATO Fight COVID-19, “Corona24.news”, 15 April 2020

[<https://www.corona24.news/c/2020/04/15/ukraine-helps-nato-fight-covid-19.html> access: 20 April 2020].

20 A. Ma, *China Is Attempting to Win Political Points from the Coronavirus with ‘Mask Diplomacy’ – But It Mostly Isn’t Working*, “Business Insider”, 18 April 2020 [<https://www.businessinsider.nl/analysis-china-coronavirus-political-points-mostly-not-working-2020-4/> access: 23 April 2020].

21 K. Zhai, H. Wu, *Virus Diplomacy: As Outbreak Goes Global, China Seeks to Reframe Narrative*, “Reuters”, 06 March 2020 [<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-diplomacy-an/virus-diplomacy-as-outbreak-goes-global-china-seeks-to-reframe-narrative-idUSKBN20T14C> access: 18 April 2020].

22 D. Kang, *China’s Diplomats Show Teeth in Defending Virus Response*, “The Associated Press”, 18 April 2020 [<https://apnews.com/11356a590ecee0572545b3ffb7de0d5b> access: 19 April 2020].

23 T. Fawthrop, *Cuba’s Improbable Medical Prowess in Asia*, “The Diplomat”, 24 April 2020 [<https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/cubas-improbable-medical-prowess-in-asia/> access: 26 April 2020].

Currently, global health programmes continue to ascend the political agenda in scale and influence. Countless new initiatives offer open data sources, collecting information from various sources: The Human Coronaviruses Data Initiative, for example, collects patented knowledge about the virus; Wikimedians pool all COVID-19-relevant information and resources in Wikidata; the Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering shares the collected data in Github; the OECD collects open data sources; the Virus Outbreak Data Network of the Go Fair Initiative develops standards and makes recommendations for infrastructures. The COVID-19 pandemic presents a major test for our science, economic, political, and international system, and humanity. The world must unite the existing initiatives and accelerate the exchange of needed information and support science diplomacy to help address the current crisis.

When the pandemic eases and some restrictions are removed, world leaders should discuss ways to live in a new world, ways of reforming WHO, and border crossing protocols.

Diplomats play an important role now and will be important in the future, as each country will strive to ensure security from future similar crises and to preserve the rights of its citizens to cross the borders of other states freely, in accordance with current international agreements. The new criteria for global health programmes will depend not only on qualified doctors and

experts but also on the international policies of the countries, which can be leaning towards protectionism. This is especially important for countries where international trade makes up a large share of the economy.

Conclusion

Global lockdown has expedited the digital transformation process of social life and the work of diplomacy and government. Theory is being put into practice, and this provides the framework that will determine our future. Health issues have become increasingly preeminent in the evolving global diplomacy agenda. More leaders are thinking about how to structure and utilise diplomacy and science in pursuit of global health goals.

Diplomacy is a conservative substance, which changes as societies develop. History suggests that changes in diplomacy always happen eventually, but it offers no guidance on how those will unfold or how long it will take. COVID-19 has prompted reactions similar to that of Lord Palmerston, but this is not the end of diplomacy. This is the time to adjust to a new reality.

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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY

Piotr Hajdecki

Ex-commercial diplomat of Poland ¹

Commercial diplomacy is an important part of diplomacy. It is likely that in post-COVID-19 times, it will become even more important as a means contributing to faster economic recovery of countries. Performance measurement has been gaining importance in commercial diplomacy practice. It is not only about controlling people, identifying weak points and dysfunctions, and possible repressions, but also serves many positive purposes (e.g. improving operations, building trust with stakeholders, or enabling data-based advocating for higher budgets). The article will discuss what metrics can be used to measure performance in commercial diplomacy.

The recent trend is clear: Commercial diplomacies make greater efforts to measure the impact of trade support services and to use formal performance indicators and targets². Performance measurement in commercial diplomacy is on the rise.

This trend is accompanied by an increasing role of commercial diplomacy³ and a shift in expectations of business towards commercial diplomats⁴. In post-COVID-19 times, commercial diplomacy will most likely be appreciated even more as a means to get out of the economic crisis faster. The current situation makes countries more

concerned about their national economies. It will inevitably result in increasing protectionism, promotion of “made in” products, and preference for domestic suppliers and contractors, creating a big challenge for commercial diplomats. It will most likely bring in increased importance of public aid/public support for market success. This, in turn, will increase the role of lobbying, public affairs, and government relations. In diplomatic world, one could hear that some countries have already been preparing additional corpus of commercial diplomats to fight for economic interests of their country in post-COVID-19 times.

1 The author presents private opinions accumulated by over 15 years' experience in commercial diplomacy and private sector. The opinions and positions presented in the text are not the opinions of the author's current or previous employer or any institution he cooperates with.

2 *A Guide to Commercial Diplomacy*, International Trade Centre: Geneva 2019, p. 5.

3 D. Lee, H. Ruel, *Introduction: Commercial Diplomacy and International Business: Merging International Business and International Relations*, [in:] H. Ruel (ed.), *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business. A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Bingley 2012, p. xv; O. Naray, *Commercial Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview*, Conference Paper at 7th World Conference of TPOs, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2008.

4 Compare: M. Kostecki, O. Naray, *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, April 2007, ISSN 1569-2981, pp. 8-9.

There is also a shift in expectations of business towards commercial diplomats, which has been clearly expressed by Arancha González, the executive director at International Trade Centre, in her foreword to the *Guide to Commercial Diplomacy*: “In a rapidly changing trade landscape, those who support businesses to trade need new ways of working, new skills and new partnerships”.⁵



In diplomatic world, one could hear that some countries have already been preparing additional corpus of commercial diplomats to fight for economic interests of their country in post-COVID-19 times

Another stimulus coming from the business world is an increasing awareness and assertiveness of business representatives who know what to expect from commercial diplomats and how to assess their work using corporate standards. They are ready to complain to the ministry, go to mass media, or express their disappointment on social media if they do not like the standard of commercial diplomacy service. This all means that modern, well-designed, objective, and methodologically valid performance measurement is a must in today's commercial diplomacy. And it should not cause any fear or resistance among staff if we realise that potential benefits outweigh the threats.

Why Measure Performance in Commercial Diplomacy?

Commercial diplomacy needs metrics for many reasons:

1) The most expensive resource. Diplomats are the most expensive category of public

servants, as they are paid not only salary but also overseas daily allowance, travel expenses, cost of residence, etc. As they are the most expensive human resource in public sector, their performance should be measured diligently.

2) Physical distance between headquarters and diplomatic missions. This makes direct supervision impossible. One can imagine a situation when the ministry is located in Europe and a diplomat is posted in Australia or North America. Due to time difference, it is challenging to have even a Teams conversation during office hours. Performance metrics recorded in an electronic system enable following the performance of diplomats in foreign posts on an ongoing basis.

3) Increasing public scrutiny requires evidence that resources for commercial diplomacy are well spent. Citizens and business are increasingly aware and assertive when it comes to the quality of public services. Metrics help to respond to such inquiries and critics, and build trust in public service.

4) Need for adequate metrics and reward criteria. Compensation policies should motivate staff for good performance and rewards should be granted to those who make impact and really contribute to achieving organisational goals. This need is illustrated by the following example: Experience in a foreign service has been usually recognised as the criterion for years-in-service allowance. However, in times of digitalisation, dynamic development, technological disruptions, and rapidly emerging new business models, it cannot be taken for granted that a diplomat with the longest experience brings the most value. A system using years in service as a reward criterion does not reflect the

⁵ A *Guide to Commercial Diplomacy*, n2.

actual value of work and contribution of an individual employee. Rewarding a person for surviving in the organisation is not reasonable.

5) Need for accurate response to actual business needs. Performance measurement helps to identify actual business needs and their geographical patterns and to respond to them accordingly, e.g. by allocation of relevant resources in the global network.

Measuring performance is not only about controlling people, identifying weak points and dysfunctions, followed by possible repressions, but it also serves many other purposes. A classic article by Robert D. Behn of Harvard University names eight purposes of measuring performance: evaluating if the agency is doing well, controlling if subordinates are doing the right things, deciding on budget allocations, motivating the staff, promoting achievements and impact made by the agency, celebrating successes, learning what is working and what is not, and improving performance⁶. Translating these general purposes into the specific commercial diplomacy context, performance measurement allows:

- To follow the process of goal accomplishment, identify problems, and launch improvements in commercial diplomacy operations;
- To apply for budgets, substantiating application with relevant quantitative arguments;

- To show the results of commercial diplomacy, unit, or a single diplomat to citizens, journalists, constituencies, and other stakeholders;
- To build trust and accountability of foreign service;
- To motivate and reward the staff more effectively based on objective criteria.

Definition of Commercial Diplomacy

Commercial diplomacy is a governmental service for the business community, which aims at the development of socially beneficial international business ventures⁷. Commercial diplomats perform their activities in the host country and are usually staff members of a diplomatic mission, trade promotion organisation (TPO), or investment promotion agency (IPA). Commercial diplomacy is the work of diplomatic missions (and other agencies) to support the home country's business sector⁸. Its functions are sometimes performed by a trade representative with non-diplomatic status or by local staff, citizens of the host country, with non-diplomatic status.

A comprehensive set of potential commercial diplomacy activities has been compiled by Shirin Reuvers and Huub Ruel⁹ and grouped into four categories: network activities, intelligence, image campaigns, and support business.¹⁰

6 R. D. Behn, *Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures*, "Public Administration Review", September/October 2003, vol. 63, no. 5.

7 Kostecki, Naray, n4, p. 1.

8 *A Guide to Commercial Diplomacy*, n2, p. 12.

9 S. Reuvers, H. Ruel, *Research on Commercial Diplomacy, A Review and Implications*, [in:] H. Ruel (ed.), *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business. A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Bingley 2012, p. 8.

10 Oliver Naray provides an alternative classification of commercial diplomacy activities, naming: business intelligence, country image, networking and partner search, conflict handling, support of business and government delegations and strategic concerns. See: Naray, n3.

Challenges in Measuring Performance of Commercial Diplomacy

While designing performance measurement systems, some issues should be considered and addressed. They are briefly described below.

- Non-tangible service. Diplomacy offers a non-tangible service; thus, it is not easy to measure its performance.
- No overall control. The ultimate outcome of commercial diplomacy's efforts is determined by many different factors, some of which are out of control of commercial diplomats – commercial diplomacy service is usually a fraction of forces determining the final outcome.
- Non-obligatory follow-up from companies. Both commercial diplomacy customers and partners in the host country are not obliged to report the final outcome (impact) of the diplomatic service. As a result, it is challenging to track the impact.
- Diversity of domains and services. A performance measurement system is determined heavily by the domain of commercial diplomacy services – different metrics can be relevant for export promotion, inbound investment promotion, tourism promotion, or enhancing R&D cooperation, for certain type of service, or depending on chargeability/non-chargeability/subsidised-chargeability for services.
- Diversity of host countries' characteristics. The importance of certain commercial diplomacy services depends heavily on the host country characteristics; e.g. networking services (high-value connections) are important in such countries as China, Turkey, or Poland, whereas they have minor value in Scandinavia, where it is relatively easy to access relevant people and initiate dialogue.

- Need for integrative approach. Commercial diplomacy operates in a broader system consisting of diplomats in foreign posts, officials in the headquarters and other ministries, public export credit agencies, export financing institutions, and regional business development centres. Commercial diplomacy metrics should optimally be integrated with the metrics of the other agencies to stimulate synergies rather than cultivating the silo effect.
- Need for complexity. Metrics focus the attention of the personnel. People do what is measured and what they are rewarded for: "What gets measured, gets done". Thus, a good measurement system should consolidate the entire scope of desired behaviours.
- Measurement should not be burdensome. The measurement process should be easy and seamless for the staff. Measurement cannot consume the resources for operational activity.
- Insightfulness. The measurement system should provide a comprehensive insight into commercial diplomacy operations. The metrics reported in an electronic system should also inform about the profile of the customer, type of service, topic of inquiry, category of expertise used, follow-up. Such knowledge helps to better plan resource allocations in the global network and to optimise its operations.

What to Measure?

Commercial diplomacy models vary significantly country-by-country, which makes copying the performance measurement system from one country to another hardly possible. However, some of the metrics can be universal (or applicable after some adaptation). The article suggests nine metrics that can be used (after some adaptations) for performance measurement in commercial diplomacy.

Number of cases served

Companies in a phase of foreign expansion need information, intelligence, advocacy, and lobbying. The number of such cases correlates with desired future outcomes – the more knowledge and efforts diplomats share with the customer, the more likely the customer’s success in the host country would be. So, the first metric to be used is the number of cases served by a diplomat.

In order to reduce the risk of creative reporting, it is advisable to provide a clear definition of what a case means for measurement purposes. Cases are not the same. There are minor cases, like checking records in a national business register; medium cases, like drafting a list of distributors of certain profile; and large cases, like drafting a market entry strategy for the customer. That is why it is advisable that the cases are standardised based on the time spent into three categories, e.g.:

- Minor cases – up to 3 working hours,
- Medium cases – up to 24 working hours,
- Large cases – up to 40 working hours.

Standardisation eliminates the risk of dividing the task into smaller cases in order to get better numeric results. The above numbers are only exemplary, as each diplomacy should consider the time caps for services for one individual company and annual time spent per one company regarding, e.g., available resources, volume of demand for its services, and commercial diplomacy strategy.

Number of business opportunities activating home country companies

A recent trend in commercial diplomacy is focusing on proactive work on spotting high-value opportunities, rather than only

responding to enquiries¹¹. Home country companies expect commercial diplomats to identify meaningful business opportunities in the host country.



Commercial diplomacy models vary significantly country-by-country, which makes copying the performance measurement system from one country to another hardly possible

However, opportunities themselves are worthless if they are not attractive for or addressed by home country companies. That is why the number of opportunities identified should be accompanied by a metric showing if an opportunity attracted meaningful interest of at least one home country company (of course, the more activated companies, the better). Meaningful interest of customers should be recognised based on objective facts, e.g., proposal submission, start of negotiations, signing letter of intent, etc. The number of activations is a comprehensive measure, as it reflects both the diplomat’s knowledge of the offering and interest of the home country business, value of the opportunity for the company, but also the effectiveness of the diplomat in communicating the opportunity to the home country companies.

A key for success of this metric is a clear definition of the terms “business opportunity” and “activation” as well as setting some quality standard for business opportunities. The basic standard for a business opportunity should require some background: actual need of an individual business, sector, or economy of the host country; objective facts confirming the

11 *A Guide to Commercial Diplomacy*, n2, p. 19.

business need; relevance for the profile of the home country offering; and financing feasibility (sound financial standing of the buyer, guarantee, grant, or loan). In order to meet the standard, a commercial diplomat should do some business opportunity verification work.



The number of introductions is a comprehensive measure, as it reflects also the ability and motivation of a diplomat to build and cultivate relationships and connect people

Because a diplomat, being a source of the opportunity, has an interest in accounting the business opportunity and activations, he or she can be self-biased. That is why it makes sense to appoint a person in the headquarters who qualifies all business opportunities and activations vis-à-vis objective criteria and set standards.

Introductions

One of the most important services of commercial diplomacy is door opening, establishing high-value connections and referrals (as an umbrella term: “introductions”). Diplomats, due to their status, well-established networks, and reputation are a good source of introductions. Again, a precise definition of an “introduction” and a quality standard set for it helps to avoid creative reporting. The number of introductions is a comprehensive measure, as it reflects also the ability and motivation of a diplomat to build and cultivate relationships and connect people.

Number of expert meetings

The key diplomatic asset is knowledge. Knowledge is usually localised beyond

the walls of the embassy’s premises (if information is available online, it means it can be accessed from the home country). If a diplomat wants to obtain knowledge, he/she should “leave the building” and interact with experts. Like in the business world, the knowledge should be recorded in a knowledge management system in order to make it available to the organisation (e.g. CRM, databases, or similar).

Meetings should be methodologically planned regarding the anticipated needs of the home country’s companies rather than be a blind “hunting for business cards” to record them in a CRM system and to get the score. To ensure that expert meetings are meaningful, the metric should require reporting the meeting in the system and showing the potential application of the knowledge gained. Again the definition: It is advisable to define precisely what is meant by “expert meeting” for measurement purposes.

Number of media hits

Presence in social media and traditional media is an important and usually free-of-charge channel for sending a message. It is also a tool for building the image of the home country, its achievements, cooperation opportunities, etc. Metrics should incentivise diplomats to be active in the media. One metric can be the number of media hits.

However, media differ by audience, content, range, and even reputation, as well as the form of media presence can be different (interview, comment, article, social media post, etc.); thus the metric should be built regarding the characteristics of the media landscape vis-à-vis diplomatic needs. The metric should motivate the diplomats to use the right channel to reach the relevant audience. Media monitoring and analytics tools can be used to measure the media presence.

Customer satisfaction rate

It is potentially easy to report a lot of cases and a lot of introductions, but they can be of poor quality. Commercial diplomacy is getting more and more customer-centric. Customer satisfaction matters. That is why it is advisable to put on top of the three above metrics an additional one – the level of customer satisfaction. Monitoring and evaluation that does take place is often based on customer satisfaction surveys¹². Depending on methodology and scale adopted, the minimum level can be set, e.g., at 75%. It is advisable that customer satisfaction measurement is based on surveying larger numbers of customers in order to statistically eliminate personal antipathy or random mistakes.

Ghost shopping (mystery shopping)

Ghost shopping (mystery shopping) is a concept taken from marketing, being a tool that helps to obtain unbiased information. This procedure is used to measure and assess the quality of actual services rendered to customers: A quality controller acts as a regular customer contacting the service provider and asking for service¹³. Based on this interaction and following a script/questionnaire, the quality controller assesses the performance and drafts a report commenting on key service quality aspects. Ghost shopping quality control can be outsourced to specialised agencies. In the case of diplomacy, ghost shopping should measure the quality of content and response time.

Time spent on a client (electronic timesheet)

One of the possible metrics is a number of hours spent per customer (specifying type of activities). Like in consulting companies, a diplomat completes an electronic timesheet at the end of each week, reporting how much time he/she spent on certain activities for each customer. Such information can be used for many purposes:

- It informs which company gets support and in what amount (which is important for fair and equal treatment of customers and helps to respond to the occasionally raised argument that commercial diplomats help only their friends and cronies¹⁴).
- It provides evidence showing how much time diplomats spent on helping companies (provided that time is spent effectively, it can be helpful for trust- and image-building of commercial diplomacy).
- Using a timesheet can also show the relation between the time spent on internal procedures and meetings and the time actually spent on serving business needs, and can give a clue for optimisations.
- A timesheet informs what services are most time-consuming in the commercial diplomacy network and in certain localisations, which can be an insight for automation or training for diplomats.
- A timesheet helps to find out what services are most popular by country,

12 J. van Barnevelt, W. Vullings, M. Rijnders-Nagle (ed.), *Benchmark Standardisation. Practices from DE, DK, FR and UK*, Report by Technopolis Group for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2014, p. 11.

13 A similar concept, named "Export Support Performance", has been proposed by Gorazd Justinek; see: G. Justinek, *Measuring Export Support Performance*, [in:] H. Ruel (ed.), *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business. A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration*, Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Bingley 2012, pp. 141-150.

14 The criticisms for abusing diplomatic power for personal benefit or for that of a diplomat's cronies has been raised in: Kostecki, Naray, n4, p. 3.

region, or globally; what companies use the commercial diplomacy's service most; and what sectors are most active (which, in turn, can prompt training needs as well).

However, deploying this measure can result in disadvantages and risks. A timesheet does not stimulate increasing effectiveness of work (as it focuses on hours instead of the result); it can annoy the personnel and result in distrust. As commercial diplomats are sometimes just public servants and generalists with no previous experience in business, the customers – comparing the number of hours spent and the output – can criticise commercial diplomacy for low effectiveness. On the other hand, it can motivate a revision of commercial diplomacy effectiveness and reforms.

Revenue or virtual revenue

In the case of diplomacies, which charge for their services, the principal metric can be the revenue from services, followed by the customer satisfaction rate. It is easy – if the service is of poor quality, the customer will not come again or will claim money refund.



It requires issuing to companies a “virtual voucher” for commercial diplomacy services.

In order to implement the system, diplomats should be attributed with individual hourly rates based on the total cost of their work

The same logic can be used also in commercial diplomacies not charging for their services. It requires issuing to companies a “virtual voucher” for commercial diplomacy services. In order to implement the system, diplomats should be attributed with individual hourly rates based on the total cost of their work

divided by the standard number of working hours in a period.

Home country companies are granted a virtual voucher (virtual money limit) that they can spend on commercial diplomacy services in the global network.

Example: A home country company is granted a virtual voucher amounting to 5,000 EUR, which can be spent on commercial diplomacy services in the global network in 2020. The hourly rate of a trade counsellor in a certain location is 200 EUR, a secretary's is 150 EUR, an attaché's is 120 EUR, and a local advisor's is 80 EUR. That means that the company can get five hours of work of a trade counsellor, 20 hours of an attaché's, and 20 hours of local staff. If the company expands to a few foreign destinations, it can use a part of the voucher amount at any post in the global network. As the company has limited resources, it executes an effective utilisation of the hourly rate.

Provided that the service will be of a quality relevant for the hourly rate, such a virtual voucher system has many advantages:

- It shows the monetary value of the service to companies;
- It shows the monetary value of working time to diplomats;
- It focuses staff attention on value-creating activities instead of internal/administrative work;
- Different hourly rates incentivise for rational delegating and optimal allocation of human resources;
- It helps to estimate the cost-value relation in commercial diplomacy.

The voucher system is associated with a risk that companies, even not prepared for foreign expansion, can request commercial diplomacy just not to lose virtual money. This challenge can be addressed by pre-

qualification of companies in the home country institutions (headquarters or regional development agencies)¹⁵. This approach would help to prepare the companies for internationalisation and ensure the provision of commercial diplomacy services only to companies ready for foreign expansion.

Commercial diplomacy is an important part of diplomacy. It is likely that in post-COVID-19 times, it will become even more important as a means contributing to faster economic recovery of countries. Performance measurement has been gaining importance in commercial diplomacy practice, as it is not only about controlling people, but also serves many positive purposes (e.g., improving operations, building trust with stakeholders, and enabling data-based advocating for higher budgets).

Even if commercial diplomacy models vary significantly country-by-country, which makes copying performance measurement systems hardly possible, some metrics can be universal. The number of cases served, the number of business opportunities activating home country companies, establishing high-value connections, the number of expert meetings, the number of media hits, customer satisfaction rate, time spent on a client, and revenue are among them.

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¹⁵ The issue of customer preparedness as a determinant of commercial diplomacy effectiveness has been raised by Huub Ruel and Lennart Zuidema in: H. Ruel, L. Zuidema, *The Effectiveness of Commercial Diplomacy. A Survey among Embassies and Consulates*, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 123, March 2012, Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", ISSN 1569-2981, pp. 10-11.

“SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY” IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: RETROSPECT AND REALITIES

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The primary purpose of the article is to demonstrate in retrospect the practical implementation of “shuttle diplomacy” in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taking into consideration the fact that “shuttle diplomacy”, whose success falls to the first half of the 1970s, exerted the biggest influence on Egypt among all the conflicting parties, the article presents historical facts that can serve to study this phenomenon. The analysis of the US-Egyptian relations in the context of “shuttle diplomacy” is based on striving to crystallise both positive and negative experiences and shows why this model of interaction is limited.

Setting the Scene

The issue of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict remains relevant to this day. The territorial problems that were exacerbated by the Six-Day War in 1967 gave rise to a series of misunderstandings and, in some cases, a hostile relationship between the conflicting parties. By the beginning of the 1970s, it had become clear that a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arabs would imply a search for new ways of interaction. The desire of Arab leaders to take revenge through the ensuing war had turned into a failure. It was that moment when the famous “shuttle diplomacy” of Henry Kissinger, the US national security adviser, was used to mitigate the long-standing conflict.

Some officials blame Kissinger for “shuttle diplomacy” by focusing on his personal sympathies and Washington’s official policy towards Israel.¹ Nevertheless, a number of factors that are presented in the article indicate his ability to keep balance skilfully in the triangle of ties among the United States, Israel, and Egypt. In this sense, the experience of Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” may be useful for today’s cases due to the current geopolitical situation in which the bipolarity of the international relations system has lost its former importance.

“Shuttle diplomacy” is defined by Cambridge Dictionary as “discussions between two or more countries, in which someone travels between the different countries, talking to the governments involved, carrying

1 122. محمد حسنين هيكل، بحريف الغضب: قصة بداية ونهاية عصر أنور السادات، دار الشرف: القاهرة 1983، ص. 122.
(M. Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Story about the Beginning and the End of Sadat’s Epoch, Dar Ash-Sharaf: Cairo 1983, p. 122).

messages, and suggesting ways of dealing with problems".²

The very idea of "shuttle diplomacy" was put forward in the late 1960s by W. Michael Reisman, a professor at Yale Law School, who tried in his work *The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives in the Middle East* to give it a certain historical and legal basis. By describing the multidimensionality of this region with its various economic systems, ideologies, faiths, and religious trends, Reisman found it impossible to elaborate a comprehensive approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which all acute issues seemed to be reduced to the US-Soviet confrontation. "Relations between Israel and Egypt, Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan and Palestinian people", Reisman wrote, "are a series of problems and each of them requires a special approach and a separate diplomatic strategy".³ Under the special approach, he meant not a radical solution for the Middle East peace settlement but partial, separate agreements on certain issues. Reisman proposed to begin with the establishment of a so-called minimum order in the Middle East, the most important component of which, in his opinion, could be "a project for the Sinai Peninsula comprehensive development" under effective external control. He strongly recommended creating an international corporation titled the Sinai Development Trust whose fund would consist of the USA, the Middle East countries, and other interested parties' contributions. Egypt, in accordance with that idea, had to transfer the Suez Canal to the trust as a concession for a period of 50 years while retaining sovereignty over its territory.

As for practical implementation of "shuttle diplomacy" in the 1970s regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, the key point was to hold separate bilateral negotiations between US officials and representatives of the conflicting parties with a view to agreeing on the most effective course of action. The idea of "shuttle diplomacy" was presented to the Arabs almost as a reorientation of the US Middle East policy. Official Tel Aviv, for its part, did not cause concern about it, having contributed in fact to the growing intransigence of the Israeli position. It was not only a matter of ways how to implement "shuttle diplomacy", but also of who carried it out. President Richard Nixon entrusted maintaining contacts with the Israeli government to National Security Adviser Kissinger, who was also well known as a skilful defender of the Rockefellers' and some other influential Jewish families' interests.

It is worthwhile to mention that political leadership shift in Egypt in October 1970 became one of the most favourable factors for conducting "shuttle diplomacy". The idea of a rapprochement with the United States based on their ability to maintain contact with both parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to exert some influence on Tel Aviv pushed President Anwar Sadat to take radical steps. On 17 July 1972, he announced the termination of the mission of 15,000 Soviet military advisers and specialists in Egypt, who had been assisting in the reorganisation of the Egyptian armed forces since 1968. The reaction of American decision-makers to this event was rather ironic. One of the most outstanding Egyptian scholars, Mohamed Heikal, quoted

2 Shuttle Diplomacy, "Cambridge Dictionary", Cambridge University Press 2019 [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/shuttle-diplomacy access: 16 July 2019].

3 W.M. Reisman, *The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives in the Middle East*, Princeton University Press: Princeton 1970, p. 20.

Kissinger: "If Sadat had informed us about such his intention earlier, we would have given him something in return. However, in politics just like in any other business, no one pays for what has already fallen into his pocket".⁴



Shuttle diplomats and mediators relied on the psycho-emotional state of President Sadat, who tried, by all means, to prove to the USA that Egypt could play a role of their Middle Eastern ally on an equal footing with Israel

Numerous contacts with the Americans, which were considerably intensified in 1972-1973 in the context of "shuttle diplomacy", demonstrated to the official Cairo that the USA had been adhering to the main six principles in the Middle East policy:

1. Elimination of the USSR from the Middle East settlement;
2. Not a comprehensive, but a partial settlement of the conflict on a bilateral basis between Israel and Egypt, Israel and Syria, Israel and Palestinians;
3. Gradual settlement of the conflict;
4. Explication to the Arabs that a return to the 1967 borders is hardly possible;
5. Emphasis mostly on the issue of refugees in the Palestinian problem; and
6. Constant coordination of the peace settlement in accordance with American interests in the Middle East.

At two secret meetings with Egyptian National Security Adviser Hafez Izmail, which took place in Paris (February and April 1973), Kissinger made it clear that "further concessions expected of Egypt must be both political and territorial; therefore the Egyptians must cede part of their sovereignty to ensure Israel's safety". He persistently imposed the psychology of the loser on the Egyptian side. Anwar Sadat cited this strategic line of Kissinger even in his autobiographical work *Soul-Searching Story of My Life*: "My advice to A. Sadat is to be a realist. We live in a pragmatic world; that is why we cannot build plans based on desires and illusions. The reality is that you, Arabs, were defeated, however, you demand and command as if you're winners. You have to make significant concessions, and then the United States will try to help you".⁵

Shuttle diplomats and mediators relied on the psycho-emotional state of President Sadat, who tried, by all means, to prove to the USA that Egypt could play a role of their Middle Eastern ally on an equal footing with Israel. Taking into account such an approach, it is clear why the Egyptian president informed pro-Western Arab leaders about preparations for a secret military operation and at the same time hid this information from Libya, which, according to Heikal, provided Egypt on the eve of the war with the most solid military and financial assistance of at least one billion US dollars.⁶

Also, it is not surprising that the US intelligence service knew about the

4 Heikal, n1, p. 124.

5 المكتوب المصري الحديث: القاهرة 1998، ص. 385 أنور السادات/البحث عن الذات: قصة حياتي ، A. Sadat, *Soul-Searching Story of My Life*, Al-Maktab al-Mysriy lil Bahs: Cairo 1998, p. 385.

6 M. Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, Ballantine Books: New York 1976, p. 197.

preparations for that operation already in May 1973 and immediately started to intensify its activities in Egypt in order to collect exclusive military information being mediated by diplomats from other US allies there. Kissinger himself admitted: "We were very satisfied with the work of our intelligence service. Due to its efforts, we knew everything that was going on in Egypt and there was not a single clue that we would not realize".⁷

The fourth Arab-Israeli war, which began on 6 October 1973 and ended 18 days later, clearly summarised the diligence of shuttle diplomacy implementation. Referring to the manoeuvres of "shuttle diplomacy", Harvard University professor Edward Sheehan admits that even during the preparation of the first agreement on the troops' separation on the Sinai Peninsula, Kissinger handed over to the Israeli government a secret memorandum of understanding. In accordance with it, the United States promised to make every effort to fully meet Israel's long-term weapons needs.⁸ Tel Aviv also demanded from Kissinger that the given memorandum veto the Palestine Liberation Organisation's participation in the Geneva Peace Conference. Later, the Israeli journalist Matti Gollan stated: "The purpose of Kissinger's manoeuvres during the troops' separation was to avoid negotiations on the border demarcation and the final settlement".⁹ Thus, the American side, having voted in the UN Security Council for Resolution 242, which provided that the Israeli troops must withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, at the same time pursued a behind-the-scenes policy

to circumvent the border issue, which was totally in Israel's interests.

The agreement of 18 January 1974 on the troops' separation, which obligated Egypt and Israel to refrain from military actions against each other, became a kind of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" triumph and, at the same time, instigated a sharp deterioration in the relations with the USSR. President Sadat took such a step without consulting the Soviet leadership notwithstanding that the UN Security Council Resolution 338 provided that negotiations on the Middle East peace settlement should be coordinated by all stakeholders under the corresponding control of the two superpowers.

The Egyptian president openly welcomed Kissinger's involvement in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict by comparing him to Albert Einstein and Winston Churchill and emphasising that his Americanism dominated over his being of Jewish origin. Sadat wrote that he totally trusted Kissinger and "it is very easy to negotiate with him because he is a very wise man who sees the problem in all its aspects".¹⁰ It was obvious that he still sought to turn Egypt into a reliable ally of the United States in the Middle East on an equal footing with Israel.

From 10 to 15 February 1975, Kissinger toured the capitals of Egypt, Syria, and Israel, and later, from 8 to 22 March in the same year, he made a series of "shuttle diplomacy" trips between Aswan, Tel Aviv, and Damascus. The talks were focused on proposals to withdraw Israeli troops from

7 H. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Little Brown & Co: Boston-Toronto 1982, p. 378.

8 E. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East*, Reader's Digest Press: New York 1976, p. 211.

9 M. Gollan, *Secret Conversations by Henry Kissinger: Step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East*, Bantam Book, Inc.: New York 1976, p. 8.

10 Sadat, n6, p. 425.

the Mitla and Gidi mountain passes, as well as from the Abu Rudeis oil fields on the Sinai Peninsula. However, as both the Egyptian and Israeli sides were quite adamant in pursuing their own line on that issue, the US State Department decided to resort to a new manoeuvre.

On 22 March 1975, Kissinger stated that the USA should suspend attempts to help the parties of the Middle East conflict to reach a further peaceful settlement because their misunderstandings on a number of key issues had proved excessive. In response, Sadat hastened to reassure the Americans of his full loyalty. The meeting with President Ford, which took place on 1-2 June 1975 in the Austrian city of Salzburg, could serve as a proof. During the meeting, Sadat expressed the view that 99 per cent of Washington's Middle East interests are provided by the Arabs, and as for the Israelis, they oppose the US policy in the region every time when their interests run counter to American ones. "However, we do not call for Israel to be thrown into the sea and for the United States to renounce special relations with it," the Egyptian leader mentioned cautiously.¹¹ The main outcome of this meeting for the Egyptian side was Washington's intention not to allow stagnation in searching for effective methods of the Middle East conflict settlement and striving to continue to put its efforts as a mediator to establish peace between Egypt and Israel. In general, the Americans expressed satisfaction with Sadat's constructive approach to the issue of peace and his willingness to accept any form and method of settlement.

On 5 June 1975, the Suez Canal was opened for navigation after an eight-year break. Such a gesture of the Egyptian president gave a new impetus to the US "shuttle diplomacy"

between Cairo and Tel Aviv with the purpose to reach the next Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai. The second Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the troops' separation on the Sinai Peninsula was signed in Geneva on 4 September 1975. In accordance with the agreement, Israeli non-military ships were allowed to pass through the Suez Canal. Israel announced the return to Egypt a part of the occupied territories, including the Abu Rudeis oil fields.

On the eve of this agreement's signing, Washington issued a document titled "Assurance of the US Government to the Arab Republic of Egypt" (1 September 1975) that imposed on the US a responsibility for ensuring Israel's fulfilment of all obligations and reaffirmed their aid policy towards the economic development of Egypt. Despite the doubts of the Congress and some warnings of his colleagues from the State Department, Kissinger insisted on providing economic aid to Egypt in order to implement further the US plans regarding Sadat's regime. First of all, he offered the Egyptians help in rebuilding the Suez Canal and clearing it of mines and wrecks in the aftermath of the fourth Arab-Israeli war. Indeed, 85 million US dollars in aid was given to Egypt after the conclusion of the second Sinai agreement on the Egyptian and Israeli troops' separation.

In the same year, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched an assistance programme to the Arab Republic of Egypt. According to the statement of the USAID mission director in Egypt Donald S. Brown, "From the very beginning the aid program to Egypt has been directed to reap the full benefits, namely infrastructure development, technical and scientific expertise, general health, education, family planning, and improved agricultural

¹¹ Ibid, p. 432.

productivity".¹² Among the first achievements of the programme were the restoration and reopening of the Suez Canal, one of the most important waterways for international business and the main centre for receiving foreign currency for the Egyptian economy. In addition, the programme provided for a significant expansion of Egypt's infrastructure in the fields of energy, telecommunications, port buildings, granaries, water supply. Thus, the second half of the 1970s marked the beginning of the strengthening of institutional and professional ties between the USA and Egypt, and it happened largely due to the skilful implementation of "shuttle diplomacy" by Henry Kissinger.

When Jimmy Carter headed the US administration in January 1977, Anwar Sadat was once again convinced that Washington would continue to play the role of a "first fiddle" in the Middle East peace settlement. On the eve of his presidency, Jimmy Carter promised to develop a more flexible and effective course of US Middle East policy. The starting point of this course was to conclude that certain measures of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" had exhausted themselves by the time. And such a conclusion was quite natural. American researchers Eric Brahm and Heidi Burgess state that high-profile official diplomats should not conduct "shuttle diplomacy", as its methods are working only in cases when the parties to the conflict are so angry and polarised that direct communication between them is hardly possible.¹³

Conclusion

The main mission of the "shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East was that it was aimed both theoretically and practically at bilateral but

not comprehensive solutions of the peace settlement. Anwar Sadat, who positioned himself as a pro-Western leader, became the ideal guide for the implementation of Henry Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" ideas for a partial solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In an attempt to take the place of the US ally on an equal footing with Israel, Sadat was ready to make impulsive decisions. The "shuttle diplomats", headed by Kissinger, first perceived the new Egyptian leader as a random and short-lived figure in the political arena; however, they soon realised that he could interact quite successfully based on his strivings to distance himself from the USSR and to draw closer to the United States.



the most significant results of "shuttle diplomacy" – the Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty – became apparent after he had left office, it is undeniable that they became a merit of the US mediation

Kissinger did his best to help Egypt and Israel to eliminate the consequences of the fourth Arab-Israeli war. And although the most significant results of "shuttle diplomacy" – the Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty – became apparent after he had left office, it is undeniable that they became a merit of the US mediation.

Nevertheless, the segmental approach in resolving the contradictions between the conflicting parties became a scourge to achieving a comprehensive peace in the region. Despite the fact that over time the

12 D. S. Brown, *Egypt and the United States: Collaborators in Economic Development*, "The Middle East Journal", 35(1), p. 7.

13 E. Brahm, H. Burgess, *Shuttle Diplomacy*, "Beyond Intractability", November 2003 [https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/shuttle_diplomacy, access 14 May 2020].

followers of Kissinger managed to bring Egypt and Jordan to a relative mutual understanding with Israel on most of the issues, the territorial problems between Israel and Syria, as well as between Israel and the Palestinians, remain unresolved to this day. Thus, “shuttle diplomacy” can be considered only an effective method in collaboration with the political regimes that are ready to interact completely following US mediation and to accept Washington’s decisions as an unconditional postulate in exchange for some concessions and financial assistance.

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